Privacy in the developing world

MASTER THESIS
ALEX HAGEMAN – S1013068 - FEBRUARY 2014
SUPERVISOR: DR MATTHYS - SECOND READER: DR DEVROE
MASTER: CRISIS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT - LEIDEN UNIVERSITY

PRIVACY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Analysing and assessing public accountability mechanisms regarding Closed Circuit Television
surveillances and its alleged consequences for our fundamental right to privacy.
it’s not the question whether you or me have something to hide, it is the question whether they that monitor
have that right to monitor you or me and our private collectivities

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Thesis in fulfilment of the Master of Science in Public Administration in Crisis and Security Management at the
Faculty Campus The Hague at Leiden University
Photo retrieved from: www.poliziek.info

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The contemporary surveillance society
David Murakami Wood stated that we are already living in a surveillance society for some time:
• Video cameras are watching us everywhere – in buildings, shopping streets, roads and
residential areas. Automatic systems can now recognize number plates, and increasingly
recognize faces. Cameras are updated with intelligent software that can identify real-time
unlawful behaviour;
• Electronic tags make sure that those on probation do not break their release conditions, and
people arrested by police have samples of their DNA taken and kept whether they are guilty
or not. ‘Criminal tendencies’ are identified earlier and earlier in life;
• We are constantly asked to prove our identity, for benefits, healthcare, and so on. The
government introduced a new system of biometric ID cards, including ‘biometrics’
(fingerprints and iris scans) linked to a massive database of personal information;
• When we travel abroad, who we are, where we go and what we carry with us is checked and
monitored and the details stored. Our passports are changed: computer chips carry
information, and like ID cards; there are now biometric passports;
• Many schools use smart cards and even biometrics to monitor where children are, what they
eat or what books they borrow from the library;
• Our spending habits are analysed by software, and the data is sold to all kinds of businesses.
When we call service centres or apply for loans, insurance or mortgages, how quickly we are
served and what we are offered depends on what we spend, where we live and who we are;
• Our telephones, e-mails and internet use can be tapped and screened for key words and
phrases by most intelligence services;
• Our work is more and more closely monitored for performance and productivity, and even our
attitudes and lifestyle outside work are increasingly scrutinised by the organisations that
employ us.
Source: Wood, D.M., & Ball, K. (2006). A report on the Surveillance Society.
Surveillance Studies Network. Public Discussion Document, 1-98.

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Abstract
Increasing contemporary security concerns seems to justify the use of innovative technology tools,
such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras. However, these innovative tools are also means
for increasing social control by the state. It is postulated that without proper accountability
mechanisms, the use of privacy invading surveillance technologies will contribute to the creation of a
‘panoptic surveillance state’. For that reason this thesis intends to conduce to a more accountable
deployment and use of CCTV cameras, by focusing on proportionate ‘checks and balances’, which
implies that public authorities are held accountable for their laws, regulations, policies, and actions.
The intended approach of this research is to analyse and assess the governmental accountability
mechanisms, which reflect the deployment and use of CCTV by public authorities in public areas, in
the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands. Results of the analysis will be established through a
developed and amalgamated ‘CCTV-accountability Assessment Framework’ (CAF) of multiple
authors, which will do what is explained in part 3: chapter 1.3. Additionally, this research will describe
proportionate and well-encompassed recommendations for possible inadequacies in accountability
mechanisms. The rationale here is that whenever governmental authorities implement CCTV cameras
in a legitimate and proper manner by the control of accountability mechanisms, it can help to ensure
that efforts to improve security do not lead to the creation of the earlier-mentioned ‘panoptic
surveillance society’. Moreover, an accountable CCTV system is more likely to gather public support
when the protected community understands the objectives, and knows that it is the result of a
thoughtful analysis. In regard to the rationales for the selected country case studies, this research
selected the United Kingdom because it is argued by some authors to be a “bad example”, due to the
normalization of surveillance, its massive amount of surveillance technologies, and the argued lack of
proper accountability mechanisms. The Netherlands is selected because it is argued to transform into
a surveillance society, similar as the United Kingdom. Altogether, just like there are strong arguments
in favour of achieving economic growth in an environmentally-friendly manner, the prolonging of
(national) security can evidently also be maintained in a privacy-friendly manner.
The conclusion will answer the main question, which is:
To what extent do the accountability mechanisms in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom safeguard the compatibility between security and the right to privacy
regarding the increasing use of CCTV technologies in public areas, by public
authorities?

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Preface
In 2004, the 9/11 commission stated: “We must find ways of reconciling security with liberty, since the
success of one helps the other. The choice between security and liberty is a false choice. Our history
has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that
we are struggling to defend” (9/11 Commission, 2004: 395). Hence, in this regard, the question
whether justice or security is the first virtue of the 21
st
Century society remains. The problem of
enhancing security without undermining justice – managing risk without undermining the rule of law –
has always confronted societies, but recent developments such as the expanding scope of criminal
law, new counter-terrorism measures, stricter migration control, and an increasingly pronounced
concern with public safety, poses new challenges. The fundamental right to privacy is such a
challenge. While there are human right violations all across the globe, in Europe, especially in Western
Europe, the threat upon the right to privacy are “at the hands of those who control advanced
surveillance technologies, and is, and will remain the story of the early 21
st
Century” (Klitou, 2012: v).
This thesis intends to contribute to both legal- and social science debates surrounding the
development of the so-called ‘surveillance society’. It is dedicated to analyse and assess
accountability mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Accountability mechanisms
which should govern the deployment and use of Closed Circuit Television surveillances in a ‘checked
and balanced’ manner, which concern the fundamental right to privacy and the prolonging of (national)
security. Moreover, this research serves to point out both the wanted and unwanted aspects of these
new surveillance technologies and recommends how to prevent the erosion of privacy. The CCTV
projects are still of particular interest because they are ‘works in progress’. Some of their core
elements are already in use. We call those ‘first generation CCTV cameras’, but in today’s society, a
‘second generation’ is en route, which is an innovative, operational ‘smart’ surveillance technology.
These ‘smart’ technologies are still mostly discussed at this point, and therefore not implemented on a
wide scale within the Netherlands and the UK. However, these innovative technologies can become
increasingly widespread. National security, public safety, the prevention and detection of crime, and
the control of borders, are among the most powerful forces behind the use of a wide range of CCTV
techniques and the collection and analysis of large quantities of personal data (House of Lords, 2009:
paragraph 45). Although these new technologies have enlarged the range of available possibilities for
public and private agencies to increase security, it is postulated by Mathiesen (1997: 229), that it
contributes to the creation of a ‘panoptic surveillance state’, up to the point where questions
concerning ‘ethics and bias’ are raised by the public- and human rights organizations. These ‘ethics
and biases’, are a part of this research, and are actuated by arguments, such as: “CCTV technologies
are contributing to a trend in state surveillance whereby people are kept under constant observation
without any prior indications of involvement in criminal activities or disorderly behaviour” (Eijkman,
2012b: 3). From this perspective, Vernon Coacker (UK Member of Parliament), made some striking
statements in a report of the UK House of Lords (2009), which partially reflects the root causes for
writing this thesis: “Respect for human rights should be a core principle of states. We have to cherish
the right to privacy. That is fundamental to all of us and needs to be protected. The UK government

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has always been clear that where surveillance affects privacy, it should only be done where it is both
necessary and proportionate … of course, the other principle to balance up with all of that is the desire
to protect the public … not only from terrorism but also from serious crime … it is about where we
draw the line and how we have to find a correct balance between these things which is absolutely
essential. However, it is not always easy to do that.” Vernon Coacker also stated: “different times
require the appropriate response to that particular time. Times change, technologies change. There
are difficulties, there are threats to us, as we know only too well, which we have seen in our streets,
which requires us to take action. Additionally, society should respond in the appropriate way to the
threat that it faces at that particular time, always having regard to the need to balance national security
with human rights, and the judgment of where that line should be drawn will vary one age to the next”
(House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 263).
Regarding my perspective; I find the knowledge about the consequences of our (future)
‘information society’, and the advancement of the latest technologies capable of infringing upon the
right to privacy extremely important. Also, I deem the debates surrounding privacy and security as
extremely relevant, but also rather complex. Complex, because security is just like privacy a universal
human right, and we need our governments to protect our human rights, and foremost, we need the
government to protect us against injury, harm, or termination. Additionally, we want our governments
to protect our national interests, and our properties and objects from unlawful or unauthorized damage
or destruction. We also want our governments to act in a proportionate manner, and not in a manner
where high-profile judicial mismanagement of CCTV are easily ‘handled’; or the ways in which certain
legal protections are sidestepped, or cast aside in the battle against anti-social behaviour. Altogether,
complexities arise because the ‘security versus privacy debate’ places governments between ‘a rock
and a hard place’; in trying to protect our national or individual interests and properties, and at the
same time safeguard our fundamental right to privacy.
Hence, it could be argued that the context of privacy protection has changed. The threshold to
monitor civilians for security and safety purposes is lowered, and legislation, guidelines and ‘best-
practices’ needs to be updated. From a ‘safety and security perspective’, innovative monitoring and
surveillance technologies are to be welcomed. Nonetheless, the effects for democratic societies and
the protection of citizen’s rights have to be taken into account as well. And for these reasons, I believe
it is time to thoroughly analyse and asses the great challenges and threats, posed by (smart) CCTV
surveillance, on the right to privacy, and to oppose the prediction that privacy will end soon, as multiple
academic authors depict.

