CMIS Report 2011

Civil‑Military
Interaction Seminar

Civil‑Military Effectiveness:
building tomorrow’s capabilities
Summary Report

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> w w w.acmc.gov.au

Contents
Executive Summary 3

1 Introduction 6

2 Current trends, future needs: determining tomorrow’s
civil‑military requirements 7
2.1 The economic needs of transition 7
2.2 Conditions of flux in humanitarianism 8
2.3 More natural disasters, in more complex environments 9
2.4 Emerging concerns 10

3 Local-level processes: ownership in practice 11
3.1 Analysis 11
3.2 Capability 14
3.3 Emerging difficulties and dilemmas 15

4 New and non-traditional players 16
4.1 Analysis 16
4.2 Capability 19

5 importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness
The 21
5.1 Analysis 21
5.2 Capability 24

6 Prevention and preparedness for conflicts and disasters 27
6.1 Analysis 27
6.2 Capability 31

7 Civil–military guidelines: from concept to practice 33
7.1 Analysis 33

8 way ahead: an agenda for civil‑military effectiveness
The 35
8.1 The top three priorities 35

References 36

Further reading 40

Relevant links 42

2 ACMC Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar (CMIS)

Executive Summary
Decades of peace operations, stabilisation efforts and disaster relief have resulted
in widespread agreement about the civil‑military imperative in international
responses to natural disasters, armed conflict and complex emergencies: to be
effective, traditionally unconnected participants must now more often work in
coordinated partnerships.
Progress is being made to develop comprehensive, integrated approaches at both
the national (‘whole-of-government’) and the international (‘whole-of-system’)
levels. But there are still questions remaining such as: what next for civil‑military
effectiveness? What are the primary civil‑military capabilities? What capabilities
will be required in future conflicts and disasters? Where should policy makers,
force developers, planners, practitioners and analysts focus their attention in the
years to come?
To examine these questions and advance this important discussion, the Australian
Civil‑Military Centre hosted the third annual Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar
at Walsh Bay, Sydney from 7 to 10 November 2011.1 Framed by the theme
‘Civil‑Military Effectiveness: building tomorrow’s capabilities’, the aim of the
seminar was to highlight current trends in civil‑military practice and discuss
future needs in seeking to avert, mitigate and respond to conflicts and disasters.
The seminar began with an examination of current global trends. Prominent among
those trends were: the fragile reality faced by war-torn states transitioning toward
peace and development and their need for an integrated economic reconstruction
effort; the fluidity and uncertainty that characterise the current conflict,
stabilisation and international humanitarian arena, reflected by such dynamics as
the ‘securitisation’ of aid and proliferation of non-traditional humanitarian actors;
and the increase in natural disasters in more complex environments, notably
urban and conflict-affected environments.
The seminar focused on five broad themes:
local-level processes—ownership in practice
‘new’ and non-traditional players
the importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness
prevention of and preparedness for conflicts and disasters
civil‑military guidelines—from concept to practice.
In the rush of foreign assistance that follows a crisis, there has been a tendency
to ‘crowd out’ local ownership, and to overwhelm and weaken local communities.
There is increasing attention to the question of local ownership and a growing
consensus that sustainable peacebuilding is impossible without local ownership,
although difficulties remain. The locally led peace processes in Bougainville and
Solomon Islands represent rare but important experiences and potential models
for future operations both within the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Seminar

summary reports from the first and second annual Civil‑Military Interaction Seminars are
1
The
available at http://civmilcoe.gov.au/tag/centre-publications


participants considered the question ‘What innovations are needed to ensure
that local priorities and preferences are directing international civil‑military
responses?’ They looked at enhancing the host government role, developing
mechanisms for liaison and consultation with local communities, including
institutionalised engagement, and improving local knowledge among international
personnel. Various emerging difficulties were addressed with measures suggested
including: preparing host countries for the onslaught of foreign aid during crises,
and avoiding aid dependencies and the emergence of local ‘power blocs’ sustained
by aid regimes.
Natural disasters, conflicts and complex emergencies are drawing a proliferation
of new and non-traditional players with new constituencies and new agendas.
They include private military and security companies, organised crime networks,
new and emerging non-Western donors—especially emerging economies, new
and emerging NGOs such as religious or faith-based organisations, and ‘digital
humanitarians’—also known as volunteer technical communities. Participants
considered the question ‘What practical innovations can help to address criminal
activity—including criminal violence—in conflict and disaster settings?’ They
focused on improving understanding of the incentives and disincentives for
criminal activity, paying more attention to developing alternatives to criminal
activity, and using and supporting culturally appropriate responses to criminal
activity, notably community policing. Participants remained aware that there
is currently limited understanding of organised crime in conflict-affected
environments, and acknowledged the dilemma that some criminal networks also
provide critical social services in their communities.
Information is an essential civil-military capability. Yet natural disasters, conflicts
and complex emergencies are often characterised by a dearth of it. There are a
multitude of calls for more, and better, more nuanced, information. Increasingly,
this information is being collected through non-traditional means—notably
social media—outside of official systems and often relies on local and volunteer
communities. Participants considered the questions ‘What information do policy
makers and practitioners wish for?’ and ‘What innovations might help to access
it?’ They considered the importance of timely, accurate and verified information,
information to facilitate preparedness, the utility of longitudinal data, the benefits
of using local data collectors and analysts, creative thinking about information
gathering and collection, and being open to non-traditional sources of information.
The concerns remaining were the unknowns about the new and evolving field of
social media, the digital divide, the lack of clarity about the relationship between
military actors, open-source information, ‘digital humanitarians’, and dealing with
too much information.
Conflict prevention and civil-military disaster preparedness are two
fundamental civil‑military capabilities that are gradually being strengthened at the
national, regional and global levels, but challenges remain. Conflict prevention is
difficult to sell. Both it and disaster preparedness also are difficult to implement.
Participants considered the question ‘What are the most promising opportunities
for more effective conflict prevention and disaster preparedness?’ On prevention,
they focused on local mechanisms, regional arrangements, improving early
warning systems, and advocating for the benefits of prevention. Their innovations
for preparedness included local monitoring mechanisms, national and regional


disaster risk reduction plans, raising awareness about national and regional
models and best practice and existing national capacities and capabilities, and
regional preparedness exercises. Various emerging difficulties and dilemmas were
also considered including: the sources of electoral violence and the capacity and
capability gaps between local civilian authorities and national and foreign military
forces in a disaster situation.
Civil-military guidelines are widely considered to be a basic method for
dealing with the complexity of civil‑military interaction. The large assortment of
civil‑military guidelines currently in circulation and use in the civil‑military arena
reflects this thinking. However, guidelines alone are insufficient for building,
supporting and improving civil-military interoperability; seminar participants were
adamant that opportunities for interaction and relationship building—including
simple everyday forms such as sporting and social events—are also crucial,
especially before crises occur.
Three clear priorities emerged from the Seminar, which comprise the basis for a
future civil-military agenda. First, there was broad consensus that civil-military
actors need to build better civil-military understanding so that they can ‘hit the
ground running’ when a crisis occurs. Second, the civil-military community needs
to improve its knowledge building and information sharing methods and networks.
Third, the civil-military community needs to institutionalise local ownership in all
of its international activities.
During the seminar one speaker asked, ‘Is this as good as it is going to get or can
we do better?’ The clear response from all seminar participants was that we can
do better.


