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Harden Security Devices Against Increasingly
Sophisticated Evasions
BreakingPoint Webcast Wednesday
December 16, 2009
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Introductions/Agenda
• BreakingPoint speakers:
– Dennis Cox, CTO
– Todd Manning, Protocol & Security Researcher
– Dustin D. Trammell, Protocol & Security Researcher
• Quick Glance Agenda:
– Evasions Overview
– Evasions in Layer 3, 4, 5, 7 and more
– Latest evasion techniques
– How to validate you are protected
– BreakingPoint Five Keys
2
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Evasion Technique Introduction
• What Is An Evasion?
– Legitimate Permutation of Data
• Data remains valid
• Data looks different
– Attempt at bypassing detection or filters
• Data representation not recognized or understood by the
monitoring entity
• Cause the monitor to revert to a less scrutinizing state
• Transport of data in a state that is not observable by the
monitor
3
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Where are Evasions Used?
• Everywhere!
– Layer 3: IP
– Layer 4: TCP
– Layer 5: DCERPC, SunRPC, SIP
– Layer 7: HTTP, SMTP, POP3, FTP
– Content: HTML, OLE, Command-lines (Windows &
UNIX), Exploit Shellcode
4
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Layer 3: IP Evasions
• FragEvasion
– IP Fragmentation
– Four IP fragmentation methods available:
• Overlapping end fragments, favoring either old or new data
• Overlapping all fragments, favoring either old or new data
• FragOrder
– Change the order in which fragments are sent
– Three behavior options:
• Normal order
• Reverse order
• Randomize order
5
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Layer 4: TCP Evasions
• SegmentOrder
– Change the order in which segments are sent
– Three behavior options:
• Normal order
• Reverse order
• Randomize order
• SkipHandShake
– Skip the three-way handshake for all connections
6
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Layer 5: SIP Evasions
• CompactHeaders
– Use compact header names instead of full-length header names
– Example: “From: <user>” -> “f: <user>”
• PadHeadersLineBreak
– Pad headers with line breaks
– Example: ‘Authorization: Digest username=“user”, realm=“home”’
-> ‘Authorization: Digest rnusername=“user”, rnrealm=“home”’
• PadHeadersWhitespace
– Pad headers with whitespace elements
– Example: “From: <user>” -> “From:tt<user> “
• RandomizeCase
– Randomize the case of data which is case insensitive
– Example: “From: <user>” -> “fROm: <UsEr>”
7
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Layer 7: Common Evasions
• PadCommandWhiteSpace
– SMTP, POP3, FTP, Commands (Windows, UNIX)
– Inserts arbitrary whitespace between commands and their
arguments
– Examples:
• SMTP: “HELO example.com” -> “HELOtt t example.com”
• FTP: “USER username” -> “USER t tt username”
• Commands: “rm -rf /” -> “rmt t –rft tt/”
• PadPathSlashes
– Commands (Windows, UNIX)
– Uses slashes to pad command path names
– Examples:
• Commands: “/bin/cat /etc/passwd” -> “/////bin///cat /etc////passwd”
8
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Layer 7: HTTP Evasions
• Too many to list them all here…
• DirectorySelfReference
– Convert all directories to self-referenced relative directories
– Example: “GET /path/to/myfile.txt” -> “GET /./path/./to/./myfile.txt”
• EncodeHexRandom
– Encode random parts of the URI in hex
– Example: “GET /index.html” -> “GET /ind%65x.%68tml”
• ServerChunkedTransfer
– Use “chunked” transfer-encoding to split up the server response
• ServerCompression
– Use gzip to encode the server response
• EncodeUnicodeRandom
– Encode random parts of the URI in wide Unicode (UTF-16)
9
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Content Evasions
• HTML Evasions: HTMLUnicodeEncoding
• Encodes HTML in the selected flavor of Unicode:
– UTF_7: 7-bit
– UTF_8: 8-bit
– UTF_16BE: 16-bit big-endian
– UTF_16LE: 16-bit little-endian
– UTF_32BE: 32-bit big-endian
– UTF_32LE: 32-bit little-endian
• Shellcode Evasions: RandomNops
• Uses random nop-equivalent sequences instead of actual No-Op
instructions
• Example (ia32):
– “x90x90x90x90x90x90x90x90”
– becomes
– “x16x2fx5dx55x91x06x44x0e”
10
www.breakingpointlabs.com
The Latest Evasion Techniques
• Latest and greatest
• 2010 Forecast?
11
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Do Evasions Cause Damage?
12
www.breakingpointlabs.com
How To Validate You Are Protected
• Forward Thinking
• Test, Test, Test
• Be Realistic
• Be Random
• Be Consistent
13
Properly Testing Using Evasions
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Enabling Evasions for BreakingPoint
• BreakingPoint Methods
– Attack Manager:
• Attack Group Options - Affects only the attack group selected
– Security Test Component:
• Parameters Tab, Attack Profile setting - Affects the entire test
• Overrides Tab - Affects the entire test
• Order of precedence
– Overrides
– Group Options
– Attack Profile
15
www.breakingpointlabs.com
The Five Keys BreakingPoint Provides
1. 80+ evasion techniques
2. Dedicated security team
3. New evasion techniques
4. Apply across 4,300+ attacks
5. Multi-layered evasions
16
www.breakingpointlabs.com
Q&A
Thank You!
17

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Harden Security Devices Against Increasingly Sophisticated Evasions