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Table of contents
List of abbreviations............................................................................................................................................ 8
Part 1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 10
Chapter 1 Central thesis....................................................................................................................... 10
1.1 Contextual problem statement...........................................................................10
1.2 Research objectives.......................................................................................... 13
Part 2 Conceptual framework.......................................................................................................................... 15
Chapter 1 The concept of security........................................................................................................15
1.1 Security as a contested concept....................................................................... 15
1.2 Security in historical perspective....................................................................... 15
1.3 Redefining the concept of security in a contemporary design........................... 16
1.4 Conclusion.........................................................................................................17
Chapter 2 Closed Circuit Television......................................................................................................18
2.1 The evolution of Closed Circuit Television technology.......................................18
2.2 What is Closed Circuit Television?.....................................................................19
2.3 Types of Closed Circuit Television.................................................................... 21
2.4 Criticisms regarding Closed Circuit Television.................................................. 22
2.5 Conclusion......................................................................................................... 23
Chapter 3 The concept of privacy.........................................................................................................24
3.1 Privacy as a contested concept......................................................................... 24
3.2 Conclusion......................................................................................................... 26
Chapter 4 The concept of public accountability mechanisms.............................................................. 27
4.1 Accountability as a contested concept.............................................................. 27
4.2 What is accountability........................................................................................ 28
4.3 Types of accountability...................................................................................... 29
4.4 The relevancy of accountability mechanisms.................................................... 31
4.5 Conclusion......................................................................................................... 31
Part 3 Theoretical framework...........................................................................................................................33
Chapter 1 Assessment framework........................................................................................................33
1.1 GAP Framework – Global Accountability Project: Blagescu et al...................... 34
1.2 Public Accountability Framework: Bovens......................................................... 35
1.3 CCTV’s-accountability Assessment Framework................................................ 36
Part 4 Methodology & Approach..................................................................................................................... 40
Chapter 1 Operationalization................................................................................................................ 40
1.1 Type of research, methodology, and approach................................................. 40
1.2 Rationale behind the selection of cases............................................................ 41
1.3 Main sources of information...............................................................................42
1.4 Research questions........................................................................................... 44
1.5 Issues and areas not substantially addressed...................................................44
1.6 Assessment framework..................................................................................... 45
1.6.1 Operationalization............................................................................ 45
Part 5 Analysis & Assessments...................................................................................................................... 56
Chapter 1 Accountability mechanisms in the United Kingdom............................................................. 56
1.1 SECTION 1: Democratic dimension.................................................................. 58
1.2 SECTION 2: Constitutional dimension............................................................... 67
1.3 SECTION 3: Cybernetic dimension................................................................... 68
Chapter 2 Accountability mechanisms in the Netherlands................................................................... 71
2.1 SECTION 1: Democratic dimension.................................................................. 73
2.2 SECTION 2: Constitutional dimension...............................................................80
2.3 SECTION 3: Cybernetic dimension................................................................... 82
Part 6 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 85
Part 7 Recommendations.................................................................................................................................89
Part 8 References..............................................................................................................................................94
Part 9 Appendix.................................................................................................................................................102

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List of abbreviations
2012 Act Protection of Freedoms Act, 2012
AFSJ Area of Freedom Security and Justice
ALPR Automatic License Plate Recognition
CAF CCTV-accountability Assessment Framework
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
Code of Practice Surveillance Camera Code of Practice
CSC Chief Surveillance Commissioner
CST Council of Science and Technology
DPA Data Protection Act
Dutch DPA Dutch Data Protection Authority
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EU European Union
HRA Human Rights Act
IC Information Commissioner
ICC Interception of Communication Commissioner
ICO Information Commissionaire’s Office
IPT Investigatory Powers Tribunal
MOD Ministry of Defence
MOJ Ministry of Justice
OSC Office of Surveillance Commissioners
PDPA Personal Data Protection Act
PIA Privacy Impact Assessment
RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
SCC Surveillance Camera Commissioner
SIA Security Industry Authority
UK United Kingdom
WPR Wet Persoonsregistraties, or the Registration of Personal Data Act

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Chapter 1 Central thesis
1.1 Contextual problem statement
Before starting an extensive elaboration on a part of the problem in the widely discussed security
versus privacy debate, it is important to recognize the assumption that the collective interest to
security and the rights to privacy are competing values, and deemed irreconcilable in the European
Union (EU), which could have disadvantages for the exercise of human rights in democratic societies.
Therefore, analysing accountability mechanisms, and assess whether these mechanisms provide
proper checked and balanced elements is deemed necessary. Besides, Article two of the treaty on the
EU, outlined in the next paragraph, complements this argument.
In the context of EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ), the “EU is founded on
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights” (European Union, 2008: title 1, article 2), which include the right to privacy. However, as
acknowledged by the EU Court of Justice, “the fundamental rights recognized by the Court are not
absolute (…). Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those rights (…) provided
that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European
Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable
interference, impairing the very substance of those rights” (Hofmann, Rowe, & Turk, 2011: 159). The
objectives of general interest, or aims, pursued by the EU, are the promotion of peace, the
preservation of its traditions, and citizens’ well being. Furthermore, security is instrumental to the
pursuit of the objective of general interests by the EU, and the protection of fundamental rights can be
seen as a public good. Hence, the protection of public or national security is seen as a legitimate aim
for justifying restrictions on the exercise of the rights in a democratic society. Moreover, this statement
– coupled with the increasing contemporary security concerns, such as: the increase in anti-social
behaviour and international terrorism – seems to justify the use of innovative technological tools, which
could risk invasive and abusive surveillances: where the few, in this case the state, continuously keep
under observation the many, the people, what facilitates the creation of a ‘surveillance society’
(Mathiesen, 1997: 221). Altogether, this complements the often discussed question: about how the
balance is struck between achieving as much security as possible, by eliminating risks, and still
upholding sufficient privacy for all.
In regard to increasing contemporary security concerns, the EU has promoted a broad
spectrum of measures serving a wide understanding of security, ranging from crime prevention to
measures surrounding the ‘war on terrorism’. Broadly speaking, three main strategies can be
identified: an increase in the grant of very broad powers to the police; the creation of broad terrorism
offences, including early-intervention offences and the use of preventive measures to curb the
activities of individuals outside the criminal justice system; and an increased use of a form of
surveillance (Fenwick, 2011: 107), which includes the use of CCTV cameras. Although some argue
that (national) security is a legitimate aim for justifying restrictions on the exercise of human rights, and
that new technologies, such as surveillance, is a powerful tool to prevent anti-social behaviour;
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

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questions are raised about the relation between public authorities and citizens, and therefore about
human rights compliances regarding laws and regulations. These concerns are partly addressed by
focusing on ‘checks and balances’, which implies that public authorities are held accountable for their
laws, regulations, policies, and actions (Eijkman and Weggemans, 2011: 147). In addition, Fisher
(2004) stated that we are living in an “age of accountability” (p.1), where demands for public officials to
account for their decisions transcend levels of governance, and are on the rise. However, other than a
few descriptions of existing formal accountability arrangements, there have been almost no efforts to
describe and evaluate how existing accountability mechanisms regarding public institutions and their
actions operate, although democratic principles affirm that the public at large should have the ability
and power to influence the decisions that affect their lives (Kraft-Kasack, 2008: 537; Stie, 2010: 3).
Furthermore, on the international level, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
‘promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terror’, Martin
Scheinin, has highlighted the “erosion” of the rights to privacy in relation to the fight against terrorism
(UN Human Rights Council, 2009: 2). According to Scheinin (2009) the increased use of surveillance
powers in public places and on large groups of people leads to weaker systems of authorisation and
oversight. Moreover, technologies, according to Scheinin (2009), lack adequate legal safeguards (UN
Human Rights Council, 2009: 14). If there are, for instance, no proper checks and balances in relation
to new technological tools, there is the risk of eroding the fundamental rights to privacy. In addition, the
creation of a surveillance society affects, besides potential terrorists and serious criminals, also
ordinary people, who run the risk of being (preventively) labelled a threat to national security or public
order (Eijkman, 2012b: 2). In this regard, and in the perspective that media, interest groups, and
citizens, are all adopting an increasingly more critical attitude toward governments, deployed
accountability mechanisms should be more analysed and assessed on proportionality. This is deemed
relevant, because the respect for authority is fast “dwindling” and the confidence in public institutions is
under pressure in various Western countries (Elchardus and Smits, 2002).
In regard to upholding as much freedom as possible and to counter the risk that innocent
individuals are associated with security measures, and additionally, to prevent the earlier mentioned
erosion on the right to privacy, the EU ‘formally’ relies on elaborated systems of privacy and personal
data protection laws. These laws detail concrete safeguards that substantiate the human right to
respect for privacy life as established by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
(ECHR) (Fuster et al., 2013: 30). Moreover, in order to minimize harm and breaches of human rights
as a result of expanded surveillance systems, well-encompassed safeguards and effective oversight is
required. The Council of Europe’s ‘Venice Commission’ stated that a scrutiny check is considered
important for holding public authorities accountable regarding the implementation of video surveillance
and its effect on human rights (Venice Commission, 2007). Such a ‘scrutiny check’ should be based
on international human rights law criteria (Eijkman and Weggemans, 2011: 147).