1 Introduction
The 2011 Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar brought together 125 experts from
21 different countries, among them Afghanistan, Belize, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan and
the United States. Those who attended represented a diverse range of organisations,
such as the African Union, the African Standby Force, the Australian Government, the
United Nations, universities, and non-government organisations such as Oxfam, World
Vision and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The three-day seminar focused on five broad themes:
local-level processes—ownership in practice
‘new’ and non-traditional players
the importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness
prevention of and preparedness for conflicts and disasters
civil‑military guidelines—from concept to practice.
It began with a discussion of current trends and future needs—determining
tomorrow’s civil‑military requirements. Specific questions were used to facilitate
examination of each theme. There were panel discussions, a debate on the private
sector in conflict zones, small group discussions facilitated by iMeet, a collaborative
technology session, and various networking events such as the seminar dinner.
The objectives of the 2011 seminar were to identify major capabilities for promoting
future civil‑military effectiveness, to highlight opportunities for overcoming capability
constraints, and to advance practical, innovative methods of improving civil‑military
practice. The concept of capabilities was considered in broad terms, encompassing
areas of knowledge; tools, technologies and practical initiatives; the civil‑military
community itself; principles, guidelines and doctrine; resources; and time.
This report2 draws on speakers’ presentations, submissions from the small group
discussions (collected through iMeet), the notes of the seminar rapporteur and other
Australian Civil‑Military Centre staff, as well as academic articles and analyses.3
A number of chapters begin with ‘word clouds’, which were based on the group
discussions on some of the seminar themes. These ‘clouds’ give greater prominence
to words that appear more frequently in the discussion, thus potentially highlighting
those words’ greater importance in the framework of civil‑military interaction. Text
inserts also are used throughout the report to highlight comments made by speakers
and participants during the seminar, as well as information and analyses drawn from
external sources. Attribution is made in the footnotes, where it is a published article
or document; attribution by name with no footnote means that the person cited
made the statement at the seminar. Non-attributed quotes come from the plenary
discussion or submissions made through iMeet: some are paraphrased; some are
directly cited.

2
This report was compiled by Sarah Shteir, Research Project Officer, Australian Civil-Military Centre.
views expressed in the report are not necessarily representative of Australian government policy.
3
The


2 Current trends, future needs: determining
tomorrow’s civil‑military requirements
Decades of peace operations, stabilisation efforts and disaster relief have resulted
in widespread agreement about the civil‑military imperative in international
responses to natural disasters, armed conflict and complex emergencies: to be
effective, traditionally unconnected participants must now more often work in
coordinated partnerships. Building on this widespread agreement, civil‑military
engagement has evolved into an important area of focus globally, for policy
makers and practitioners alike. Conferences, seminars, training sessions and
exercises are held, and guidelines, standard operating procedures, reports and
lessons learnt analyses are produced, all aimed at building, supporting and
improving civil‑military interoperability.
Today, the question is no longer whether to promote civil‑military interaction but
how to do that. Asking how moves the spotlight from considering the need for, and
challenges of, civil‑military interaction to a discussion of the primary civil‑military The ‘Ten Commandments’ of
capabilities that are and will be required. Where should policy makers, force the economics of peace
developers, planners, practitioners and analysts concentrate their attention in the 1. It is better to ‘let them do it rather
than do it better for them’.
coming years? Considering current global trends is perhaps the first step in finding
2. Ensure integration rather than
answers to this question. The trends outlined here highlight strategic factors that merely coordination.
will shape civil‑military engagement and practice in the years to come and the
3. Design strategy according to
capabilities required to support this engagement. resources and capabilities in the
host country.
2.1 The economic needs of transition
4. Channel aid through the central
The experiences of war-torn states moving towards peace and development government budget or local
authorities.
demonstrate the need for greater attention to be given to the economic
dimensions of the civil‑military space. For countries moving away from chaos— 5. Ensure that aid moves rapidly from
short-term humanitarian action to
be it Afghanistan, South Sudan or Libya—fragility is the reality. Before attaining reconstruction activity.
a normal development path, they must transition from the ‘economics of war’ to 6. Establish well-planned and
economic reconstruction, or what Dr Graciana del Castillo calls the ‘economics synchronised programs for DDR
of peace’. In Dr del Castillo’s view, the ‘challenge of this phase is to reactivate the (disarmament, demobilisation and
re‑integration).
economy while simultaneously consolidating peace’.4
7. Establish different programs for
The concept of the economics of peace is based on the realisation that a higher level commanders.
development-as-usual approach to countries emerging from conflict does not 8. Increase support for NGOs with
work. It requires an effort that is motivated by the primacy of peace (politics), not successful records.
development, and that humanitarian aid be phased out as soon as possible in 9. Establish economic reconstruction
order to avoid aid dependencies and economic distortions in the local economy, zones to ‘jump start’ economic
activity.
both of which can retard and harm a country’s reconstruction effort. This must
10. Ensure that the political or peace
take place as part of a complex multilateral and multidimensional effort. In other objective prevails at all times.
words, what is needed is an integrated economic reconstruction effort in which (see note 4)
‘security, political, social and economic issues are addressed together, rather than

del Castillo, ‘The economics of peace: Five rules for effective reconstruction’, United States
4
G
Institute of Peace Special Report 286, September 2011, p.1. The ‘Ten Commandments’ are
drawn from del Castillo’s seminar presentation and del Castillo, ‘The Economics of Peace in
Afghanistan’, Project Syndicate, 13 September 2011, http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/the-economics-of-peace-in-afghanistan


separately’5, so that, as del Castillo explains, ‘inclusive and sustainable growth
is created and the population at large can have a stake in the peace process.
Extending humanitarian aid often creates attractive job opportunities for new
graduates from universities in donor countries, rather than jobs for the local
population. It is imperative that war-torn countries reactivate investment and local
jobs as soon as possible so that they can stand on their own feet and avoid aid
dependency’. In other words, so that new graduates from new schools have jobs
into which to go.

2.2 Conditions of flux in humanitarianism
The humanitarian business has evolved into a multi–billion dollar industry
represented by increasingly structured and institutionalised organisations. It has
never been better equipped and better resourced, but is it better at saving
“What does it mean
lives? This question is encouraged by current dynamics in the humanitarian when the face of US
space—such as the ‘securitisation’ of aid and the proliferation of non-traditional humanitarian aid is
humanitarian participants. These dynamics reflect the fluidity and uncertainty that now a soldier’s?”
currently characterise the international humanitarian arena.
Dr Elizabeth Ferris (see note 6)
As Dr Randolph Kent noted, today the boundaries between humanitarian and
military actors and agendas are more uncertain than ever before. This is a direct
consequence of the securitisation of aid, which is an increasingly unavoidable
Trends in violence against
reality in conflict-affected environments such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and
aid workers
Sri Lanka. In these environments humanitarian assistance has become a central
tool in the military and political efforts of the US and other governments, and 2009
military actors (in particular the US military) have become ‘major stakeholder[s] Two hundred and seventy-eight
in the humanitarian system’.6 As a result of this securitisation, the boundaries humanitarians were victims of 139
serious security incidents.
between humanitarian action and ‘a Northern security and political agenda’
have become less discernible.7 Although some humanitarian actors are able to 2008
maintain their independence, Antonio Donini says ‘even those who try to distance Two hundred and sixty aid workers were
themselves from politics or alignment with Western foreign policy objectives are killed, kidnapped or seriously injured.
part of a web of contacts, contexts and values that are essentially of the North’.8 1999
This blurring of boundaries is reflected in trends in attacks against aid workers.9 Sixty-five humanitarians were involved
Researchers with the Humanitarian Policy Group note, ‘… aid organisations in 34 incidents (see note 9).
are being attacked not just because they are perceived to be cooperating with

5
del Castillo, ‘The economics of peace’, p. 2.
Ferris, ‘9/11 and Humanitarian Assistance: A Disturbing Legacy’, Brookings UP
6
E
FRONT (Blog), 1 September 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/
posts/2011/09/01‑sept11-ferris
Donini et al., ‘Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Final Report—The state of the humanitarian
7
A
enterprise’, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Somerville MA, March 2008, p. 3.
Donini, ‘Local perceptions of assistance to Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping,
8
A
vol. 14, no. 1, p. 159.

