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Recent Breaches
 & their Causes
  Branden R. Williams, CISSP, CISM

     brw@brandenwilliams.com

  http://www.brandenwilliams.com
Agenda

•   My background

•   Where I see breaches

•   If I were a bad guy, where would I go?

•   Discuss causes of recent breaches

•   Q/A
My background
Where do I see breaches?


•   Fewer attacks against
    the network layer

•   Usually relatively
    complex
Where are the weak ones?

•   Brick & Mortar Retail

•   Internal Sites

•   Small-Medium Biz

•   Healthcare Practices

•   New Cashless Ventures
Recent Breach Trends
Applications in Debug Mode

•   Applications going into production with debugging info
    set

•   Excessive logs on systems
    •   Track Data
    •   Usernames/Passwords
    •   Admin functions

•   Extra functions available for use
Deprecated or old code
•   Developers leaving old code that can still be executed
    •   page1.asp when page.asp is the correct version
    •   Deprecated functions (triggered through get/post)

•   Poorly executed upgrades
    •   Old code from old versions
        (jump.php not in current ver)
    •   Incomplete Upgrades
Poor Hardening
•   Applications ignoring input validation

•   Blank SQL Account passwords (INCLUDING SA)

•   Easily Guessed Passwords

•   Complex applications with 3rd party middleware
    •   Follow the data path
    •   Consider binary analysis

•   Clear User IDs/Passwords from app to DB or stored
Other Misc. Causes

•   DLL injection

•   Drive-By in the form of hidden iFrames
    •   INTERESTING Attacks
    •   Complexity increasing

•   Memory Dumping

•   Sniffer/Keylogger

•   Any/Any rules on firewalls
Thank you!
brw@brandenwilliams.com

  brandenwilliams.com

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OWASP Dallas

  • 1. Recent Breaches & their Causes Branden R. Williams, CISSP, CISM brw@brandenwilliams.com http://www.brandenwilliams.com
  • 2. Agenda • My background • Where I see breaches • If I were a bad guy, where would I go? • Discuss causes of recent breaches • Q/A
  • 4. Where do I see breaches? • Fewer attacks against the network layer • Usually relatively complex
  • 5. Where are the weak ones? • Brick & Mortar Retail • Internal Sites • Small-Medium Biz • Healthcare Practices • New Cashless Ventures
  • 7. Applications in Debug Mode • Applications going into production with debugging info set • Excessive logs on systems • Track Data • Usernames/Passwords • Admin functions • Extra functions available for use
  • 8. Deprecated or old code • Developers leaving old code that can still be executed • page1.asp when page.asp is the correct version • Deprecated functions (triggered through get/post) • Poorly executed upgrades • Old code from old versions (jump.php not in current ver) • Incomplete Upgrades
  • 9. Poor Hardening • Applications ignoring input validation • Blank SQL Account passwords (INCLUDING SA) • Easily Guessed Passwords • Complex applications with 3rd party middleware • Follow the data path • Consider binary analysis • Clear User IDs/Passwords from app to DB or stored
  • 10. Other Misc. Causes • DLL injection • Drive-By in the form of hidden iFrames • INTERESTING Attacks • Complexity increasing • Memory Dumping • Sniffer/Keylogger • Any/Any rules on firewalls
  • 11.
  • 12. Thank you! brw@brandenwilliams.com brandenwilliams.com