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This research will focus on some of the elements of these international criteria for the use of
CCTV in a proper and accountable manner, for example: the purpose specification (e.g., what is the
surveillance scheme trying to do?); accountability/oversight (e.g., who is legally responsible for the
CCTV schemes?); transparency (e.g., providing notice and contact information to the public at large);
limitation/retention (e.g., restricting access, and specifying the timeframe for retention);
security/evaluation (e.g., audit procedures, clear and well-documented handling procedures, privacy
and security safeguards in schemes). Hence, on the international level there are clear emerging
criteria for public accountability in relation to visual surveillance. However, two highly acclaimed
human rights organisations, ‘JUSTICE’ and ‘Liberty’, argued that, despite the enormous growth of
surveillance cameras, there is no framework governing the use and implementation of these cameras.
JUSTICE also stated that it is “important to bear in mind the limitations of the constitutional framework
for the protection of the constitutional rights” (JUSTICE, 2007: 30). Furthermore, critics of smart
surveillance, and advocates of human rights, argue that the rapid development and deployment of new
surveillance technologies, in combination with its rigid character have led to parts of laws and policies
becoming outdated or incomplete, including the safeguards that substantiate human rights as
established by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. In addition, human rights
advocates claims that surveillance technologies, such as CCTV, remains largely unregulated due to
the fact that effective regulation can only be achieved if it is in place before CCTV has spread widely
(Gras, 2004: 228). According to Fenwick, the lack of national guidance, and the lack of concrete
privacy safeguards for the use of technological surveillance tools, militates against the measures
found proportionate in democratic societies (Fenwick, 2011: 112).
Backed by case studies and overall analysis, this research is centred on the innovative
technologies of CCTV surveillance that could, without the proper accountability mechanisms, create
panoptic surveillance societies. Additionally, as the discussion about governmental accountability in
relation to innovative, technological CCTV measures progresses, one could raise the question whether
state accountability should be reconsidered (Eijkman, 2012b; Eijkman & Weggemans 2011; Eijkman &
Weggemans, 2013). In this perspective, this research analyses the accountability mechanisms
regarding the use of CCTV (concerning the relevant checks and balances in privacy and security) in
the Netherlands and in the UK, and assesses these mechanisms according to an amalgamated theory
and definition of Bovens (2005, 2007a, 2007b, & 2010) and Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd
(2005). After the assessment, recommendations for checked and balanced accountability mechanisms
will be established. These checks and balances are deemed necessary for the deployment and use of
(smart) CCTV surveillance in the Netherlands and the UK (or the European Union in that matter) that
coincides the necessity of upholding national security, with a human right-based perspective. In this
perspective, and in the light of different articles and statements made by various academics, such as:
Whitaker (2000), Spinello (1997), Garfinkel (2001), and Holtzman (2006), that privacy (at least as we
know it) will end in the near future, if we do nothing about it, or is already on its way to ending, makes
a valid reasoning and seemingly urgent calling to analyse and assess governmental accountability
mechanisms for the deployment and use of CCTV surveillance.

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1.2 Research objectives
This section outlines the research objectives in an abstract and concise manner; and are as followed:
First, defining the four contested variables in a conceptual framework for finding common ground, and
a language of reconciliation; second, analysing the accountability mechanisms regarding the use of
CCTV in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; third, evaluating and assessing the accountability
mechanisms through an amalgamated theory of multiple authors; fourth, defining an approach for
striking a balance between privacy on the one hand, and security on the other; last, developing
recommendations for proper checks and balances, which will reflect the accountability mechanisms
that coincides the necessity of upholding national security, with a human right-based perspective.

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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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Chapter 1 The concept of security
Besides globalization, the concept of security is implicitly related to the concept of human values, as it
is to CCTV. From that perspective and the perspective of finding a language of reconciliation between
security and human rights, or, put another way, when searching for some basis upon which ‘liberals’
can engage with those who promote the pursuit of security, it is important to develop a well-
encompassed understanding of each of these concepts. In this chapter, the frequently asked question:
“how to define the concept of security?” is answered by providing a detailed review and analysis of the
concept. Therefore, paragraph 1.1 explicates the argument that security is seen as a contested
concept. Paragraph 1.2 outlines a contemporary historical overview of the evolving concept of
security, along with the preceded discussions concerning today’s security versus human rights
debates. In paragraph 1.3, a contemporary understanding of security is given regarding the
conceptualization of the European construction and its transformation in recent years through the anti-
terror efforts. The last paragraph concludes by summing up the important aspects regarding the
concept of security.
1.1 Security as a contested concept
Besides the argument that security is of vital importance, it is also legally a human right. The term is
frequently used to help raise consciousness of the importance of particular issues, which are then so
labelled in the minds of the population at large (Buzan, 1983: 18). Security is also portrayed as an
elastic legal concept in EU law. It takes on several shapes, such as ‘international’, ‘internal/external’,
‘national’ or even ‘essentially national’ security, which do not systematically correspond to specific
manifestations of sovereignty (Fuster, 2012: 331). Despite the numerous efforts by scholars of security
studies and academics to conceptualize 'security' in a coherent and systematic way, no single,
generally accepted definition of security has been produced. In this regard, security can be seen as a
contested concept, on which no consensus exists, (Baldwin, 1997: 7), but defies the pursuit of an
agreed general definition (Buzan, 1983: 10). The ‘concept of security’ refers to different sets of issues,
purposes, and values, often closely reflecting conflicting theories in ‘International Relations’. However,
in regard to this conceptual vagueness, it is crucial to gain clear understanding of the concept security,
otherwise, finding common ground in discussions concerning the security versus privacy nexus will be
difficult. Moreover, it is deemed important to look at security from a historical perspective, because
these are the foundations of all the aspects regarding security, besides, it shows the foundations of
‘European Liberal thoughts’ on privacy and security, which also reflects the Dutch and British debates
in the privacy versus security nexus. This will be discussed in the next paragraph.
1.2 Security in historical perspective
Security in present day is still argued to be a contested concept. But in regard to the history of the
concept ‘security’, the term also shows ambiguities. Ambiguities, as to numerous significant changes
of ‘borders’, counter-concepts, and key tensions, and therefore the meaning of security cannot be held
PART TWO - CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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as a constant – or just as having a constant core – across centuries. For that reason, the starting point
in this part of ‘security in a historical perspective’ is an angle of incidence from Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), which was an English philosopher, best known today for his work on political philosophy.
Hobbes is relevant because of his 1651 book “Leviathan”, which established the foundations for most
of the Western political philosophy from the perspective of ‘social contract theory’. Hobbes also
developed some of the fundamentals – which reflects parts of this research – of the earlier-mentioned
‘European liberal thoughts’, namely: the natural equality of all men; the artificial character of the
political order, which led to the later distinction between civil society and the state; the view that all
legitimate political power must be “representative”; and a liberal interpretation of law leaving people
free to do whatever the law does not explicitly forbid (Manent, 1994: 20-38).
The Hobbesian, early modern usage of security is the ‘protection against external threats’, and
against the break-down of domestic order. But as stated by Weaver (2012), the early modern sense in
classical texts has the protection of one individual against another as the core. Only in a secondary
sense does the external protection come into the picture (Weaver, 2012: 49). During the 16
th
to 18
th
Century, the state aimed at specific, detailed regulation and laws to pertaining man’s utmost
happiness in life, however, towards the 19
th
Century, these regulatory schemes were increasingly
seen as limiting freedom (Foucault, 1995: 20), and thus not to be the optimal policy. Moreover, the mid
20
th
Century was centred on debates regarding the relationship between freedom and security. Mr de
Jouvenel (1947) formulated this in general terms as the ‘battle’ in our society between Libertarians and
Securitarians (Jouvenel, 1947: 414). However, important in this regard is the significant amount of
authors stating that: “liberty is a precondition for security and/or how security is necessary for liberty”
(Conze, 1984: 852).
1.3 Redefining the concept of security in a contemporary design
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the concept of security was increasing in popularity and became more
dominant. Some argued that the concept of security has become an ‘overdeveloped concept’, “so wide
in its scope that it is in danger of being emptied of its meaning” (Garnett, 1996: 12). Hence, security is
still at the core of controversies among scholars and policymakers today. Its key innovation, by
governments and policy makers, has been to place the individual, or some individuals, at the heart of
security considerations and the securitisation processes. Rather than collective security, or the
security of the state, it is deemed more important that the security of the individuals is safeguarded. In
addition, individuals are assessed and categorised in the light of their perceived dangerousness to
other individuals. This results in an increase of state’s powers for safeguarding individuals’ security.
As argued by Burgess (2009), the key to understanding security and security threats lies in
understanding the systems which links human values to the technologies that put them under threat
(p.310). Moreover, globalization has brought significant changes to the present threat landscape.
There is a consensus today, among both scholars and practitioners, that a wide range of security
threats, both new and traditional, confronts states, individuals and societies. New forms of nationalism,
ethnic conflict and civil war, information technology, biological and chemical warfare, resource