9
Data in text insert from A Stoddard et al., ‘Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009
update—trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response’, Humanitarian
Policy Group, Policy Brief 34, Overseas Development Institute, London, April 2009, p.1;
Humanitarian Outcomes Aid Worker Security Database, ‘World Humanitarian Day—
security trends’, 19 August 2010, p.1.


Western political actors, but because they are perceived as wholly a part of the
Western agenda’.10
The humanitarian arena is becoming increasingly diverse. Recent natural disasters
and continuing armed conflicts and complex emergencies have been characterised
by a proliferation of non-traditional humanitarian actors (see Chapter 4). Many of them
represent new constituencies, new agendas and new approaches to humanitarianism,
and their participation can be expected to add layers of complexity to already
complicated civil‑military dimensions in the humanitarian arena. Despite widespread
concerns about accountability and transparency, private military and security
contactors have become part of the landscape in conflict-affected environments and,
in the view of James Brown, their numbers will greatly increase in the near future.
‘Digital humanitarians’ are emerging as increasingly important actors in their efforts
“Military actors will
to collect and verify information through social media technologies such as Facebook, increasingly be called to
Twitter, YouTube, blogs and SMS for use in a humanitarian response effort (see respond to disasters.”
Chapter 5). Muslim NGOs are increasing in number and assuming greater significance.
Dr Elizabeth Ferris
So, too, are non-Western donors such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and
South Korea (the BRICSS) and the Gulf States. Together, these new players reflect
a larger process of global power shifts and represent what Donini referred to as a
challenge to the ‘dominant Western enterprise’. “One billion people
2.3 More natural disasters, in more complex environments (one third of the world’s
urban population) live
Because of climate change, in future we are likely to witness more sudden‑onset
natural disasters of greater intensity and severity and in more complex environments, in slums.”
including urban settings11 and conflict zones.12 The unique characteristics of Dr Elizabeth Ferris (see note 13)
both urban and conflict-affected environments present particular challenges for
civil‑military disaster response.
Those responding to disasters in urban areas face a different range of players and “Although towns and
different vulnerabilities compared with non-urban areas. In the view of Dr Ferris, urban
cities constitute just 2.8
settings are characterised by a more vocal and mobilised populace, as well as a unique
range of local actors—including the different levels of government, local businesses per cent of the earth’s
large and small, political associations, local NGOs and civil society organisations and, surface, since 2008
often, organised criminal networks such as gangs.13 Urban populations, notably slum more than half of the
dwellers, also have different vulnerabilities, such as limited access to clean water,
global population now
sanitation facilities and health care, inadequate living space, poor security, and weak
structural integrity.14 These factors can have profound consequences for the wellbeing lives in urban areas.”
of inhabitants in the face of a natural disaster. UN–Habitat Urban World (see note 11)

Disasters in conflict-affected environments present particular challenges for a
civil‑military response. For example, the Haiti earthquake in 2010 drew attention to

10
Stoddard et al., p. 6.
11
UN-Habitat, ‘Cities and land rights’, urban WORLD, vol. 3, issue 1, February-April 2011, p.5.
12
Ferris noted in her presentation this will probably be accompanied by an increase in
Dr
slow‑onset disasters, such as rising sea levels and drought.
13
Ferris, ‘Haiti and future humanitarian disasters’, Brookings UPFRONT (Blog), 12 January 2011,
E
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/01/12-haiti-ferris
14
Millennium Project, A home in the city, Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers,
UN
Earthscan, London, 2005.


the reality of a disaster occurring in a country hosting a UN peacekeeping operation—
in this case the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or MINUSTAH. Peacekeeping personnel
became both victims of and responders to the disaster. Drawing on this experience,
UN peacekeeping operations are now being tasked to consider disaster management
as part of their mandate.
The Pakistan floods of 2010 highlight another set of dynamics, based on the reality
of a natural disaster occurring in a highly politicised and militarised environment and
alongside a military offensive against an insurgency. In this context the Pakistani military
was both a principal responder and a combatant, and the dynamics of the conflict had
both a direct and an indirect effect on the disaster response effort. In addition, insecurity
arising from the insurgency—including reported threats made by Pakistani Taliban
members against international aid groups—slowed the deployment of international staff,
thus hampering the international aid effort, and the delivery of aid became an instrument
for the insurgency, with Pakistani Taliban members and NGOs associated with militant
groups participating in the delivery of relief to local communities.15 This relatively new
area of experience for the global community warrants further attention.

2.4 Emerging concerns
Presentations and the plenary discussion raised various concerns that present “How do we deal with
challenges for the civil‑military community and deserve greater attention:
disaster response in
The far-reaching ‘ripple’ effects of disasters such as the Icelandic volcano
complex environments
highlight the need for a better understanding of what it means to be ‘affected’ by
natural disasters. where responders
More attention should be given to the range of difficulties that can arise in
themselves may also
coordinating action between international actors and national governments when be victims?
taking action in response to a disaster.
After the Haiti
More creativity is required when thinking about responding to disasters in conflict earthquake, the
zones, especially in connection with civil‑military relations.
MINUSTAH troops
Disasters in complex environments such as urban areas present particular should have been moved
challenges that are unique to such settings—the range of local actors, the extent of
local mobilisation, the security challenges presented by gangs, and so on.
out: ‘They were victims!
MINUSTAH [troops] were
The overlap of natural and technological disasters is a new phenomenon and
presents significant and specific safety concerns for humanitarian personnel. not paying attention
At present there is a reluctance to think about this in the humanitarian community. to the Haitians. They
Dr Ferris’s view is that military thinking would be useful in this regard. were distracted. They
Donini observed that in Afghanistan ‘there are very few purist humanitarian should have been sent
players any more’. Many NGOs are multi-mandated and have responsibility for away and “fresh” troops
multiple programs, simultaneously providing humanitarian aid and engaging in
reconstruction activities without relevant training. This requires more attention,
brought in’.”
especially because it further blurs the already blurry divide between the Brigadier General Earl Arthurs
humanitarian and political–military spaces.

Masood, ‘In Pakistan, Taliban Hint at Attacks on Relief Workers’, The New York Times, 26
15
S
August 2010, viewed 8 December 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/world/
asia/27pstan.html; AB Ellick, ‘Hard-Line Islam Fills Void in Flooded Pakistan’, The New York
Times, 6 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/world/asia/07pstan.html?_r=1


