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Why	
  DNSSEC?	
  
James	
  Galvin,	
  Ph.D.	
  
Afilias	
  Limited	
  
11	
  November	
  2013	
  
ION	
  Toronto	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

1	
  
Afilias	
  and	
  DNSSEC	
  
•  Afilias	
  makes	
  Internet	
  addresses	
  
more	
  accessible	
  and	
  useful	
  
through	
  registry	
  services,	
  
Managed	
  DNS,	
  and	
  mobile	
  Web	
  
services	
  like	
  goMobi®	
  and	
  
DeviceAtlas®.	
  
–  Operator	
  INFO	
  and	
  MOBI	
  
–  Host	
  to	
  9	
  ccTLDs	
  and	
  7	
  gTLDs	
  
–  Have	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  largest	
  DNS	
  
infrastructures	
  

•  Started	
  with	
  DNSSEC	
  in	
  2008	
  

–  Signed	
  ORG	
  in	
  June	
  2009	
  
–  ORG	
  offered	
  signed	
  delegaYons	
  in	
  
June	
  2010	
  
–  Root	
  signed	
  in	
  July	
  2010	
  
–  Signed	
  all	
  TLDs	
  and	
  offered	
  signed	
  
delegaYons	
  soon	
  aZer	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

2	
  
•  DNSSEC	
  Basics	
  
•  Benefits	
  of	
  DNSSEC	
  
•  Internet	
  Future	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

3	
  
DNSSEC	
  -­‐	
  BASICS	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

4	
  
What	
  is	
  DNSSEC?	
  
•  DNSSEC	
  provides	
  an	
  asserYon	
  
by	
  a	
  zone	
  that	
  a	
  specific	
  data	
  
element	
  is	
  bound	
  to	
  a	
  domain	
  
name.	
  
•  This	
  is	
  most	
  oZen	
  used	
  to	
  bind	
  
an	
  IP	
  address	
  to	
  a	
  domain	
  
name,	
  e.g.,	
  to	
  find	
  a	
  web	
  site.	
  
•  The	
  validaYon	
  of	
  the	
  asserYon	
  
is	
  possible	
  independent	
  of	
  its	
  
source.	
  
•  Benefits	
  
–  CriYcal	
  Infrastructure:	
  
everything	
  uses	
  the	
  DNS	
  
–  Hierarchical:	
  delegate	
  and	
  
distribute	
  responsibility	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

5	
  
DNSSEC-­‐aware	
  applicaYons	
  

DNS	
  with	
  DNSSEC	
  
2	
  
1	
  

ROOT	
  SERVERS	
  

DNSSEC	
  
DNSSEC	
  

TLD	
  
Authorita;ve	
  
NS	
  

Local	
  
cache	
  
1	
  

2	
  

3	
  

DNSSEC	
  

Itera;ve	
  
Resolver	
  
Local	
  
cache	
  

3	
  

SLD	
  
Authorita;ve	
  NS	
  	
  
Stub	
  Resolver	
  

USER	
  PC	
  
©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

6	
  
Who	
  are	
  the	
  Players?	
  
•  Domain	
  registraYon	
  system	
  

–  Registries:	
  operate	
  the	
  TLDs	
  
–  (Registrars):	
  middleman	
  
between	
  registry	
  and	
  
registrant	
  
–  Registrant:	
  own,	
  manage,	
  and	
  
deploy	
  domain	
  names	
  

•  Domain	
  name	
  system	
  
–  Root	
  system	
  
–  Registries	
  
–  DNS	
  Operators	
  

•  Community	
  
–  ISPs	
  
–  Users	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

7	
  
BENEFITS	
  OF	
  DNSSEC	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

8	
  
Why	
  DNSSEC?	
  