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conflicts, pandemics, mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and environmental dangers,
challenges the conventional means of understanding threats and assuring the security of all regions of
the world (Burgess, 2009: 312). Altogether, in the current globalized setting, the challenge of
maintaining security is no longer limited to traditional foreign policies. Within such an atmosphere,
Barry Buzan claims (1983) that “the security of human collectivities is affected by factors belonging to
five main sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental” (p.31).
Additionally, nowadays, security threats have become more diverse, less visible and less
predictable. In this new formulation of security, attention has turned to the perception of insecurities,
security threats, and the term ‘securitization’ (Kirchner, 2005: paragraph 7). The latter signifies a
process by which particular issues are ‘taken out of the sphere of every-day politics’ and are defined
as security problems. In this respect, security is analysed as the reaction of political actors towards an
existing or perceived threat. Hence, securitization is merely a political process and differs from a threat
that can be caused by various factors (Kirchner, 2005: paragraph 7). Furthermore, the management of
insecurities through innovative technology are increasingly becoming policy priorities for the Western
societies. New technologies of control and surveillance, which rely in particular on evolutions in
technologies of information and communication, are deemed crucial because they allow agencies to
anticipate threats and act proactively instead of being limited to reactive measures. This new
emphasis on technological responses to insecurity is justified in governmental arenas through the
argument that this drive is rendered necessary by the environment of the earlier-mentioned global
threats. However, these new technologies bolster the capacity of security agencies to intrude into the
private lives of citizens and non-citizens alike, and create major potentialities of encroachment upon
fundamental rights.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter was devoted to describe and define the contested concept of security. Therefore, this
chapter concludes by stating the following concise definition regarding the concept of security: security
is first and foremost seen as the protection of persons from injury, harm or termination, and secondly,
the protection of objects and property from unlawful and unauthorized damage of destruction. Another
important aspect to mention regarding the contemporary concept of security is: the growing trend by
governments and policy makers to place the individual at the heart of security considerations and
securitization processes, resulting in increasing powers of the state. This is due to the fact that
providing security and prevention requires risk assessments and the monitoring of dangerous citizens
and aliens alike. Moreover, due to the globalization of diverse, less visible, and less predictable
security threats, new technologies of control and surveillance are deemed crucial, but could create
potentialities of encroachment upon human rights, like the right to privacy, which will be analysed in
the next chapter.

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Chapter 2 Closed Circuit Television
This chapter examines today’s ‘surveillance society’ through the lens of current and emerging CCTV
technologies. As widely recognized, CCTV surveillance systems may legitimately be deployed for the
sake of (national) security and countering terrorism, preventing and detecting crime, protecting
property and individuals, and defending public interests. The police are especially permitted to use
CCTV systems for carrying out their duties and functions. Private entities may also be permitted to use
CCTV cameras, since their use may be considered reasonable to prevent criminal offenses or assist
in the lawful arrest of offenders, when carried out in accordance with the law. However, this research
solely focuses on CCTV cameras implemented by public organizations in public areas.
This chapter analyses the concept of CCTV, by looking at the evolution its technology in
paragraph 2.1. Paragraph 2.2 will answer the question what CCTV is in a concise and descriptive
manner. Paragraph 2.3 analyses the different types of CCTV. Paragraph 2.4 outlines contemporary
criticism regarding the use of CCTV and its argued privacy-invading contents. Last, paragraph 2.5
sums up the important aspects of Closed Circuit Television, and describes a concise and final
definition that will be used in this research.
2.1 The evolution of Closed Circuit Television technology
The concept of surveillance has in itself existed for hundreds of years (Foucault, 1995: 16), and has
been widely employed throughout that time by multiple countries and organisations with varying
degrees of success. Its use is regularly and relatively uncontroversial characterised as an necessary
part of a democratic society. Moreover, the on-going evolution of CCTV technology has evolved from
expensive, fixed cameras connected to videocassette records via cables, which recorded and stored
restricted amounts of low-resolution video data, to affordable, wireless ‘pan/tilt/zoom’ CCTV cameras,
which can be remotely accessed and controlled, and can record practically unlimited amounts of
digital, high resolution video data, transmitted to digital hard drives for storage and analysis (Bullock,
2009: 15-17). Furthermore, it should be noted that during the 21
th
Century, CCTV installations are not
evolving and implemented in every country in the same velocity and pace.
Particularly in the UK, the number of surveillance cameras and the innovation in CCTV
cameras has increased dramatically. A common cited figure is a total of 4.2 million cameras across
the UK; however, this figure is based on a working paper published in 2002 by the academics Michael
McCahill and Clive Norris (CCTV User Group, 2011: 2). Another conducted research in 2011, by the
Cheshire Police, puts the figure closer to 1.85 million (Evans, 2012: paragraph 8). Furthermore, the
history of CCTV in the United Kingdom can be traced back all the way to 1960, when the Metropolitan
To provide clarity about public areas, the next conceptualization will be applied: the concept ‘public area’ is
most generally used as: all the places where one comes and goes, meaning the street or roads that are
accessible for everyone. However, the remaining public spaces, which are freely accessible, also fall under
this concept, for example: airports, malls, business parks, bus or train stations, public parking lots, public
buildings, and so on.

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Police installed two temporary cameras in Trafalgar Square to monitor crowds ahead of the arrival of
the Thai Royal Family. The first permanent installation of CCTV in the UK came in the form of a
permanent camera at a London Transport train station in 1961, moreover, throughout the 1960s, the
overwhelming focus of CCTV cameras was on transport security; cameras were installed at numerous
railway stations (Wood, McCahill, & Norris, 2004: 1-2). According to the ‘Surveillance Studies Network’
(an international research centre), during the 1990s approximately 78 percent of UK Home Office’s
crime prevention budget was spent on installing CCTV, whilst some £500 million of public money was
invested in CCTV in the decade up to 2006 (Ball et al., 2006: 8). Where previously this money might
have been spent on street lighting and supporting neighbourhood crime prevention initiatives, it is now
used to maintain and expand the network of police and local authority cameras. Moreover, the 9/11
attacks prompted increased security across much of the western world, and the UK was no exception.
The Netherlands, however, does not have an extensive history in the use of CCTV cameras
like the United Kingdom. The first projects using CCTV cameras in public spaces in the Netherlands
date back to 1997 (Flight, Heerwaarden, & van Soomeren, 2003: 1), but, just six years later in January
2003, more than 80 of the country’s 550 municipalities were using CCTV in public places – in
entertainment districts, shopping centres, car parks, industrial areas, and public transport (Gras, 2004:
224). With estimations over 200.000 CCTV cameras (DutchNews, 2013: paragraph 1) operational in
the Netherlands, and over 1350 surveillance cameras just in Schiphol Airport (Eijkman & Weggemans,
2011: 143), CCTV surveillance is becoming a hot issue in the Netherlands.
Contrasting to the amount of cameras in the United Kingdom, and the fast increasing rate of
deployed CCTV cameras in the Netherlands, Sweden only has an estimated number of 30.000 CCTV
cameras installed, with systems consisting of solely 3.2 cameras on average (Gras, 2004: 224). In
addition, the first French cities that started using CCTV cameras were around the 1990s. However,
between 2007 and 2010, the French government spent relatively little of their budget, around €72.1
million, to develop CCTV system. Resulting in an additional 5000 cameras in 2009, thereby the total
number of ‘street-area’ CCTV cameras reached 27.000 (Germain et al., 2012: 294).
2.2 What is Closed Circuit Television?
Closed Circuit Television, or CCTV as it is commonly called, generally refers to all semi permanently
installed video equipment primarily used to monitor places or behaviour, usually by the police or other
state or public authorities (Bellanova et al., 2012: 24). CCTV is a surveillance system in which a
number of cameras are connected through a closed circuit. The cameras are used to monitor and
record images of what takes place in specific locations in real time. Cameras may be ‘actively
monitored’ in “real time”, where those monitoring the cameras can provide a response to incidents;
they may also be ‘passively monitored’, in that they may only record data which can be later referred
to if an incident occurs (Bellanova et al., 2012: 25). Moreover, the cameras can be fixed, set to scan
an area, or controllers can operate them. Monitors can be watched by those controllers, or can be left
unmonitored. The recorded information can be stored and reviewed by those who have access to the
recordings at their convenience. The growing use of CCTV cameras in public and private places,