3 Local-level processes: ownership
in practice

Efforts in support of local
ownership
the UN Secretary-General’s
2009 report on peacebuilding
in the immediate aftermath
of conflict (the ‘imperative of
national ownership’) and 2010
3.1 Analysis progress report
No matter how well intentioned the international response to natural disasters, report of the UN Secretary-
armed conflicts and complex emergencies, there has been a tendency, in the General’s Senior Advisory Group on
Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath
words of one participant, to ‘crowd out’ local ownership. ‘We’ve been totally of Conflict—recommendations on
excluded from the relief effort. Who knows what all these internationals are enabling national ownership
doing? It’s a new occupation of Haiti’, complained a Haitian pastor Dr Ferris the 2011 workshop hosted by the
interviewed in Port-au-Prince in January 2011.16 These words represent a UN Peacebuilding Support Office
common sentiment of exclusion and marginalisation voiced by local communities on the meaning and practices of
national ownership
receiving international aid in response to a natural disaster or following the end of
Graciana del Castillo’s ‘Ten
conflict. The exclusion and marginalisation are the consequence of an international Commandments’
aid regime that is, says Donini, more accountable to donors and parliamentarians
g7+ initiative
than to local communities.
In the words of Dr Susan Harris Rimmer, foreign interventions and operations have
a profound long-term ‘catalytic effect’ on host countries. The Hon. Paul Tovua
“Two-thirds of Liberia’s
articulated a similar sentiment but with different language: ‘A foreign visitor is like
a pebble in water’. In the immediate period following a large-scale crisis, the often GDP is spent on the UN
‘overly zealous’ rush of assistance by foreigners can overwhelm local communities. peacekeeping mission
Frequent tours by dignitaries—common in the aftermath of disasters—can also there, UNMIL, and most
overwhelm communities. As recalled by Jane Parfitt, Christchurch, New Zealand,
UNMIL money leaves the
faced a steady stream of tours and requests for tours for ten weeks after the 2011
earthquake, the logistics for which required taking staff away from critical recovery country.”
work. In the longer term, international interventions tend to weaken local actors Dr Graciana del Castillo
through creating aid dependencies and introducing price and wage distortions

16
Quoted in E Ferris, ‘A research trip to Haiti: Personal reflections’, Brookings Foreign Policy
Trip Reports, No. 9, 12 January 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/0112_
haiti_ferris.aspx


in the local economy. This helps explain why the arrival of international aid is
sometimes referred to as the ‘second wave of disaster’.
The question of local ownership is attracting growing attention, especially in
relation to post-conflict peacebuilding. There is an ‘emerging consensus … that
national ownership is a crucial prerequisite for sustainable post-conflict
peacebuilding’ based on the ‘commonsense wisdom that any peace process not
embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail’.17 The UN system is
devoting increasing attention to improving understanding of this and of practices
aimed at encouraging local ownership. Experts such as Dr del Castillo are
examining ways of preventing the dependencies so common in aid relationships
and instead institutionalising local ownership (see the ‘Ten Commandments’ text
insert in Chapter 2). Additionally, fragile and conflict‑affected states are
themselves mobilising around the principle of national ownership: the g7+, a group
of 19 fragile states, was established in 2010 to ‘gives us a stronger voice to speak
to the international community about our needs and circumstances’.18
Despite this consensus, the concept of local ownership remains beset by
complexity and a long list of difficult questions, many of which permeated the
seminar discussions:
Who does ‘local’ refer to?
Does it mean central governments or local governments or communities and
civil society19, or all of these?
How do you ensure that local engagement is inclusive and not biased toward
elite segments of the population?
Who owns what?
Who decides who owns what?
What does this ownership look like?
What happens when local ownership is exercised in a way that directly
conflicts with norms of good governance? “The [idea] of local
Is local ownership an absolute right or a conditional right? 20
ownership is very
What happens when local capacities are weak, do not exist or have been popular but very
completely overwhelmed, as in cases of large-scale disaster? difficult to put into
How do you retain ownership in the face of a massive wave of well-intended practice.”
incoming foreign aid?

Machold and T Donais, ‘From rhetoric to practice: operationalizing national ownership in
17
R
post-conflict peacebuilding’, workshop report, workshop organized by UN Peacebuilding
Support Office, Wilfrid Laurier University and the City University of New York’s Ralph Bunche
Institute for International Studies on the meanings and practices of national ownership in the
context of post-conflict peacebuilding. 14 March 2011, New York, June 2011, p. 2.
18
g7+, ‘Statement by the g7+’, 10 April 2010, http://www.g7plus.org/
news‑articles/2010/4/10/statement-by-the-g7.html
19
workshop report by Machold and Donais makes the important point that the concept of
The
‘civil society’, like the concept of ‘local’, is similarly difficult to define, p.3.
20
Machold and Donais, p. 6.


How do you strike a balance between respecting and striving for local agency
while remaining mindful that lives are in chaos and in need of humane and
sensitive support?
These hard questions reflect the reality that ‘it remains far from clear how the
concept [of national ownership] should be put into practice’.21
Although examples of locally initiated and led international response efforts
are rare, they constitute important experiences and useful models for future
operations. The Bougainville peace process is a prominent example and one
that was explored at the seminar. The success of the regional intervention in
Bougainville (the Truce and Peace Monitoring Groups, 1997 to 2003) is often
attributed to the locally owned and led nature of the peace process.22 As the
Hon. James Tanis explained, the peace process and subsequent regional
intervention emerged from a widespread consensus among Bougainvillean actors
that the war had to end. There was also widespread agreement about the need for
reconciliation, a negotiation process with Papua New Guinea and a foreign peace “The fact … that the
force, the requirements for which were expressed by the Bougainvillean parties Bougainvilleans at all
to the conflict themselves. Local ownership was further enabled by the diverse
make-up of the intervention force, which, said the Hon. James Tanis, had
times were in control of
‘relevance’ for different segments of the community. Women in the local the extent and content
communities felt comfortable speaking to female Truce and Peace Monitoring of the activities of the
Group members. Much, too, has been written about the ability of Maori, Fijian, external actors and
ni‑Vanuatu, and Indigenous Australian members of the regional operation to
develop a rapport with local communities, given similar cultural backgrounds and,
that the peace-building
in some cases, linguistic familiarity. This rapport,23 or ‘relevance’, strengthened process was owned
the bond between the local community and the foreign operation. by the parties directly
In order to gain and ensure local ownership, international actors must have local involved … remained
knowledge and access to local information. They need an understanding of local the main reason for the
history, the often complicated layers and dynamics of the conflict, existing formal
success of the external
and informal decision-making structures (for example, disaster management
committees), and political, social and cultural structures and processes. assistance.”
Yet sudden deployment and limited training often prevent international actors V Boege, 2010 (see note 22)
from acquiring this knowledge before being deployed. This operational reality—
plus the need for accurate and timely local information and the imperative of
national ownership—demands greater effort to capitalise on the expertise and
knowledge of local players. “Need to use personnel
Local actors, including civil society organisations, as well as members of diaspora that have lived through
communities, have a ‘natural cultural awareness that cannot be taught’. In the the experience they are
context of highly politicised post-conflict environments—Solomon Islands, intervening in.”
for example—the Hon. Paul Tovua has suggested that much-needed political

Machold and Donais, p. 1.
21

22
Much has been written about the locally-led nature of the Bougainville peace process,
including V Boege, ‘How to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post-Conflict Hybrid Political
Order –The Case of Bougainville’. Journal of International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, 2010, pp.
330-352. Text insert from p. 341.
Wehner and D Denoon (eds), Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace
23
M
in Bougainville, 1997-2001, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2001, pp. 112, 120.


expertise is often best found in local players who ‘are more aware of political
nuances’. Regional players can also facilitate local ownership if they have
shared or similar cultural characteristics. In view of this, they can sometimes
present themselves as a ‘bridge’ between the international effort and local
communities. For example, there have been numerous references to the benefits
of having personnel from Vanuatu, Fiji and elsewhere in the Pacific involved in
the interventions in Bougainville, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands because of
their similar cultural background and linguistic familiarity, such as the ability to
speak Pidgin.24