  • 1. Harden Security Devices Against Increasingly Sophisticated Evasions BreakingPoint Webcast Wednesday December 16, 2009
  • 2. www.breakingpointlabs.com Introductions/Agenda • BreakingPoint speakers: – Dennis Cox, CTO – Todd Manning, Protocol & Security Researcher – Dustin D. Trammell, Protocol & Security Researcher • Quick Glance Agenda: – Evasions Overview – Evasions in Layer 3, 4, 5, 7 and more – Latest evasion techniques – How to validate you are protected – BreakingPoint Five Keys 2
  • 3. www.breakingpointlabs.com Evasion Technique Introduction • What Is An Evasion? – Legitimate Permutation of Data • Data remains valid • Data looks different – Attempt at bypassing detection or filters • Data representation not recognized or understood by the monitoring entity • Cause the monitor to revert to a less scrutinizing state • Transport of data in a state that is not observable by the monitor 3
  • 4. www.breakingpointlabs.com Where are Evasions Used? • Everywhere! – Layer 3: IP – Layer 4: TCP – Layer 5: DCERPC, SunRPC, SIP – Layer 7: HTTP, SMTP, POP3, FTP – Content: HTML, OLE, Command-lines (Windows & UNIX), Exploit Shellcode 4
  • 5. www.breakingpointlabs.com Layer 3: IP Evasions • FragEvasion – IP Fragmentation – Four IP fragmentation methods available: • Overlapping end fragments, favoring either old or new data • Overlapping all fragments, favoring either old or new data • FragOrder – Change the order in which fragments are sent – Three behavior options: • Normal order • Reverse order • Randomize order 5
  • 6. www.breakingpointlabs.com Layer 4: TCP Evasions • SegmentOrder – Change the order in which segments are sent – Three behavior options: • Normal order • Reverse order • Randomize order • SkipHandShake – Skip the three-way handshake for all connections 6
  • 7. www.breakingpointlabs.com Layer 5: SIP Evasions • CompactHeaders – Use compact header names instead of full-length header names – Example: “From: <user>” -> “f: <user>” • PadHeadersLineBreak – Pad headers with line breaks – Example: ‘Authorization: Digest username=“user”, realm=“home”’ -> ‘Authorization: Digest rnusername=“user”, rnrealm=“home”’ • PadHeadersWhitespace – Pad headers with whitespace elements – Example: “From: <user>” -> “From:tt<user> “ • RandomizeCase – Randomize the case of data which is case insensitive – Example: “From: <user>” -> “fROm: <UsEr>” 7
  • 8. www.breakingpointlabs.com Layer 7: Common Evasions • PadCommandWhiteSpace – SMTP, POP3, FTP, Commands (Windows, UNIX) – Inserts arbitrary whitespace between commands and their arguments – Examples: • SMTP: “HELO example.com” -> “HELOtt t example.com” • FTP: “USER username” -> “USER t tt username” • Commands: “rm -rf /” -> “rmt t –rft tt/” • PadPathSlashes – Commands (Windows, UNIX) – Uses slashes to pad command path names – Examples: • Commands: “/bin/cat /etc/passwd” -> “/////bin///cat /etc////passwd” 8
  • 9. www.breakingpointlabs.com Layer 7: HTTP Evasions • Too many to list them all here… • DirectorySelfReference – Convert all directories to self-referenced relative directories – Example: “GET /path/to/myfile.txt” -> “GET /./path/./to/./myfile.txt” • EncodeHexRandom – Encode random parts of the URI in hex – Example: “GET /index.html” -> “GET /ind%65x.%68tml” • ServerChunkedTransfer – Use “chunked” transfer-encoding to split up the server response • ServerCompression – Use gzip to encode the server response • EncodeUnicodeRandom – Encode random parts of the URI in wide Unicode (UTF-16) 9
  • 10. www.breakingpointlabs.com Content Evasions • HTML Evasions: HTMLUnicodeEncoding • Encodes HTML in the selected flavor of Unicode: – UTF_7: 7-bit – UTF_8: 8-bit – UTF_16BE: 16-bit big-endian – UTF_16LE: 16-bit little-endian – UTF_32BE: 32-bit big-endian – UTF_32LE: 32-bit little-endian • Shellcode Evasions: RandomNops • Uses random nop-equivalent sequences instead of actual No-Op instructions • Example (ia32): – “x90x90x90x90x90x90x90x90” – becomes – “x16x2fx5dx55x91x06x44x0e” 10
  • 11. www.breakingpointlabs.com The Latest Evasion Techniques • Latest and greatest • 2010 Forecast? 11
  • 13. www.breakingpointlabs.com How To Validate You Are Protected • Forward Thinking • Test, Test, Test • Be Realistic • Be Random • Be Consistent 13
  • 15. www.breakingpointlabs.com Enabling Evasions for BreakingPoint • BreakingPoint Methods – Attack Manager: • Attack Group Options - Affects only the attack group selected – Security Test Component: • Parameters Tab, Attack Profile setting - Affects the entire test • Overrides Tab - Affects the entire test • Order of precedence – Overrides – Group Options – Attack Profile 15
  • 16. www.breakingpointlabs.com The Five Keys BreakingPoint Provides 1. 80+ evasion techniques 2. Dedicated security team 3. New evasion techniques 4. Apply across 4,300+ attacks 5. Multi-layered evasions 16

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. SneakAckHandshake Establish sessions with the SneakAck Handshake for all connections