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Pole Vaulting over
Agile Security Pits
Daniel Liber
~whoami
• Current: Security Leader @ CyberArk
– Product security
– Strategy and process driven
– A pain in the insecurity’s a$$
• Past @ multiple places
– Consulting, Research, PT
~whereami
• CyberArk
– Privileged account security
– Look us up (we’re hiring )
www.cyberark.com/
~quote
“Sometimes you just have to jump off the
cliff without knowing where you will land”
~agenda
• Agile, a reminder
• SDLC and Agile
• Collaboration with R&D for security
• Crunching numbers – Why is this issue so
important?
So… Agile?
Individuals and interactions over
processes and tools
Working software over
comprehensive documentation
Customer collaboration over
contract negotiation
Responding to change over
following a plan
So… Agile?
Sprint
Backlog
SprintProduct
Backlog
Deliverables
Scrum:
So… Agile?
Kanban:
Security Frameworks & Dev
Reflecting on Agile:
“Deliver working software frequently,
from a couple of weeks to a couple of
months, with a preference to the
shorter timescale.”
Security Frameworks & Dev
• Vendor SDLC programs
– Microsoft
– SAP
– Cisco
– Etc..
• Maturity Models
– OWASP SAMM
– BSIMM
• NIST
<Compatibility issues>
Security Frameworks & Dev
Bryan Sullivan (Microsoft) @ BlackHat 2010
Security Frameworks & Dev
(Microsoft SDL for Agile)
Security Frameworks & Dev
Security Frameworks & Dev
Reflecting on Agile:
“Welcome changing requirements,
even late in development.”
 Threat modeling not only for new
features, but also for CHANGED
features
Security Frameworks & Dev
Threat Modeling
• Approach:
– Attack / software / asset centric
• Mapping
– Assets / Actors / Entry points
• Flow
– Data / Process / Logic
Not as lightweight as expected from a sprint task
Security Frameworks & Dev
Coordinating with Product Owner
Emperor of the backlog
•Product’s roadmap
•‘Sensitive’ features attention
•Setting security sprints (bucket
security tasks)
•Cut-off for most important threats
Security Collaborations
Reflecting on Agile:
“The most efficient and effective
method of conveying information to
and within a development team is
face-to-face conversation.”
Security Collaboration
Security Collaborations
Pop Quiz
• Sprint of 2 weeks
• Overlooking 4 teams
• Participating in every daily (15
minutes long)
10 days X 4 teams X 15 min.
= 10 hours ~ 1 day = 10% of your time
Security Frameworks & Dev
Security Champions
Team’s “security bouncer”
• Why?
– Probably knows the product better
– Reports back on security aspects
• Who?
– Curious, security friendly
• Growth potential – join the dark side
Security Collaborations
Reflecting on Agile:
“The best architectures, requirements,
and designs emerge from self-
organizing teams.”
 Teams contain different positions,
responsibilities, practices and quite
versatile
Security Collaborations
The Team
Team Leader Developer / Architect QA
System Analyst
 The Security Guy
Security Collaborations
Customized Training
• Stop using ‘one session fits all’
• Create tracks per position
• Use examples from your products
• Track, certify, re-certify
Flexibility in carrying out security tasks
Security Collaborations
Training Name Developer Architects Functional
Analyst
Security
Team
QA Team
Leaders
PM
Basic Security
Training
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (no
test)
Optional
Security
Analysis
Optional Optional Yes Yes Opt. Opt. Optional
Secure Design Optional Yes Optional Yes Opt. Opt. Optional
Secure
Development
Yes Yes Optional Yes Opt. Yes (no
test)
Optional
Security
Testing
Optional Optional Optional Yes Yes Opt. Optional
Adv. Security
Testing
Optional Optional Optional Yes Opt. Opt. Optional
Risk
Management
Optional Optional Optional Yes Opt. Yes (no
test)
Yes (no
test)
Crunching Numbers
• Requirements
• Design
• Coding
• Testing
Development
• Distributing
• Deploying
• Feedback / IR
Release
• Researching
• Exploiting
• Pivoting
Abuse
Track of insecure software:
Crunching Numbers
“We will fix it post release!”
Jeremiah Grossman
WhiteHat Security
AppSec Israel 2015
Crunching Numbers
“Ok. BUT – if our software causes a breach, the
customer will surely detect it.”
Global Advanced
Threat Landscape
Survey
CyberArk 2015
Crunching Numbers
“I’m sure that there are other factors for a breach than
bad practices of development and deployment”
Global Advanced
Threat Landscape
Survey
CyberArk 2015
Crunching Numbers
“It doesn’t matter as a lot of companies secure their
networks anyways against breaches”
Analyzing Real-World
Exposure to Windows
Credential Theft
Attacks
CyberArk Labs 2015
Crunching Numbers
(Size does not matter, in this case.)
Analyzing Real-World
Exposure to Windows
Credential Theft
Attacks
CyberArk Labs 2015
Conclusions
• Agile is a modern methodology for software
development which is commonly used
– In theory – security could be integrated
– In practice – there are some glitches
• Don’t be afraid to adjust (use the in this ppt)
• There is a long chain of product security
– SDLC is first in line
– You really don’t want to experience security incident
down the chain
Questions?