3.2 Capability
In an effort to ‘do more than pay simple lip service to the idea of local ownership’,
seminar participants considered the question ‘What innovations are needed to
ensure that local priorities and preferences are directing international
civil‑military responses?’ The resultant suggestions are grouped here into
a number of broad priority areas, as follows.
Supporting an enhanced decision-making role for the host government
A number of senior participants called for enhancing the decision-making role and
power of the host government. Dr del Castillo spoke forcefully about the need to
channel aid through government, at both the national and the local levels: creating
a stronger role for local government in managing the aid funds will help build
strong leadership, and ‘ownership will follow strong leadership’. In the context of
disaster response, a second suggestion was to develop an inventory of deployable
capabilities available to the local authorities and allow those authorities to decide
what capabilities they need.
Proactively liaising with and consulting local communities
Many group discussions focused on the need to develop mechanisms for liaison
and consultation with local communities. Various suggestions focused on
identifying and/or establishing and using positions dedicated to liaison between
international personnel and local communities. Such positions include local points
of contact, and ‘CIMIC [civil‑military cooperation] teams’. Participants stressed
the need for caution in engaging with communities in inclusive ways, reconciling
diverse opinions and priorities, and ensuring that elite groups are not privileged
over other segments of society. In relation to trying to determine a community’s
priorities, one suggestion was to ‘triangulate’ the proposals put forward by “We need to move
the local leadership with those of opposition groups and wider communities. beyond ‘parachuting-in’
Another suggestion was to recognise and make use of genuinely neutral brokers expats.”
in situations where local authority or local interests are contested.
Augmenting knowledge and understanding of the local context and
existinglocal capacities
Considerable emphasis was given to the need for international personnel
“We need to open our
to be better informed about the local context and existing local capacities. eyes to existing local
Pre‑deployment briefings on local history and social and cultural factors were capacities.”
suggested. To improve disaster preparedness, it was noted that international

ee, eg,Wehner and Denoon (eds) id; Boege; J. Hutcheson, ‘The Lessons of 2006: Army
24
S
Operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands’. Australian Army Journal, vol. 4, Winter 2007.


personnel should expand their understanding of existing local disaster response
and management arrangements and priorities (which can help facilitate local
direction setting), as well as their knowledge of gaps in such local arrangements
and local hazards. Finally, if relationships with national and local authorities are
established before a disaster occurs, one’s situational awareness during a crisis
can be greatly improved.
Establishing rules, standards and expectations for international engagement
with local communities
Various suggestions touched on the need to institutionalise engagement with
local communities through the clear establishment of rules, standards and
expectations. One suggestion involved the developing of international rules of
engagement for guiding and managing relations with local communities. Another
involved incorporating in government reporting, policy and other documents
(such as ministerial and cabinet submissions) a requirement for local consultation.
A further suggestion dealt with the need to educate international politicians on
the importance of seeking and taking into account advice from local actors and
beneficiaries before taking any decisions.

3.3 Emerging difficulties and dilemmas
In group discussions several particular challenges requiring further attention
were identified:
More work is needed to help prepare host countries and local communities
for receiving foreign aid in times of large-scale disaster.
Humanitarian assistance should be transient. The difficulty lies in determining
how and when responsibility can and should revert from foreign hands to local
authorities, so as to avoid the development of dependencies.
The delivery and presence of international aid create not only dependencies
but also local ‘power blocs’—that is, segments of the local population
who directly benefit from the aid and thus have a vested interest in the
continuation of the aid regime.


4 New and non-traditional players

4.1 Analysis
Natural disasters, armed conflict and complex emergencies are drawing a “Just because we will hire
proliferation of ‘new’ and non-traditional players—private military and security companies because there
companies, organised crime networks, ‘digital humanitarians’ (see Chapter 5),
is no other option does
new and emerging non-Western donors, and new and emerging NGOs.
These actors come with new constituencies and new agendas, and their not mean it is smart.
participation can be expected to add layers of complexity to what are already
You don’t know who they
complex civil‑military dimensions.
are, what they are doing,
Private military and security companies
Private military and security companies have become part of the landscape in
and you are responsible
conflict-affected environments. They provide much-needed assistance, such as for what they do.”
logistical support, operation of checkpoints, de-mining, intelligence collection, TX Hammes
and training of security forces.25 Governments have become dependent on
them26, there is continuing demand for them and, as James Brown noted, their
numbers are expected to increase in the near future. These companies have been
contracted by the governments of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and “We’re the only game
the United States, as well as the United Nations27, to provide services in Bosnia, in town.”
Liberia, Angola, Timor-Leste, Iraq, Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Michael Stock, President of Bancroft
Nepal and Sudan. Private contractors currently outnumber troops in Iraq, are Global Development, on Somalia
serving as frontline mentors to African Union forces in the fight against the Islamist (see note 28)
militant group al-Shabaab in Somalia, and are protecting Somali politicians and

McCauley, ‘The realities of privatised security within the civil-military arena’, Civil-Military
25
L
Commentary 3/2011, Australian Civil-Military Centre, Queanbeyan, NSW, 2011.
Priest and WM Arkin, ‘National Security Inc’, Top Secret America: A Washington Post
26
D
Investigation, 20 July 2010, The Washington Post, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-
secret-america/articles/national-security-inc
McCauley
27


battling armed Somali pirates.28 The United States has made a policy decision that
is based on the reality that private contractors will continue to be a major force
in future conflicts. Similarly, in response to the growing problem of piracy, the UK
Government is planning to create increasing opportunities for private military and
security companies, reversing the current law to allow all British‑flagged vessels to
use armed guards ‘on the most hazardous shipping routes’.29
As was clearly demonstrated in the seminar debate, the use and role of private
military and security companies in conflict-affected environments remains
troubling and highly contentious for many.30 There is continuing concern about a
number of aspects of this:
the repercussions of using ‘civilians’ in military roles
the danger of contracting out such jobs as translation and interpretation to
those lacking local cultural knowledge
the lack of oversight, accountability and transparency
the role of politics and nepotism in granting and retaining contracts
ethical questions arising from the commercial motivations and interests of
such companies—including the unavoidable reality of their responsibility
to shareholders.
“Adding civilians in
military roles confuses
But, regardless of these concerns, these companies are here to stay. As one
participant noted, ‘Whether we have a place in our heart for private security
objectives.”
companies is no longer the issue’. The crucial concern is how to manage the reality Professor Damien Kingsbury
of these companies and regulate their activities.
Organised crime networks
Today’s conflict-affected environments are particularly vulnerable to exploitation
by organised crime networks. The role and impacts of these networks are,
however, poorly understood, largely because of the dearth of reliable information
(see Chapter 5). These networks can be involved in a range of illegal activities, among
them drug and human trafficking, gang violence, money laundering, piracy and the
arms trade. Through their actions they can exacerbate the vulnerability of populations
in crisis environments and make weak states weaker. Professor Andrew Goldsmith
noted that there is a growing effort to tackle organised crime through initiatives such
as the West Africa Coast Initiative, which has established Transnational Crime Units
in Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The United Nations is also recognising the
need for greater efforts to tackle the problem: plans are being made to set up Serious

Gettleman et al., ‘U.S. Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict’, The New York Times,
28
J
10 August 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.
html?ref=africapagewanted=all
29
Sims, ‘UK Government shifts policy on armed guards for commercial vessels’,
B
info4SECURITY, 31 October 2011, viewed 10 December 2011, http://www.info4security.
com/story.asp?sectioncode=9storycode=4128316c=1
30
seminar debate demonstrated the importance of distinguishing private military
The
and security companies from other private sector actors. As Dr Kent emphasized, small
businesses, local companies, and, in some cases, extractor companies can play critical roles
in supporting and providing local livelihoods, including through remittances, and may also be
among the first responders in a crisis.