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increased reliance on the interception of communications by the police and security services, and
generally provide notice to the shoppers or other individuals, who are being monitored, that cameras
are in operation (House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 19). Besides contributing to the criminal justice
system to prevent and detect crime, the cameras also contribute to make citizens feel safer and more
secure in public spaces. In this regard, the authors Armitage, Smyth, and Pease (1999) articulated that
CCTV as a mechanism is able to prevent crime in numerous ways, for example: “caught in the act”-
perpetrators will be detected, and possibly removed or deterred; “you have been framed” – CCTV
deters potential offenders who perceive an elevated risk of apprehension; “effective deployment” –
CCTV directs security personnel to ambiguous situations, which may head off their translation into
crime; “publicity” – CCTV could symbolise efforts to take crime seriously, and the perception of those
efforts may both energise law-abiding citizens or deter crime; “time for crime” – CCTV may be
perceived as reducing the time available to commit crime, preventing those crimes that require
extended time and effort; or for instance, “appeal to the cautious” – cautious people migrate to the
areas with CCTV to shop, leave their cars, and so on (p.226-27). Hence, examples of purposes
regarding CCTV monitoring and recording of public areas, we can divide, not limited, the following
categories: protection of buildings and properties; verification of security alarms; video patrol of public
areas; criminal investigation; protection of pedestrians; and ‘special event security’.
The ‘first generation’ CCTV cameras are used solely for visual surveillance, however, there is a
second generation CCTV en route (already implemented, but not on a wide scale), which can be seen
as an operational ‘smart’ surveillance technology with innovative enhancements.
Because this research will analyse CCTV in the broadest sense, it will include both generations of
CCTV. To analyse CCTV it is important to focus on the on-going potential enhancements, because
these enhancements will increasingly be implemented in the future. Klitou (2012: 118) argued that
CCTV enhancements to public surveillance cameras could include the following integration:
The term “smart” is often used in this research. The reason for this is that (future) prospects of camera
surveillance is linked with the notion of ‘smart’ characteristics. Smart surveillance systems are capable of
extracting application-specific information from captured information (such as digital images) in order to
generate high-level event description that can ultimately be used to make automated or semi-automated
decisions. Smart surveillance systems inherently offer a high level of scalability, as they in turn can act as
input to other surveillance systems (Vermeulen & Bellanova, 2012: 298).
§ Automatic License Plate Recognition systems (ALPR) that can track drivers;
§ Biometric technology, or face-recognition technology, that can be used to rapidly identify individuals;
§ Intelligent software that recognizes unlawful behaviour, activities, events or certain objects real-time;
§ Microphones or audio sensors, that can record audio data; loudspeakers that can enable CCTV
control room operators to communicate with people;
§ RFID- (radio frequency identification) readers that can track people in possession of RFID tags;
§ Software agents that can automatically and purposefully mine (discovering patterns or anomalies)
the vast amounts of visual and audio data generated and stored;
§ Millimetre imaging technology that see through clothes;
§ Networked sensors that can monitor people’s eye movements, body heat, and so on.

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2.3 Types of Closed Circuit Television
This section takes a closer look towards the deployed CCTV cameras, and outlines the different
perspectives and purposes regarding its implementation and deployment. CCTV cameras serve many
functions and are used in both public and private settings. Besides public and private, there is also a
‘public-private’ amalgamation, due to the ‘blurring of boundaries’. Another common distinction is CCTV
deployment for mass- or targeted surveillance purposes.
First, a distinction between public and private use of CCTV is deemed important. However, the
distinction between those two settings is becoming increasingly blurred as public services are
provided through partnerships and other joint arrangements. Concerning the public sectors and joint
arrangements, CCTV surveillance may be used to assist in the provision of social benefits to
individuals or groups, and in the identification of people who may be either at risk, or who pose a risk
to others if they are not identified and properly ‘treated’. In this regard, many public sector bodies
employ outside-firms to manage their databases (House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 55). The private
sector surveillance is prevalent in the majority of commercial environments, such as shopping centres,
supermarkets, stores, and banks. Surveillance also plays a major role in the workplace, with many
employers monitoring the behaviour of employees in order to assess performances. CCTV cameras
can be used to watch over warehouses, industrial and business premises that cannot be patrolled
easily. Moreover, domestic CCTV surveillance devices can be readily purchased and installed in
private residences (House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 59). In regard to the amalgamation, there is
increasing ‘co-operation’ between public and private CCTV cameras. Generally, public authorities only
permit the use of CCTV cameras focused on public places; however, the involvement of private parties
in cameras surveillance in public places is to some extent allowed. In case of co-operation between
public authorities and private security companies, the public authorities remain responsible for the
surveillance activities in the public area. Second, the two other broad types of surveillances that can
be distinguished are: mass surveillance and targeted surveillance. Mass surveillance is also known as
‘passive’. It is not targeted on any particular individual but gathers images and information for possible
future use. CCTV is an example of this type of surveillance. Moreover, targeted surveillance is
surveillance directed at particular individuals and can involve the use of specific powers by authorised
public agencies. Targeted surveillance can be carried out overtly or covertly, and can involve human
agents (House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 24). Targeting involves visual surveillance devices that can
sense movement, objects, behaviour or persons. Altogether, this research aims solely on the public
deployment and use of CCTV in public areas, either through mass- or targeted surveillance, but does
not incorporate the private or public-private deployment of surveillance.

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2.4 Criticisms regarding Closed Circuit Television
The implementation of an intensified surveillance by Closed Circuit Television as a generalized
mechanism for controlling crime and deviance raises different conflicts in various field of an
individual’s life and activities. These conflicts have been overlooked as long as security reasons are
becoming more prevalent when balancing opposing interests. From this perspective, the right to
privacy continues to be at risk given that societies are preferably more inclined to choose security in
the first place. In this regard this research refers to Ulrich Beck, who argued that the border between
‘traditional’ modern society and the ‘risk society’ is defined by a very simple criterion: the phenomenon
of a risk society becomes visible where societies are exposed to risks which are no longer covered by
any kind of insurance (Beck, 1993: 44). Risk in itself is not a new phenomenon. Beck (1993) argued
that for the appropriate understanding of new approaches to surveillance and social control, one
should take into account the so-called ‘society of risks’ and its described emphasis on the pervasive
and coercive acts of government. In addition, it is commonly held that contemporary capitalist nation-
states are ‘surveillance societies’, because surveillance is becoming increasingly normalized (Wood &
Webster, 2009: 2). The domestication of security and the globalisation of surveillance would be ‘limited
processes’ if their results did not become increasingly ‘normal’, and part of everyday life.
In regard to overly intrusive governmental surveillances, Beck does not elude simply to the
breakdown of some notion of a ‘welfare state’, but the general failure of modern institutions to cope
with the self-imposed consequences of modernizations (Matten, 2004: 379). But it is important, when
there is a normalisation of surveillance, to analyse the ethical consequences. For these reasons this
paragraph focuses on some of the criticisms that is mentioned in the reviewed literature by a various
amount of authors. The most striking criticism regards the argument that CCTV cameras are not
effective crime-fighting tools (Welsh & Farrington, 2002: 41; Gill & Sprigs, 2005: 51; Welsh &
Farrington, 2008: 41; Armitage, 2002: 14-15), however most of the public is still ‘painfully’ unaware of
this fact (Farrier, 2013). Moreover, it is argued by Farrier (2013) that the presence of cameras has
substantial negative effects on societies, by increasing fear, decreasing trust and destroying a sense
of community. Additionally, other forms of criticisms are expressed and underpinned through
arguments that regard CCTV as a ‘security theatre’ or ‘stage-set security’, claiming CCTV as ‘symbols
of order’ in the ‘security theatre’. Wood and Webster (2009) argued that CCTV cameras are a visible
manifestation of the state’s concern about crime and security, their deployment show that ‘something
is being done’ (p.363). Hence, the term ‘surveillance society’ has embedded within it a sense of
negativity, it is a very subjective term and conjures up images of a ‘big brother state’, the mass control
of citizens, and threats to privacy (Wood & Webster, 2009: 266). However, it is more important to have
an objective perspective on the side effects of CCTV. For example, most citizens will pass through
CCTV surveyed areas relatively anonymously, unidentified, and ignored. But there are citizens that will
attract more attention, indicating suspicious behaviour known to the CCTV operatives, or just seem
somehow different than ‘normal’. These individuals can be scrutinized and surveyed more closely,
their movements and activities more closely monitored, and information cross-referenced and recoded
for future use (Wood & Webster, 2009: 13), while they are innocent of any crime whatsoever.