Thank you!
Daniel Liber
Daniel.Liber@CyberArk.com
https://il.linkedin.com/in/liberdaniel
CyberArk
http://www.cyberark.com/

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BSides Vienna 2015

  • 1. Pole Vaulting over Agile Security Pits Daniel Liber
  • 2. ~whoami • Current: Security Leader @ CyberArk – Product security – Strategy and process driven – A pain in the insecurity’s a$$ • Past @ multiple places – Consulting, Research, PT
  • 3. ~whereami • CyberArk – Privileged account security – Look us up (we’re hiring ) www.cyberark.com/
  • 4. ~quote “Sometimes you just have to jump off the cliff without knowing where you will land”
  • 5. ~agenda • Agile, a reminder • SDLC and Agile • Collaboration with R&D for security • Crunching numbers – Why is this issue so important?
  • 6. So… Agile? Individuals and interactions over processes and tools Working software over comprehensive documentation Customer collaboration over contract negotiation Responding to change over following a plan
  • 9. Security Frameworks & Dev Reflecting on Agile: “Deliver working software frequently, from a couple of weeks to a couple of months, with a preference to the shorter timescale.”
  • 10. Security Frameworks & Dev • Vendor SDLC programs – Microsoft – SAP – Cisco – Etc.. • Maturity Models – OWASP SAMM – BSIMM • NIST <Compatibility issues>
  • 11. Security Frameworks & Dev Bryan Sullivan (Microsoft) @ BlackHat 2010
  • 12. Security Frameworks & Dev (Microsoft SDL for Agile)
  • 14. Security Frameworks & Dev Reflecting on Agile: “Welcome changing requirements, even late in development.”  Threat modeling not only for new features, but also for CHANGED features
  • 15. Security Frameworks & Dev Threat Modeling • Approach: – Attack / software / asset centric • Mapping – Assets / Actors / Entry points • Flow – Data / Process / Logic Not as lightweight as expected from a sprint task
  • 16. Security Frameworks & Dev Coordinating with Product Owner Emperor of the backlog •Product’s roadmap •‘Sensitive’ features attention •Setting security sprints (bucket security tasks) •Cut-off for most important threats
  • 17. Security Collaborations Reflecting on Agile: “The most efficient and effective method of conveying information to and within a development team is face-to-face conversation.”
  • 19. Security Collaborations Pop Quiz • Sprint of 2 weeks • Overlooking 4 teams • Participating in every daily (15 minutes long) 10 days X 4 teams X 15 min. = 10 hours ~ 1 day = 10% of your time
  • 20. Security Frameworks & Dev Security Champions Team’s “security bouncer” • Why? – Probably knows the product better – Reports back on security aspects • Who? – Curious, security friendly • Growth potential – join the dark side
  • 21. Security Collaborations Reflecting on Agile: “The best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from self- organizing teams.”  Teams contain different positions, responsibilities, practices and quite versatile
  • 22. Security Collaborations The Team Team Leader Developer / Architect QA System Analyst  The Security Guy
  • 23. Security Collaborations Customized Training • Stop using ‘one session fits all’ • Create tracks per position • Use examples from your products • Track, certify, re-certify Flexibility in carrying out security tasks
  • 24. Security Collaborations Training Name Developer Architects Functional Analyst Security Team QA Team Leaders PM Basic Security Training Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (no test) Optional Security Analysis Optional Optional Yes Yes Opt. Opt. Optional Secure Design Optional Yes Optional Yes Opt. Opt. Optional Secure Development Yes Yes Optional Yes Opt. Yes (no test) Optional Security Testing Optional Optional Optional Yes Yes Opt. Optional Adv. Security Testing Optional Optional Optional Yes Opt. Opt. Optional Risk Management Optional Optional Optional Yes Opt. Yes (no test) Yes (no test)
  • 25. Crunching Numbers • Requirements • Design • Coding • Testing Development • Distributing • Deploying • Feedback / IR Release • Researching • Exploiting • Pivoting Abuse Track of insecure software:
  • 26. Crunching Numbers “We will fix it post release!” Jeremiah Grossman WhiteHat Security AppSec Israel 2015
  • 27. Crunching Numbers “Ok. BUT – if our software causes a breach, the customer will surely detect it.” Global Advanced Threat Landscape Survey CyberArk 2015
  • 28. Crunching Numbers “I’m sure that there are other factors for a breach than bad practices of development and deployment” Global Advanced Threat Landscape Survey CyberArk 2015
  • 29. Crunching Numbers “It doesn’t matter as a lot of companies secure their networks anyways against breaches” Analyzing Real-World Exposure to Windows Credential Theft Attacks CyberArk Labs 2015
  • 30. Crunching Numbers (Size does not matter, in this case.) Analyzing Real-World Exposure to Windows Credential Theft Attacks CyberArk Labs 2015
  • 31. Conclusions • Agile is a modern methodology for software development which is commonly used – In theory – security could be integrated – In practice – there are some glitches • Don’t be afraid to adjust (use the in this ppt) • There is a long chain of product security – SDLC is first in line – You really don’t want to experience security incident down the chain