Crime Support Units in peacekeeping operations to provide analysis and operational
support for missions and host-state police forces.
New and emerging non-Western donors
Non-Western donors, especially emerging economies, are becoming important
in the international aid industry. They include Brazil, India, Russia, China, South “The landscape of
Africa, South Korea, Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United
international power
Arab Emirates, and new members of the European Union.31 Some are new donors;
others have long histories of giving aid and their changing economic situations relations is also
are allowing them to assume greater prominence.32 Brazil, for example, gave changing, as low‑
US$36 million in humanitarian aid in 2010, compared with US$800 000 in 2009; and middle-income
India was the largest government donor in response to the Pakistan floods in
countries increase
2010; Russia is the ‘biggest non-Western contributor’ to OCHA, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; and South Africa has plans to launch its own their share of global
aid agency.33 economic influence and
The emergence of these donors is creating a challenge to the ‘traditional their contributions to
hegemony held by western donors over how and where aid is dispersed’.34 global policy thinking.
Because many are themselves recipients of aid, they offer alternative approaches This shift requires a
to aid delivery, including a more ‘solidarity-based’ and less top-down approach
and a more sensitive attitude to the politically charged question of sovereignty.35
fundamental rethink
Many of them are irked by the Western domination of such intergovernmental of the approaches of
bodies as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund36 and the Development international actors to
Assistance Committee of the OECD and—with the exception of South Korea— manage global risks
generally avoid membership of these organisations altogether.37 Instead, they
are turning to regional bodies such as ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian
collectively—and as
Nations, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference or the League of Arab States.38 equal partners.”
Their growing influence, coupled with their alternative approaches to aid and 2011 World Development Report
concerns about the current multilateral structures, suggest possible changes to (see note 32)
existing multilateral aid coordination and governance bodies in the future.39

Smith, ‘Humanitarian aid and smaller donors: diversity, collective response and
31
K
better data’, Global Humanitarian Assistance, Blog, 2 December 2010, http://www.
globalhumanitarianassistance.org/humanitarian-aid-and-the-role-of-smaller-non-dac-
donors-diversity-collective-response-and-better-data-1881.html
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: conflict, security and development, World
32

Bank, Washington DC, 2011, p. 38.
33
IRIN, ‘Who’s who among the “new” donors’, IRIN In-Depth, 19 October 2011,
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?indepthid=91reportid=94008
34
IRIN, ‘The rise of the “new” donors’, IRIN In-Depth, 19 October 2011,
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?indepthid=91reportid=94003
35
IRIN, ‘Reaching out to “emerging” donors’, IRIN, 19 October 2011, http://www.irinnews.org/
Report/94011/AID-POLICY-Reaching-out-to-quot-emerging-donors-quot
36
IRIN, ‘The rise of the “new” donors’.
IRIN, ‘Who’s who among the “new” donors’.
37

38
IRIN, ‘Reaching out to “emerging” donors’.
39
ibid.


New and emerging NGOs
The field of non-government aid work is also diversifying. Not only are new
donors arising from emerging economies: so, too, are non-government aid
organisations. In the words of Claudia Meier of the Global Public Policy Institute,
‘… maybe an Indian NGO, the Chinese Red Cross, the Red Crescents of the Gulf
States [will emerge] … they are not fully there yet, but there are lots of signs of
their professionalisation’.40 There has also been a ‘dramatic increase’ in both
the number and visibility of religious or faith-based organisations active in
development and humanitarian aid (a burgeoning area of academic research).41
Muslim NGOs are an example: in response to both the 2005 earthquake and the
2010 floods in Pakistan, Muslim NGOs and Islamic trusts assumed significant
responsibility during the relief efforts.42 Although many such organisations have
been providing aid for years, they have become the object of increasing attention
and wariness because of the association of some aid groups with militant and
terrorist groups.

4.2 Capability
To focus the discussion on ‘new’ and non-traditional players, seminar participants
considered the question ‘What practical innovations can help to address criminal
activity—including criminal violence—in conflict and disaster settings?’ The resultant
suggestions are grouped here into a number of broad priority areas, as follows.
Improving understanding of the basic causes of criminal activity
Many group discussions observed that a first basic step is to understand not only the
incentives (such as economic forces) and disincentives for criminal activity but also
the ethical and value systems that determine what constitutes ‘criminal activity’ in
the local population. This well-established understanding could be used to develop
an early warning system for detecting potential trends toward criminalisation. Such a
system could incorporate Neighbourhood Watch–like structures.
Paying greater attention to developing alternatives to criminal activity
Although, as Professor Goldsmith noted, the prevailing focus to date has been
“You can’t eliminate
biased in favour of containment of criminal violence, group discussions reflected
the need to move towards a more transformative approach that is sensitive to criminal activities.
local livelihoods and the local environment. Numerous suggestions focused on You need to identify
developing practical alternatives to criminal activity, supporting the diversification alternatives.”
of skills among the local population and alternative sources of income—‘Jobs.
Jobs. Jobs’ in the view of one group.
Using and supporting culturally appropriate responses to criminal activity
“Respect cultural
Many group discussions were broadly based on the principle that local capacities,
resilience and coping strategies and customary laws and systems should be used heritage and traditional
and supported in any external efforts to combat criminal activity. Community policing mechanisms.”
policing was often mentioned, and it was suggested that dedicated liaison offices

40
Quoted in IRIN, ‘Reaching out to “emerging” donors’.
Petersen, ‘International religious NGOs at the United Nations: a study of a group of
41
MJ
religious organisations’, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, November 2010, pp. 1, 2.
42
Jafar, ‘Muslim NGOs take part in Pakistan flood relief’, Al Arabiya News, 20 August 2010,
M
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/08/20/117141.html


be established to facilitate engagement between external players and existing
local police structures. Effective community policing is, however, possible only if
local police are properly resourced and trained, as one group noted.

In group discussions several particular challenges requiring further attention
were identified:
There is limited understanding of organised crime in conflict-affected
environments—including an understanding of the extent of the harm caused
by criminal activity of this nature.
Criminal networks, including gangs, might provide important social services
that are not being provided through other channels. Should these aid
pathways be legitimised or marginalised? Should alternative social safety nets
be identified? These are difficult questions that warrant attention.
Greater understanding is needed in relation to military policing and its role in
disasters and complex emergencies.


5 The importance of information
in civil‑military effectiveness

5.1 Analysis
Information is an essential civil‑military capability, yet to date in the contexts
of natural disaster, armed conflict and complex emergency there has been a “A deficiency of
widespread dearth of it. Practitioners and policy makers alike are in desperate
need of more information. ‘We didn’t know enough and we still don’t know
information undermines
enough.’ This oft-quoted comment was made by the former commander to the the capacity to
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, ‘prevent, prepare for
when speaking about the efforts of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. and respond more
He went on to say, ‘Most of us, me included, had a very superficial understanding
of the situation and history, and we had a frighteningly simplistic view of
effectively to conflicts
recent history …’43 and disasters …’”
Gen. McChrystal’s reflection and assessment have relevance and application to
interventions far beyond the borders of Afghanistan. The absence of information
has proved a major weakness in efforts to tackle organised crime in countries such “In crisis, the first
as Guinea-Bissau. It has led to a lack of understanding in the aid community about essential thing you need
the post-earthquake situation in Haiti. In Bougainville there are no updated data is information, not food
on per capita income, population, age and geographic distribution, and sources
of income, yet it is this type of information that is crucial for planning post-conflict
or shelter. Information
recovery there. Professor Satish Chand has gone so far as to observe that data on will tell you where food
which to base policy making are absent in most post-conflict situations. and shelter is needed.”
In addition to recognition of the need for more information, as Rebecca Shrimpton Zainudin Malang
explained, there is greater acknowledgment of the need for better information—