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Other criticism or disadvantages mentioned in the literature is that independent assessments
have repeatedly revealed that CCTV is extremely limited in its effectiveness regarding preventing and
solving crime (Welsh & Farrington, 2002: 42; Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 115), which could result in
arguments of inefficient use of public funds (Groombridge, 2008). Moreover, Detective Chief Inspector
Mick Neville (Metropolitan Police’s Visual Images Identifications Office) said: “for every 1,000 cameras
in London, less than one crime is solved per year”, suggesting that each crime has cost $20,000 to
detect (Hope, 2009: paragraph 8).
2.5 Conclusion
How should we define the concept of CCTV? For starters, CCTV is a surveillance system in which a
number of cameras are connected through a closed circuit; the footage taken by cameras is sent to a
television monitor or recorder. The recorded information can be stored and reviewed by those who
have access to the recordings. Additionally, the second generation smart CCTV camera is capable of
tracking drivers by ALPR systems (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) mounted on these cameras,
but also record audio, communicate towards citizens, identify individuals due to face-recognition,
suspect individuals by software capable of recognizing unlawful behaviour, or for example monitor
people’s eye movements or body heat. Furthermore, a large part of the literature argued that CCTV
technologies are important measures for security and crime prevention (e.g. the London Bombings
and the Boston Marathon bombings proved rapid identification of the bombers due to the adequate
use of CCTV cameras). However, it is also important to recognize that CCTV is criticized due to its
privacy-invading content, and its arguable ineffectiveness.

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Chapter 3 The concept of privacy
Security, surveillance, and privacy are intimately connected. While states attempt to increase their
ability to defend their citizens from external and internal threats, they also necessarily risk undermining
the ability of the individuals within their borders to live free from scrutiny, suspicion, categorisation, and
discrimination. The potential impact of surveillance technologies in terms of fundamental human rights
has become an established debate in the academic and policy-making field. In particular, most of
these discussions are phrased in terms of privacy and data protection (Nissenbaum, 2010). During the
last decade, due to innovative information, communication and surveillance technologies, the context
of privacy protection has changed drastically (Nissenbaum, 2010). Even though Article 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human provides the basis for a general right to respect for
privacy and family life, it does not provide an accepted legal definition of privacy. Privacy is a tricky
concept to define; therefore, most courts have declined to offer a definition, preferring to judge the right
on a case-by-case basis (House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 123). In addition, the rationale of the
argument that ‘privacy rights are notoriously difficult to define’, is that these rights often overlap with
other substantive rights, such as the right to liberty, and also because there is often dispute over what
it is that privacy seeks to protect (Feldman, 1994). In these perspectives, and the necessity to develop
a common language regarding the dichotomy in this research, the right to privacy, similar as the
concept of security, must be analysed and well defined, which is the purpose of this chapter.
3.1 Privacy as a contested concept
A key feature of smart surveillance techniques is that they are used to monitor and control identifiable
persons, as they are moving in public places. According to Bellanova et al. (2012) such an individual
in ‘transit’ may well expect a lesser degree of privacy, but “does not expect to be deprived in full of his
rights and freedoms as also related to his own private sphere and image” (p.102). It is recognised that
the specific interests, or values, underpinning privacy are in many ways dependent upon cultural
tradition. Therefore, despite many official pronouncements of the position of privacy as a fundamental
right, there is less of consensus as to what values are actually protected (Taylor, 2011: 456). Privacy
is thus a contested concept, lacking a ‘lucid or consistent meaning and context’, which is due to
different formulations, perspectives and ideologies regarding this fundamental right (Wacks, 1993: xi;
Fenwick, 2000: 338; O’Brien, 2008: 26). In this paragraph we will analyse and describe some of the
formulations and perspectives from multiple authors in order to develop clarity in the ‘competitive and
deep-rooted debates between surveillance and privacy in the culture of Western liberal democracies’
(Bloss, 2007: 208).
From a historical perspective, privacy-based ideas stretch back to the work of Aristotle and his
bifurcation of the private or the family from the political and the public. This public-private divided
concept was developed, post-Enlightenment, by the liberal theorists (O’Brien, 2008: 26). Moreover, the
English philosopher, John Lock (x1632-1704), argued that in nature, all the world’s goods are common
to all, but that property could be acquired and thus become private. Some consider that the core value
of privacy is perhaps limited to ‘secrecy’, the withholding of information from others or non-disclosure.

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Others, however, argued that ‘secrecy’ does not engage with privacy at all, suggesting that individuals
are not so interested in non-disclosure of individual information (Taylor, 2011: 456). Additionally,
Fenwick (2000: 338) stated the broadly described ‘informational autonomy’ as the central privacy
value, which is the right to control the information about the public. Moreover, Lester and Pannick
(2004), defined privacy as “the presumption that individuals should have an area of autonomous
development, interaction and liberty, a ‘privacy sphere’ with or without interaction with others and free
from state intervention and free from excessive unsolicited intervention by other uninvited individuals”
(UN Human Rights Council, 2013: 7). Besides this well encompassed definition, others auteurs, for
instance, Westin (1967: 7), regards privacy as the control of personal information. He argues that
privacy is fundamentally concerned with the ability of ‘individuals, groups or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’.
Similair, but a more philosophical definition of privacy is prominently defined by Parent (1983), who
argues that privacy can be defined as the control over information about oneself, more specific,
“privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one, possessed by
others. A person’s privacy is diminished exactly to the degree that others possess this kind of
knowledge about him” (p.269). He also argues that, when it comes to privacy, ‘knowledge’ can only be
understood as facts, and includes such things as details about one’s health, marital and financial
status, educational background and sexual orientation. Moreover, “If others manage to obtain sensitive
personal knowledge about us, they will by that very fact acquire power over us. Their power could then
be used to our disadvantage” (Parent, 1983: 276). In contrast to this emphasis on the control of
information, other auteurs, suggest that privacy is best understood in terms of its connection to ideas
of personal autonomy, self-determination and human dignity. Privacy in this sense goes well beyond
control over information and looks to provide individuals with the means to protect themselves against
intrusions that might compromise their independence and represent an insult to their sense of human
dignity (Goold & Lazarus, 2007), those goals may be seen ‘as essential to human flourishing’
(Fenwick, 2000: 39). According to Feldman (2002), privacy rights are important because they enable
individuals and groups to determine and, to some extent at least, control the boundaries between the
necessity of security and the extent in which ‘security’ is obtained, alongside the principle that a
person’s home and family life were to be free from intrusion (p.542). In this context, privacy rights
deserve protection because they are essential for the maintenance of personal autonomy and the
defence of human dignity. Furthermore, more then a century ago, Judge Thomas Cooley (1888)
argued for a “right to be let alone”, and that the concept of private life incorporates the classic notion of
civil liberties, in which the state should not be permitted to intrude into the private sphere in the
absence of strict justification (p.29). The notion of privacy broadens when personal relationships,
social relationships and other wider interactions are included. Therefore, within the idea of private life
are personal freedoms, personal autonomy, personal integrity and personal relations. Cooper (2007)
argued that the wider notion of privacy includes limits on state control of individuals within society, as
well as limits on regulation of private conduct and surveillance. These ideas form part of broader
notions of the state’s limited role within the private sphere where individual development is concerned.

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Furthermore, there is a dichotomy in the relevant literature. This dichotomy is related to the
earlier-mentioned dilemma that governments constantly have to face: “security or privacy”. At present,
security measures are characterized by its emphasis on early intervention, which is understood as
pre-emption or anticipatory justice. The underlying justification of pre-emption or anticipatory justice, it
to act before the threat materialises, because why wait before something is already happened?
However, Blad (2008), Schuilenburg (2009), and Schwitters (2008) have sounded an alarm about the
stigmatizing effect of the search for at-risk populations based on certain distinctive characteristics
(smart surveillance). In addition, de Graaff (2008) and Boutellier et al. (2005) predicts that the broad
approach (constantly watching over the activities of a large population of potential terrorists) will be
extended, which means that governments will intervene more and more in personal lives by coercive
and intrusive measures, such as the intelligent CCTV cameras.
Additionally, Professor Bert-Jaap Koops, Professor of Law and Technology at Tilburg
University Institute for Law, Technology and Society, argued that since surveillance was “moving
towards a paradigm of preventative measures in which you monitor large groups”, the privacy of
individuals was inevitably diminished because the courts are only involved in rare cases of complaints
or where “an odd thing happens” (House of Lords, 2009: paragraph 36). The loss of privacy in some
cases may be harmless and may be offset by the benefits of surveillance and data collection. In this
perspective it is important to mention that any effective counter-terrorism strategy is likely to interfere
with privacy rights. It is therefore important to understand the extent to which it is lawful to interfere
with these rights. Law-enforcement agencies have at their disposal a comprehensive array of tools
and procedures that can be used in counter-terrorism operations. These range from traditional policing
methods – such as carrying out a physical search of a suspect – to the use highly sophisticated smart
surveillance technologies, such as CCTV, where images are recorded, processed and stored. To be
lawful, they must be justified as prescribed by law, be necessary in a democratic society, and be
proportionate.
3.2 Conclusion
This chapter was devoted to describe and define the contested concept of the fundamental right to
privacy, and develop more clarity and a language of reconciliation regarding this concept. Therefore,
this chapter concludes by stating a narrow and concrete definition regarding privacy, which this
research will use and apply for further research analysis. Privacy is defined by: the condition in which
others do not know information about oneself. The amount of privacy that an individual has can
therefore be completely measured by how much information about him is known by others.
Additionally, the more accessible this information is to others, the less privacy the individual has.
Accessibility here can be understood both in terms of ‘active accessibility’ – the ability to find the
information if you are specifically looking for it, and ‘passive accessibility’ – when you can be
confronted with the information when you are not specifically looking for it, for instance when you are
watching the news.

