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COPYRIGHT TRUSTWAVE 2011
Presented by:
No-Knowledge Crypto Attacks
Daniel Crowley
Structure
› Background
› Attack!
› Potential Win
IDENTIFYING CIPHERTEXT
“Yep, it‟s wood”
Properties of ciphertext
› Appears random
› Generally encoded
› Decoded length often multiple of 8/16/32
–Block ciphers
Example
› Base64 encoded
› Decodes to 80 bytes
› Ent shows strong signs of randomness
› Probably ciphertext (okay, it is, I generated it)
REPLAY ATTACK
Bait and switch
Background
› Reuse of cryptovariables
› Trust in decrypted data
Attack!
› Reuse ciphertext
OR
› Find two places where ciphertext is
being accepted
› Swap them around
Potential Win
› Ciphertext from “article.php?id=(ciphertext)”
› Placed in
“doPasswordReset.php?userid=(ciphertext)”
› Reset password for another user
DECRYPTION ORACLE
Decrypt ALL the things!
Background
› Application takes encrypted input
› Application decrypts input
› Application gives you decrypted output
Identifying Decryption Oracles
› Look for encrypted input
› Modify input and look for garbled response
Attack!
› Take ciphertext from another
location
› Plug into decryption oracle
Potential Win
› “Password” cookie with encrypted value
› Plug cookie into decryption oracle
› PASSWORDS!
ENCRYPTION ORACLE
Encrypt ALL the things!
Background
› Application takes plaintext input
› Application encrypts input
› Application gives you encrypted output
Identifying Encryption Oracles
› Look for ciphertext in responses
› Modify input and look for modified ciphertext
› Length is often the giveaway
Attack!
› Encrypt strings like ‘ or 1=1#
› Plug encrypted string into any encrypted
input
› Cross your fingers
Potential Win
› resetpass.php?id=(ciphertext)
› resetpass.php?id=( ENC(„ or 1=1
#) )
› SQLi!
STREAM CIPHER BIT
FLIPPING
Flipping easy
Background
› Construction is simple
› Same key & IV means same keystream
› Reusing cryptovariables means catastrophic
failure
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Attack!
› Flip bits in ciphertext input
› Same bits in plaintext are flipped
› No modification to other parts of
message
Potential Win
› Plaintext
–username=fred&admin=0
› Flip lots of bits until…
–username=fred&admin=1
STREAM CIPHER KEYSTREAM
RECOVERY
I couldn‟t think of anything funny for this one
Attack!
› Guess plaintext of an encrypted
message
› XOR plaintext and ciphertext to get
suspected keystream
› XOR suspected keystream with
unknown ciphertext
–Attempt to read message
Definite Win
› Ability to encrypt and decrypt anything
– In byte positions where known plaintext resides
ECB BLOCK SHUFFLING
Every day I‟m shufflin‟
Background
› ECB is a block cipher mode
› Each block is encrypted independent of
others
› Blocks can be
reordered, removed, duplicated
BLOCK 1
CIPHER
BLOCK 1
BLOCK 2
CIPHER
BLOCK 2
BLOCK 3
CIPHER
BLOCK 3
PLAIN
TEXT
CIPHER
TEXT
Attack!
› Shuffle blocks around randomly in
encrypted messages
› Cross your fingers!
Plaintext before modification
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
L A S T V I S I
T E D = / E N /
H O M E . J S P
& U S E R I D =
1 2 3 4 x04 x04 x04 x04
lastVisited=/en/home.jsp&userId=1234
Plaintext after modification
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
L A S T V I S I
T E D = / E N /
H O M E . J S P
& U S E R I D =
1 & F O O = B A
1 2 3 4 x04 x04 x04 x04
lastVisited=/en/home.jsp&userId=1&foo=ba1234
CBC BIT FLIPPING
Flipping awesome
Background
› CBC is a block cipher mode
› When decrypting, each block affects next
block
› Flipping bits in ciphertext block n
– Garbles plaintext block n
– Flips same bits in plaintext block n+1
BLOCK A
IV
CIPHER
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
CIPHER
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
CIPHER
BLOCK C
PLAIN
TEXT
CIPHER
TEXT
BLOCK A
IV
CIPHER
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
CIPHER
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
CIPHER
BLOCK C
PLAIN
TEXT
CIPHER
TEXT
Attack!
› Submit ciphertext multiple times
› Flip a different bit each time
› Cross your fingers!
Potential Win
› Plaintext is:
–lastVisited=http://example.com/home.jsp&u
id=124%01
–(lastVisited=http)(://example.com/h)(ome.js
p&uid=124%01)
• Split into 16 byte blocks
› Flip bits in bytes 13-15 in block 2
–Block 2 becomes garbage
–“124” in block 3 has bits flipped in plaintext
MISCELLANEOUS
Bonus round!
Other Fun Attacks
› Padding Oracles
– padBuster.pl
› Hash length extension attacks
– Hash_extender

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No-Knowledge Crypto Attacks

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. If you care how it works, pay attention to the Background slidesBuy me a beer and ask for more detailsMore understanding makes these attacks more effective
  2. Ciphertext generated using a sound algorithm shows signs of randomnessEnt is a nice tool for testing randomness of datahttp://fourmilab.ch/randomRandom bytes play hell with lots of protocolsUsual suspects:Base64URL-safe Base64ASCII hexURL encodingDecoded length is often a multiple of 8/16/32 bytesAuthenticated crypto generally adds another 4 bytes
  3. Developers reuse cryptovariablesKeyIVCipherDevelopers usually reuse cryptovariables and trust that the data they have decrypted using their application is sane, due to the poor assumption that no one can generate or alter the encrypted data without the key.No input validationNo error handling
  4. Similar to fuzzing for XSSBit flipping should produce garbled dataWith authenticated crypto, swapping ciphertext might work
  5. Similar to fuzzing for XSS
  6. Stream ciphersProduce pseudo-random bytes (keystream) using key & IVEncryption/Decryption: XOR with keystreamIV reuse was the downfall of WEP
  7. Here is a multi-byte XOR operation. We assume this to be a part of a stream cipher. The middle row is the keystream, which is XORed with the ciphertext to decrypt the message.
  8. We do not know the keystream, but we know that flipping the bits of the ciphertext results in corresponding bits of the plaintext being flipped.
  9. Other messages’ blocks can be used tooRequires key reuse