43
Quoted in D Walsh, ‘US had ‘frighteningly simplistic’ view of Afghanistan, says McChrystal’,
The Guardian, 7 October 2011, viewed 5 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/oct/07/us-frighteningly-simplistic-afghanistan-mcchrystal?newsfeed=true


more nuanced information that will allow interventions to move beyond
assumptions and talking about ideas in the abstract, beyond simplistic and
homogeneous understandings of local situations and local actors as ‘good’ and
‘bad’. A person who is a perpetrator of gang violence one afternoon, a community
leader the next morning and a priest the following afternoon challenges
the mainstream tendency toward simplistic understanding of local actors.
As Dr Robert Muggah explored, this reality prompts the question of who exactly
we are talking about.
There are also areas in which a wealth of information can present challenges.
In relation to peace and stabilisation operations, for example, Shrimpton observed,
‘We underestimated how much information is out there’. In the civil‑military
community the challenge is to make sense of all this scattered information and
build a shared understanding of the situation. The Australian Civil‑Military Centre’s
Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project, or MAPSOP, is focused
partly on drawing all this information together and turning it into strengthened,
comprehensive multi-agency advice to decision makers.
Not only is information itself an essential civil‑military capability: so too are the
skills required for obtaining that information. Increasingly, information is being
collected through innovative and non-traditional means, often outside formal
official systems. In many cases these methods of information collection are
evolving as technologies such as social media evolve. Furthermore, such methods
are increasingly reliant on local communities: they are based on the philosophy
that people on the ground are a credible and important partner and source of
information in a crisis. As Heather Blanchard noted, ‘People on the ground are the
best source of information in a crisis’.
The following examples provide evidence of a clear trend toward looking beyond
government for information44:
Community household surveys have proved an effective way of obtaining
local information and insightful observations about a security and political
situation. A series of community-level longitudinal surveys conducted before
and after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti pointed to perceptions
of sustained reductions in violence and insecurity. This information was
unexpected because it contradicted sensationalist media reporting of soaring
crime rates. Similarly revealing, in a household survey measuring economic “The public [is a]
recovery in Bougainville, data on the materials being used to build houses
resource rather than a
have proved very revealing about local perceptions of security. According to
Professor Chand, information about the types of investments being made into liability.”
homes serves as ‘proxy’ data for the level of confidence communities have in Craig Fugate, US Federal Emergency
the peace process. The economic data can therefore be used to feed into a Management Agency (see note 44)
broader picture of the political, ethnic and security situation in Bougainville.

Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the
44
C
Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/disaster-
recovery-and-intergovernmental-affairs/hearings/understanding-the-power-of-social-
media-as-a-communications-tool-in-the-aftermath-of-disasters


Both these community-level surveys relied on local surveying teams—
including, in the case of Bougainville, local graduate students. Given this
reliance on local communities for information, the method also benefits from
transparent outreach to communities, explaining the objectives and methods
of the survey project. Professor Chand observed that the use of outreach
by the Bougainville survey group—through newspapers, local chiefs and
churches—helped them gain ‘entry’ into the community.
In Mindanao a grass-roots initiative has established a network of provincial
teams and local communities to monitor the ceasefire and share information
and reports via SMS with relevant institutions, including formal monitoring
organisations such as ceasefire committees. This initiative is a direct reaction
to the dearth of information about the conflict. SMS also functions as a
practical mechanism for validating information through the triangulation of
local sources. The aim is to connect the local population and its knowledge of
and proximity to events on the ground with the official response. As Zainudin
Malang observed, ‘People are the best source of information on the ground’
yet ‘these key sources of information are not being tapped’.
More and more, connected networks of volunteers, or volunteer technical
communities, are using social media to gather information in support of
‘official’ disaster- and conflict-response efforts.45 They represent a ‘new
whole avenue of digital response’, says Blanchard. Sometimes called
‘digital humanitarians’, connected communities—such as the Standby The challenges of monitoring
Taskforce, Crisis Commons and Crisis Mappers—rely on volunteers to conflict in Mindanao
scan news media and on technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, repeated cycles of displacement—
blogs and SMS to collect, verify and analyse information rapidly in real or inaccessible areas, diverse
near‑real time. In some cases these informal networks are also ‘creating ethno‑linguistic groups

data’, collecting and disseminating information about things such as what politicisation of information—
which affects aid delivery
stores and businesses are open and closed and where people can charge
bridging the divide between
their cell phones (a significant issue following the 2011 Japan earthquake). conflict-affected communities and
Once validated and fully ‘de-identified’, this information is available for use the formal response effort
by UN, government and NGO actors to improve their situational awareness
and guide their operational planning.
Social media are being adopted and used by ‘official’ systems and structures Activated, connected
too. In a global precedent–setting move the Media and Public Affairs Branch of communities:
the Queensland Police Service used the service’s recently established Facebook Indian Ocean tsunami, 2004
page, Twitter account and YouTube channel to share real-time information about post-election crisis in Kenya,
the floods that devastated parts of the state in January 2011. A number of very 2007–08
clear benefits arose from this. First, it facilitated a much more ‘nimble’ response, Sichuan earthquake, 2008
which was more appropriate in a dynamic environment such as a flood compared crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
with, for example, the slower process of writing minutes and having them cleared Syria (2010– on-going)
before dissemination. This more nimble system also allowed the police to respond

45
This topic featured prominently during the Australian Civil-Military Centre’s Regional Senior
Leaders Seminar in July 2011. This section draws upon the summary report from that
seminar. See Australian Civil-Military Centre ‘Regional Senior Leaders 2011 summary report:
strengthening civil-military coordination for conflict and disaster management’, Queanbeyan,
NSW, 2011.


promptly to any inaccurate information. Second, social media are ‘incredibly
robust’. As the flooding progressed there was a huge spike in the number of
visitors to the Facebook page and the Twitter site: between December 2010 and
January 2011, when the floods occurred, the Facebook page went from 6400
fans (or ‘likes’) to 165 000 fans, and the number of Twitter followers soared from
1200 to 11 000.46 People were turning to Facebook and Twitter because the
police were able to provide information directly to them, in a way that had not
been possible before, including live streaming of press conferences and briefings
by the Premier. As Kym Charlton put it, ‘We’re not relying on news bulletins. We’re
not relying on journalists making decisions about newsworthiness. We’ve … been
able to go directly to the people when we need to’.47 Furthermore, visitors were
able to augment the pool of available information by contributing information
based on their own experience of the flooding. Third, the Facebook page allowed
the Queensland Police Service to amplify its message to a much wider audience.
Beyond those local and international visitors who visited its page directly, there
was a much wider audience, including those without social media, who were
reached through Twitter and international media (pulling information from the
Facebook page). Through the use of this social technology, the public and other
media players helped the Queensland Police disseminate crucial information
about the floods to those directly and indirectly affected.