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Chapter 4 The concept of public accountability mechanisms
The merits or defects of particular technologies, as Etzioni (2007: 115) argued, are not inherent to the
technologies, but rather, depend on how they are used and above all, on how closely their use is
monitored and accounted for by the parties involved. In order to reassure the public and to ensure
accountability and oversight, accountability mechanisms should be created to monitor the
government’s use of surveillance and related technologies. It is argued by Etzioni (2007: 119) that
proper accountability requires multiple layers of oversight, and should not be left solely in the hands of
the government. Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) stated that public accountability is important to provide
democratic means to monitor and control governmental conduct; for the prevention of concentrations
of power; and to enhance the state’s learning capacity and effectiveness (p.49-52).
It is argued, that increasing contemporary security concerns seem to justify the use of
innovative technology tools, such as CCTV. However, it is also a means for increasing social control
by the state. In this regard, and in regard to the statements given by Mathiesen (1997), about the risks
of creating panoptic surveillance, the state is obliged to – because of its monopoly on the use force
and its duty to protect the rule of law – create proper accountability mechanisms. Additionally, as
argued by Eijkman (2012: 1), by reassessing state accountability mechanisms, the impact of
technological security measures may be checked and balanced. But what does accountability mean,
and in what way should this broad and contested concept be used in this research? In this
perspective, the aim of this chapter is to make this concept more amenable to empirical analysis of
accountability mechanisms concerning the increase use of CCTV. Thereby, this chapter analyses the
fourth ‘contested concept’, which is ‘public accountability’.
Moreover this chapter analyses the statement that “accountability is a contested concept” in
paragraph 4.1. Paragraph 4.2 explains in a concrete and concise manner what accountability is.
Paragraph 4.3 outlines the different types of accountability mechanisms and cites their relevancy.
Paragraph 4.4 shortly clarifies why accountability mechanisms are important, and the conclusion
covers the definition, which this research claims to be the most useful in the interpretation of
accountability mechanisms regarding the necessity of system of checks and balances concerning
CCTV and its alleged negative consequences for human rights.
4.1 Accountability as a contested concept
Accountability is increasingly used in the political discourse and policy documents because it conveys
an image of transparency and trustworthiness. It serves as a conceptual umbrella that covers various
distinct concepts, such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility,
and integrity (Mulgan, 2000: 555; Behn, 2001: 3-6). This makes the concept a general term without
specified boundaries for mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their ‘accountability
forums’, which can be a person, group, or the public at large. Moreover, Bovens (2007a: 450) argued
that it is very hard to come up with a general definition of accountability because the standards for
what constitutes accountable behaviour differs, depending on role, institutional context, time, place,
speaker, and political perspective. Moreover, the evocative powers of accountability make it a very

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elusive concept, because it can mean different things to different people. Koppel (2005) for that matter
distinguishes five different dimensions of accountability, namely: transparency, liability, controllability,
responsibility, and responsiveness.
So far, no attempt is made to provide a consistent analytical framework for the analysis of this
elusive concept of accountability; most authors define the concept in different ways and address very
different accountability dilemmas, practices, and potential crisis. Mulgan (2003: 8) argued that the
result of ‘disjointed accountability talk’ is that accountability seems to be ‘ever-expanding’. However,
for this research and more specifically for the assessment of accountability mechanisms, it is
important to develop a concise and concrete definition of the concept. In that perspective this chapter
focuses on the work of the following authors, Ackerman (2005), Bovens (2005, 2007a, 2007b, &
2010), Blagescu, de Las Casas, & Lloyd (2005). These authors provide concise definitions and
perspectives on social and public accountability. In addition, the authors Blagescu et al. and Bovens
established different frameworks for the evaluation and assessment of accountability in the public
domain, which will be relevant for the assessment of the Dutch and British accountability mechanism
regarding the use of CCTV. Moreover, Ackerman is specialized in Human Rights and Social
Accountability; he cites the importance of civil participation in holding governments accountable
regarding the respect for human rights.
4.2 What is accountability?
Besides living in an “age of technology”, Fisher (2004) argued that we also live in an “age of
accountability”. Demands for public officials to account for their decisions transcend level of
governance, and are, just as CCTV surveillance, on the rise. Democratic principles confirm that the
public at large should have the ability to influence the decisions that affect their lives; however,
because people transfer their sovereignty to representatives, they manage government performances
through accountability mechanisms (Stie, 2010). But what is accountability? Traditionally, efforts to
tackle the challenge of accountability tended to concentrate on improving the “supply-side” of
governance, using methods such as political checks and balances, administrative rules and
procedures, auditing requirements, and formal law enforcement agencies like courts and the police
(Malena et al., 2004: 1). Ackerman (2005: 10) argued that these “top-down” accountability
mechanisms have met with only limited success in many countries, and that increased attention has
been paid to the “demand side” of good governance, which entails the strengthening of the voice and
capacity of citizens to directly demand greater accountability and responsiveness from public officials.
In addition, it is important to notice that a fundamental principle of democracy is that citizens have the
right to demand accountability and public actors have an ‘obligation’ to account.
In order to explain the concept of accountability it is important to start with three concrete and
concise definitions of accountability. Ackerman’s definition (2005) of governmental accountability is
that it is a “process where representatives of the state, public officials, inform society about their plans
and actions and justify them simultaneously, while their actual behaviour and results are subject to
sanctions accordingly” (p.10-11). Ackerman (2005) also argued that citizens elect representatives and

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then supposedly hold them accountable for their behaviour in a following election. It is a form of
accountability, which is characterised by its focus on the rule of law and good governance (established
from a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ between the various powers of the state), as well as the inclusion of civil
society, and ordinary people. Ackerman argued (2005: 8) that the core elements of accountability are
therefore information, justification, and sanction. A fully accountable government would approach
these tasks in a pro-active manner and do so along all three temporal dimensions in the past, present,
and future. Ackerman argues that social accountability easily supports the legal defence of human
rights. Once citizens are mobilized in supervising the government, it is a small step for them to start
demanding and designing new laws as well as using the existing laws to back up their claims against
the state. Citizen’s participation in holding governments to account is far more effective in stimulating a
good government, and is a prerequisite for an effective democracy (Ackerman, 2005: 8).
Bovens (2007b) defined accountability in a narrow, and passive sense of a social mechanism,
“a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to
justify his or her conduct to the forum, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor
may face consequences” (p.447). The actor can be either an individual or an organisation, like a public
institution or an agency. The accountability forum can be a specific person or the public at large.
Furthermore, the obligation of the actor can be formal or informal. Public officials often will be under a
formal obligation to render account on a regular basis to a specific forum, such as supervisory
agencies or the public at large (Bovens, 2007b: 447).
Blagescu, de Las Casas, & Lloyd (2005: 1) defined accountability as the processes through
which an organisation makes a commitment to respond to, and balance the needs of ‘stakeholders’ or
the public in its decision-making processes and activities, and delivers against this commitment. A key
part of this definition is the notion of balance. Blagescu et al. (2005) consider this as the key
challenge, creating a more balanced relationship, in which the voices of those most affected by an
organisation’s activities are not overshadowed by the interest of the most powerful.
4.3 Types of accountability
As this paper solely concerns public organisations and its public accountability, it is important to define
what ‘public’ is in this matter. In the first place, account is not rendered behind closed doors, but is in
principle open to the general public, so it is used in the context of ‘openness’. Secondly, public refers
to the matters in the public domain, such as the spending of public funds, or relating this research, the
exercise of public authorities and the increase use of CCTV. It should be noticed that it is not limited to
public organisations, but can extend to private bodies that exercise public privileges (Scott, 2000: 41).
Moreover, important to mention is that public accountability comes in many ‘guises’. All states have
some form of mechanism in place to promote or ensure accountability of public servants. Public
institutions are frequently required to account for their conduct to various forums in a variety of ways
(Bovens, 2005: 13).