•  DNSSEC	
  protects	
  the	
  DNS	
  system	
  
from	
  cache	
  poisoning	
  adacks,	
  viz	
  
the	
  “Kaminsky	
  Bug”	
  
•  DNSSEC	
  is	
  the	
  next	
  step	
  in	
  the	
  
evoluYon	
  of	
  the	
  Internet,	
  similar	
  
to	
  the	
  web	
  back	
  in	
  1993.	
  
•  DNS	
  is	
  a	
  criYcal	
  infrastructure	
  
system.	
  	
  Virtually	
  everything	
  
depends	
  on	
  it.	
  
•  Deploying	
  a	
  safe	
  and	
  secure	
  DNS	
  
is	
  not	
  just	
  the	
  right	
  thing	
  to	
  do,	
  it	
  
is	
  the	
  cornerstone	
  of	
  building	
  the	
  
next	
  generaYon	
  Internet,	
  a	
  safe	
  
and	
  secure	
  Internet.	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

9	
  
Without	
  DNSSEC…	
  
When	
  you	
  visit	
  a	
  web	
  site	
  
can	
  you	
  be	
  sure	
  you	
  are	
  communicaYng	
  with	
  the	
  
server	
  that	
  you	
  think	
  you	
  are?	
  	
  

	
  
	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

10	
  
TLS/SSL	
  and	
  DNSSEC	
  benefits	
  
TLS	
  

DNSSEC	
  

Data	
  

!^^x<>	
  

	
  	
  	
  TLS/SSL	
  
Channel	
  

DNS	
  Data	
  

DNS	
  Data	
  

DNSSEC	
  

DNSSEC

Data	
  

Data	
  

Signed	
  

Guaranteed	
  not	
  tampered	
  

Encryp;on	
  

Authen;ca;on	
  

Integrity	
  

DNSSEC	
  protects…	
  
Users	
  from	
  DNS	
  data	
  tampered	
  by	
  
	
  
or	
  originaYng	
  from	
  malicious	
  actors	
  
	
  
©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

11	
  
INTERNET	
  FUTURE	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

12	
  
Building	
  Trusted	
  Domains	
  
•  A	
  domain	
  name	
  is	
  just	
  a	
  label.	
  	
  
Most	
  commonly	
  used	
  to	
  idenYfy	
  
hosts	
  and	
  services.	
  
–  Web	
  sites	
  
–  ApplicaYon	
  servers	
  

•  DNSSEC	
  ensures	
  we	
  have	
  the	
  
correct	
  service/address	
  
•  TLS/SSL	
  (hdps)	
  gives	
  us	
  good	
  
confidence	
  that	
  we	
  have	
  a	
  
encrypted	
  tunnel	
  
•  Matching	
  the	
  domain	
  in	
  the	
  TLS/
SSL	
  cerYficate	
  with	
  the	
  domain	
  
from	
  DNSSEC	
  offers	
  greater	
  
assurance	
  that	
  you	
  are	
  
communicaYng	
  with	
  the	
  desired	
  
site/service	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

13	
  
DNSSEC	
  Challenges	
  
•  Security	
  increases	
  the	
  
baseline	
  experYse	
  required	
  
•  Key	
  management	
  becomes	
  
mainstream	
  
–  Key	
  rollover	
  Ymings	
  are	
  
subtle	
  

•  DNS	
  operators	
  are	
  visibly	
  
essenYal	
  
–  Transfers	
  are	
  a	
  process	
  

•  Key	
  rollover	
  is	
  required	
  
•  Losing	
  and	
  gaining	
  operator	
  
must	
  overlap	
  services	
  

•  New	
  relaYonship	
  

–  DNS	
  Operator	
  and	
  registrar/
registry	
  
©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

14	
  
The	
  demand	
  for	
  DNSSEC?	
  
•  A	
  mix	
  of	
  pioneers,	
  early	
  
adopters	
  and	
  legislated	
  
compliance	
  
•  In	
  the	
  early	
  stages	
  for	
  
registrant/user	
  
awareness	
  

Barriers	
  

Incen;ves	
  

Complexity	
  

Signing	
  TLDs	
  

Costs	
  

New	
  hw	
  &	
  
sw	
  soluYons	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

15	
  
What’s	
  Next?	
  