5.2 Capability
“During the height
Seminar participants considered the questions ‘What information do policy
of the Queensland
makers and practitioners wish for?’ and ‘What innovations might help to access
it?’ The resultant suggestions are grouped here into a number of broad priority floods, the Queensland
areas, as follows. Police Service had ‘39
Timely, accurate and verified information million story hits on
Although policy makers and practitioners might require different types of their Facebook page
information, regardless of the specific content, they both need information that
in 24 hours and in one
is provided promptly, is accurate and verified, and comes from a reliable and
trusted source. week more than 73 000
Information aimed at improving preparedness
YouTube video views’.”
To improve preparedness, basic information should be disseminated about K Riordan, ABC News (see note 46)
the potential risks in given areas—such as mines, swollen rivers and downed
power lines. This information could be followed with practice drills relating to
earthquakes and bushfires, for example.
“What is ‘relevant’
Longitudinal data
Longitudinal data collected through such rapid and cost-effective methods as
information? [We]
household surveys are a vital tool for tracking change and impacts. need to challenge
Using local data collectors and analysts conventional
Information collection efforts should make use of local data collectors and understandings.”
analysts. This represents good value for money, provides employment

46
Riordan, ‘Police tweet on the beat during flood crisis’, ACB News, 20 January 2011, http://
K
www.abc.net.au/news/2011-01-20/police-tweet-on-the-beat-during-flood-crisis/1912328
Quoted in Riordan.
47


opportunities, and capitalises on the expertise of locals, who have a ‘natural
cultural awareness that cannot be taught’.
Devoting resources and creativity to information collection
Gathering and understanding data take time, and this can be a particular
concern in a crisis situation when time is limited. More resources should be
devoted to collection and analysis. Greater creativity is needed in information
gathering, especially among government actors. After all, ‘It is not just about
reading articles’. Governments are especially well placed, in view of their access
to resources, position and influence, to develop and apply more creativity in
enabling information gathering and collection.
Being open to non-traditional sources of information
The public constitutes an important source of information. Together with official
sources, members of the public create a ‘holistic understanding of a situation’.
In Blanchard’s view, the civil‑military community would benefit from improving
its engagement with emerging sources of ‘non-official’ information and analysis
such as Crisis Commons and taking advantage of their ‘skills, networks and
capabilities’. According to one group, such volunteer technical communities
have the skills, time and willingness to help. Because these communities use
social media as a source of information, a question was raised about the utility
of military actors also using social media information for their operations.
In connection with incidents in Afghanistan in which large numbers of civilians
have been killed because of a lack of information about the location of major
community gatherings, a specific question was raised: ‘Should the military
consider obtaining information via social media in order to try and reduce civilian
casualties in their area of operations?’

Group discussions highlighted a number of particularly challenging matters that “Public policy makers
require further attention, many of them relating to the use of social media:
should seek information
The field of social media is rapidly evolving but still very new. Major questions
that forces them to
need to be asked and answers sought. Many of the questions relate to
trust, security and risks, ethics, and the trade-off between verification and think outside the box.”
promptness. Should mapping be done of internally displaced persons’
camps, for example, in the way it is done for larger crisis situations
(for instance, the Libya Crisis Map)? Is this a good idea? What are the risks to “An 80 per cent
local data gatherers? Social media can assist in the protection of civilians,
but they can also expose the same civilians to threats.
solution executed on
time is better than a
Despite the rapidly expanding reach of social technologies, the digital divide
remains a serious problem. In view of the increasing attention given to and
100 per cent solution
the ‘trendiness’ of social media in the global aid community, there is concern executed late.”
that those who are not connected ‘do not exist’.


There is a lack of clarity about the relationship between open-source
information and military players and processes and the relationship between
digital humanitarians and military institutions. In relation to the former, the
military concept of information as currency stands in sharp contrast to the
philosophy behind open-source information. A question was posed: ‘Does the
military need to better understand its relationship with this information?’ In
relation to the latter, considering that digital humanitarians will most probably
not volunteer their time and data to military institutions or operate in or on
military information systems, what is the ideal, beneficial relationship between
digital humanitarians and military institutions?
Concern was expressed about whether social media fairly, appropriately
and accurately capture minority perspectives and matters to do with
local ownership.
Managing different information streams is difficult. Information in large
quantities can become ‘noise’. A question was asked: ‘How do you deal with
“noise” from an operational perspective?’ Too much noise points to a lack of
filters. Applying filters is an important research topic, especially in connection
with verification mechanisms and the importance of trusted sources.


6 Prevention and preparedness for
conflicts and disasters

6.1 Analysis
The ability to foresee and prevent conflict and the ability to be properly prepared “Ensuring that the full
to endure and respond to a natural disaster are two fundamental civil‑military range of options is
capabilities. Overall, these capabilities are gradually being strengthened at the
available requires a
national, regional and global levels, but there are considerable challenges.
level of governmental
Conflict prevention
Preventive action is slowly building in the global community with the strengthening
organization that
of institutional capacity. At a recent international conference on conflict prevention, matches the methodical
a UN official observed, ‘We are living in a conflict prevention moment’.48 organization
Within the UN system, the past decade has seen the emergence of various new characteristic of
prevention actors—for example, the Security Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group mass killings.”
on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, the Office of the Special Adviser
Presidential Study Directive on Mass
on the Prevention of Genocide, and the Department of Political Affairs Mediation Atrocities, 2011 (see note 51)
Unit. Beyond these dedicated capacities, more systematic attention is being given
to the question through the Secretary-General’s reporting, open Security Council
debates on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, as well as new monthly
Security Council ‘horizon scanning’ sessions conducted by the Department of Prevention ‘successes’
Political Affairs ‘to discuss emerging and ongoing crises’.49 UN Preventive Deployment Force
to the Former Yugoslav Republic of
At the regional level, preventive capacity is being strengthened in regional bodies Macedonia (1993 to 1999)
such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation efforts to prevent pre-referendum
in Europe, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, violence and conflict in Sudan (2011)
and the Organization of American States. Recent developments in the United

48
Quoted in P Romita, ‘The UN Security Council and conflict prevention: a primer’, International
Peace Institute, New York, October 2011, p. 1.
Ibid.
49


States are providing precedents for building preventive capacity within national
governments: in 2010, the first-ever White House position of Director for
War Crimes Atrocities and Civilian Protection was created50; and in 2011 the
President issued a Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities that mandated
the establishment of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board to facilitate
whole‑of‑government coordination on this matter.51
Despite the progress being made, a wide range of major challenges remain for
preventive action:
Prevention is difficult to sell. It is more cost effective than the alternative, but
it entails higher costs at the outset and is invisible and thus hard to measure
and evaluate. The challenge of making the case for preventive action is
reflected in the question ‘How do you justify resourcing prevention when you
can’t prove the non-barking dog?’ Although there is broad consensus on the
importance of preventive action, Dr Abiodun Williams noted that such action
it is not always treated as a necessity or a ‘must-do priority’: there is a gap
between rhetoric and practice. Political will is difficult to achieve given the
short-term horizons of politicians, the challenge of selling conflict prevention
to domestic constituents, ‘especially in tough economic times’52, and the
gulf separating decision makers from at-risk communities. This weak political
will is undermined by concerns, especially among non-Western developing “Everyone is looking
countries, that ‘conflict prevention could be abused as a pretext for the strong to everyone else to
to violate the sovereignty of the weak’: concerns that have been ‘aroused’ by take the first step in
recent interventions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.53
prevention.”
Despite new communication technologies and a proliferation of early warning
Professor William Maley
actors, there continues to be a ‘disconnect’ between early warning and
decisive preventive action. Dr Williams noted that among the factors that
might help explain this gap are ambiguity in early warnings, poor analysis,
and information overload. Within the UN system there are multiple, currently “Elections are divisive
stove-piped, streams of incoming information—from peacekeeping missions, activities that create
political missions, diplomatic missions, the field offices of UN agencies,
funds and programs, and so on. Information overload is at present inevitable
winners and losers.”
because the United Nations does not have its own intelligence capacity Professor William Maley
(a result of member state resistance) to manage this information flow.

50
White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: President Obama Directs New
The
Steps to Prevent Mass Atrocities and Impose Consequences on Serious Human Rights
Violators’, 4 August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/fact-
sheet-president-obama-directs-new-steps-prevent-mass-atrocities-and
White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Presidential Study Directive on Mass
51
The
Atrocities’, 4 August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/
presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities
Romita, p.17.
52

53
Romita, p.16.


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