•  Centralize	
  the	
  complexity	
  

–  Registrars	
  
–  DNS	
  operators	
  
–  ApplicaYon	
  service	
  providers	
  

•  Keep	
  it	
  simple	
  for	
  the	
  
registrant/user	
  
–  Should	
  be	
  invisible	
  

•  DNSSEC	
  is	
  about	
  what	
  we	
  can	
  
do	
  with	
  it.	
  	
  It	
  is	
  an	
  essenYal	
  
building	
  block	
  in	
  a	
  criYcal	
  
infrastructure	
  system	
  that	
  will	
  
change	
  the	
  Internet	
  in	
  ways	
  
we	
  can	
  not	
  yet	
  imagine.	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

16	
  
IETF	
  and	
  Pervasive	
  Monitoring	
  
•  Last	
  week	
  leading	
  
engineers	
  agreed	
  that	
  
pervasive	
  monitoring	
  is	
  
a	
  threat	
  to	
  the	
  Internet	
  
–  hdp://www.iet.org/
media/2013-­‐11-­‐07-­‐
internet-­‐privacy-­‐and-­‐
security.html	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

17	
  
Thank	
  You!	
  

James	
  Galvin	
  
jgalvin	
  	
  “at”	
  	
  afilias.info	
  
+1-­‐215-­‐706-­‐5715	
  
	
  
hdp://afilias.info/dnssec	
  

©	
  2013	
  Afilias	
  Limited	
  

18	
  

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ION Toronto - Why Implement DNSSEC?

  • 1. Why  DNSSEC?   James  Galvin,  Ph.D.   Afilias  Limited   11  November  2013   ION  Toronto   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   1  
  • 2. Afilias  and  DNSSEC   •  Afilias  makes  Internet  addresses   more  accessible  and  useful   through  registry  services,   Managed  DNS,  and  mobile  Web   services  like  goMobi®  and   DeviceAtlas®.   –  Operator  INFO  and  MOBI   –  Host  to  9  ccTLDs  and  7  gTLDs   –  Have  one  of  the  largest  DNS   infrastructures   •  Started  with  DNSSEC  in  2008   –  Signed  ORG  in  June  2009   –  ORG  offered  signed  delegaYons  in   June  2010   –  Root  signed  in  July  2010   –  Signed  all  TLDs  and  offered  signed   delegaYons  soon  aZer   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   2  
  • 3. •  DNSSEC  Basics   •  Benefits  of  DNSSEC   •  Internet  Future   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   3  
  • 4. DNSSEC  -­‐  BASICS   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   4  
  • 5. What  is  DNSSEC?   •  DNSSEC  provides  an  asserYon   by  a  zone  that  a  specific  data   element  is  bound  to  a  domain   name.   •  This  is  most  oZen  used  to  bind   an  IP  address  to  a  domain   name,  e.g.,  to  find  a  web  site.   •  The  validaYon  of  the  asserYon   is  possible  independent  of  its   source.   •  Benefits   –  CriYcal  Infrastructure:   everything  uses  the  DNS   –  Hierarchical:  delegate  and   distribute  responsibility   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   5  
  • 6. DNSSEC-­‐aware  applicaYons   DNS  with  DNSSEC   2   1   ROOT  SERVERS   DNSSEC   DNSSEC   TLD   Authorita;ve   NS   Local   cache   1   2   3   DNSSEC   Itera;ve   Resolver   Local   cache   3   SLD   Authorita;ve  NS     Stub  Resolver   USER  PC   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   6  
  • 7. Who  are  the  Players?   •  Domain  registraYon  system   –  Registries:  operate  the  TLDs   –  (Registrars):  middleman   between  registry  and   registrant   –  Registrant:  own,  manage,  and   deploy  domain  names   •  Domain  name  system   –  Root  system   –  Registries   –  DNS  Operators   •  Community   –  ISPs   –  Users   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   7  
  • 8. BENEFITS  OF  DNSSEC   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   8  
  • 9. Why  DNSSEC?   •  DNSSEC  protects  the  DNS  system   from  cache  poisoning  adacks,  viz   the  “Kaminsky  Bug”   •  DNSSEC  is  the  next  step  in  the   evoluYon  of  the  Internet,  similar   to  the  web  back  in  1993.   •  DNS  is  a  criYcal  infrastructure   system.    Virtually  everything   depends  on  it.   •  Deploying  a  safe  and  secure  DNS   is  not  just  the  right  thing  to  do,  it   is  the  cornerstone  of  building  the   next  generaYon  Internet,  a  safe   and  secure  Internet.   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   9  
  • 10. Without  DNSSEC…   When  you  visit  a  web  site   can  you  be  sure  you  are  communicaYng  with  the   server  that  you  think  you  are?         ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   10  
  • 11. TLS/SSL  and  DNSSEC  benefits   TLS   DNSSEC   Data   !^^x<>        TLS/SSL   Channel   DNS  Data   DNS  Data   DNSSEC   DNSSEC Data   Data   Signed   Guaranteed  not  tampered   Encryp;on   Authen;ca;on   Integrity   DNSSEC  protects…   Users  from  DNS  data  tampered  by     or  originaYng  from  malicious  actors     ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   11  
  • 12. INTERNET  FUTURE   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   12  
  • 13. Building  Trusted  Domains   •  A  domain  name  is  just  a  label.     Most  commonly  used  to  idenYfy   hosts  and  services.   –  Web  sites   –  ApplicaYon  servers   •  DNSSEC  ensures  we  have  the   correct  service/address   •  TLS/SSL  (hdps)  gives  us  good   confidence  that  we  have  a   encrypted  tunnel   •  Matching  the  domain  in  the  TLS/ SSL  cerYficate  with  the  domain   from  DNSSEC  offers  greater   assurance  that  you  are   communicaYng  with  the  desired   site/service   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   13  
  • 14. DNSSEC  Challenges   •  Security  increases  the   baseline  experYse  required   •  Key  management  becomes   mainstream   –  Key  rollover  Ymings  are   subtle   •  DNS  operators  are  visibly   essenYal   –  Transfers  are  a  process   •  Key  rollover  is  required   •  Losing  and  gaining  operator   must  overlap  services   •  New  relaYonship   –  DNS  Operator  and  registrar/ registry   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   14  
  • 15. The  demand  for  DNSSEC?   •  A  mix  of  pioneers,  early   adopters  and  legislated   compliance   •  In  the  early  stages  for   registrant/user   awareness   Barriers   Incen;ves   Complexity   Signing  TLDs   Costs   New  hw  &   sw  soluYons   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   15  
  • 16. What’s  Next?   •  Centralize  the  complexity   –  Registrars   –  DNS  operators   –  ApplicaYon  service  providers   •  Keep  it  simple  for  the   registrant/user   –  Should  be  invisible   •  DNSSEC  is  about  what  we  can   do  with  it.    It  is  an  essenYal   building  block  in  a  criYcal   infrastructure  system  that  will   change  the  Internet  in  ways   we  can  not  yet  imagine.   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   16  
  • 17. IETF  and  Pervasive  Monitoring   •  Last  week  leading   engineers  agreed  that   pervasive  monitoring  is   a  threat  to  the  Internet   –  hdp://www.iet.org/ media/2013-­‐11-­‐07-­‐ internet-­‐privacy-­‐and-­‐ security.html   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   17  
  • 18. Thank  You!   James  Galvin   jgalvin    “at”    afilias.info   +1-­‐215-­‐706-­‐5715     hdp://afilias.info/dnssec   ©  2013  Afilias  Limited   18