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Regarding to the different accountability types, this research refers to the systems of public
accountability that are internal to the state, which are often referred to as “horizontal” mechanism of
accountability. These horizontal mechanisms include: political mechanisms, administrative
mechanisms, legal mechanisms, and professional mechanisms. These four mechanisms contain
aspects such as: representatives rendering account to democratic societies; specific public
responsibilities conferred upon authorities; codes of standards for acceptable practices; or the aspect
of securing efficiency and effectiveness of governmental conduct (Bovens 2007b: 20). However,
vertical accountability is more relevant for this research because it refers, as Bovens (2007b)
mentioned it, to the situation where the forum formally wields power over the actor, for example by
elections, this is called social accountability. Furthermore, Mc Candless (2001) argued that due to lack
of trust in governmental authorities, there is an urge in many western democracies for more direct and
explicit accountability relations between public agencies on the one hand, and clients, citizens, and
civil society on the other. Bovens (2005: 16) referred to this as social accountability. Other
characteristics are the broad range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, communities, civil society
organizations, and independent media can use to hold public officials and servants accountable.
Mechanisms of social accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or both, but
very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom up (Malena, Forster, & Sing, 2004: 3).
Two other distinct features concerning the concept of accountability are: accountability as a
virtue, and accountability as a mechanism. Blagescu et al. (2005) operationalized accountability as a
virtue as followed: “first and foremost accountability is about engaging with, and being responsive to,
stakeholders; taking into consideration their needs and views in decision making and providing an
explanation as to why they were or were not taken on board. In this way, accountability is less a
mechanism of control and more a process for learning. Being accountable is about being open with
stakeholders, engaging with them in an on going dialogue and learning from the interaction.
Accountability can generate ownership of decisions and projects and enhance the sustainability of
activities. Ultimately it provides a pathway to better performance” (p.4-5).
In the latter case (accountability as a mechanism), accountability is seen as an institutional
relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum (Bovens, 2010: 948).
Hence, accountability is a specific social relation or mechanism that involves an obligation to explain
and justify particular conduct, which implies the relationship between an actor, the ‘accounter’, and a
forum, the account-holder, or ‘accounte’ (Pollit, 2003: 89). Characteristics of this approach are not just
the provision of information about performances, but also the possibility for debate, of questions by the
forum and answers by the actor, and eventually the judgment of the actor by the forum with
possibilities for sanctions. Altogether, both distinct features include elements op importance for this
research. Additionally, Koppel (2003: 120) argued that, although an appearance of control and a body
of legislation may exist, government-sponsored enterprises have the resources, ability and position to
effectively control their own controllers. Besides, according to various scholars, accountability deficits
can be found in various public sectors, with one important area of concern, which is the formidable
growth in formal powers (Bovens, 2010: 960; Behn, 2001: 76; Mulgan, 2003: 74).

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4.4 The relevancy of accountability mechanisms
Many authors begin their writings with the question: ‘why bother about accountability?’ For this
research it is important to answer this question because it provides the foundation regarding the main
question. To answer the question “why bother”, it is important to state that governments in western
societies face an increasingly critical public, and the exercise of public authority is not taken for
granted. Public trust in governments is fragile and a large number of industrialised democracies
experience both substantial fluctuations in public trust, and a long term gradual erosion of political
support (Bovens, 2010: 954). Accountability is meant to assure public confidence in governments and
to bridge the gap between citizens and the state. Additionally, Bovens (2010: 954) stated that
accountability mechanisms assure that public organizations remain on the ‘virtuous path’; therefore,
accountability mechanisms are important because they contribute to the legitimacy of public
governance. It is also argued that social forms of accountability helps in creating checks and balances.
Monitoring the ‘executive’ by civil society organisations, such as Statewatch, or in regard to
the right to privacy: Privacy First, European Civil Liberties Network, JUSTICE, Liberty, or for instance
the British Institute of Human Rights, are increasingly important to provide informal controls on the
abuses of executive powers (Bovens, 2010: 955). These informal controls (or accountability
mechanisms) serve as a tool to induce ‘reflection and learning’. Moreover, they can be utilized as
feedback mechanisms that can make and keep governments, agencies, and individual officials
effective in delivering on their promises. Furthermore, accountability mechanisms induce executive
agencies to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and general performances, by providing independent
feedback about the intended and unintended effects of its policies (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000;
Bovens, 2010).
4.5 Conclusion
In the wake of reconciling issues of security with a respect for the fundamental right to privacy, this
chapter was devoted to describe and define the contested concept of accountability mechanisms,
which are supposed to safeguard privacy and democracy without squandering them, or in other words,
keep security and privacy in a proportionate balance. This chapter used a variation of research and
multiple documents and authors to compare and analyse different perspectives of public
accountability. Foremost the definitions of the authors Ackerman (2005), Bovens (2005, 2007a, 2007b,
& 2010), and Blagescu, de Las Casas, & Lloyd (2005) were used, due to their various but concise
agreements on the term. Besides the fact that there are extensive and different interpretations and
definitions regarding the concept of public accountability, this paragraph defines public accountability
mechanisms narrowly as followed: A social mechanism between an actor and a forum, where the
actor (the ‘accounter’) has an obligation to pro-actively inform the forum (the account-holder or the
society) about their plans and actions, which are based on the rule of law and good governance, and
justify them simultaneously. The informed forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor
and their plans and actions may face consequences.

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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

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Chapter 1 Assessment framework
This chapter examines and answers the following sub-question: “how should we assess the
accountability mechanisms regarding CCTV in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands?” The short
answer is, by the establishment of an analysis- and assessment framework. This framework should
focus on evaluating accountability mechanisms, and analysing possible inadequacies in the form of
accountability deficits in the public domain of CCTV deployment in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. The accountability deficits can be seen as a lack of accountability arrangements, or as
accountability excesses. When the accountability mechanisms, that are used in the selected country
case studies, are corresponding, and are in agreement with the ‘CCTV-accountability Assessment
Framework’, than this research argues that in this case, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, are
using valid accountability mechanisms reflecting the necessary checks and balances, which concerns
the fundamental right to privacy and the prolonging of (national) security.
For the development of the framework, it is important to make sure that the general literature
and information concerning ‘accountability assessments’, which will be reviewed and analysed, is
legitimate, and applicable for the evaluation of specific targeted public domains. However, for an
institutionalized and broadly supported ideal as ‘accountability’, there are very few references to be
found in the literature that could lead to such an evaluation being performed, let alone a well-
encompassed and comprehensive systematic framework regarding accountability assessments that
focuses on CCTV surveillance. In addition, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ regarding the
contested concept of accountability. However, there are some common factors to find in the literature
that must be taken into consideration in order to increase accountability in an effective and meaningful
way. It is these common factors that will result in a well-encompassed framework. The realm of
empirical description, evaluating, and assessing accountability mechanisms can be found in the
literature of the authors: Mark Bovens, Monica Blagescu, Lucy de Las Casas, and Robert Lloyd. From
their perspectives this research creates an amalgamated theory and assessment framework, which
eventually results in prescriptive recommendations concerning checks and balances for (future)
deployments of CCTV in a proper, and human rights based manner. Regarding the latter, it is deemed
important to provide democratic means to monitor and control governmental conduct for the
prevention of the development of concentrations of power and its possible abuses. Before stating and
creating a well-encompassed framework, it is relevant to outline a theoretical background regarding
the work and research of the above-mentioned authors. This is relevant because the theoretical
rationale of the work of Blagescu et al. differs from the theoretical rationale of Bovens.
PART THREE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

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1.1 GAP Framework – Global Accountability Project – Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd
Blagescu et al. (2005) established, what they call, a ‘GAP framework’, which provides a baseline for
what is important if organizations are to improve their accountability to, what they refer to as,
‘stakeholders’. The GAP framework is meant to complement: legal and regulatory frameworks that
exist at national and international levels; sector-wide accountability initiatives and codes of conduct;
international norms; and other standards that are already in place. The authors of the GAP framework
argued that equal accountability to all groups at all times is impossible, therefore key stakeholders are
prioritized by the following factors: ‘influence‘, which is the degree to which the needs and interests of
stakeholders, who do not have the power to influence the organization, should be taken into account;
‘representation‘, which encompasses the legitimacies of a representative; and ‘responsibility‘, as in
financial, ethical, regulatory, or contractual responsibility (Blagescu et al., 2005: 1-2). The authors also
deemed important the degree of ‘commitment’ to accountability. Commitment determines the quality of
the mechanisms that are put in place. In addition, there are two concrete ways in which commitment
needs to manifest itself, and that is ‘embeddedness’, which refers to the integration of accountability in
everything an organization does, and ‘responsiveness’, which refers to the ways organizations show
that they consider the needs and views of stakeholders in the decision-making processes, and which
provides an explanation as to why they take the decisions as they do (Blagescu et al., 2005: 4).
The GAP framework categorizes accountability into four dimensions, namely: transparency,
participation, evaluation, and complaint & response mechanisms (see appendix three for more
information). The authors argue that to be accountable, an organization needs to integrate all four
dimensions into its policies, procedures, and practices, at all levels and stages of the decision-making-
and implementation procedures. The four dimensions entail:
a) Transparency regards to the accessibility and to providing periodic information to the
stakeholders. It also regards to transparent organizational procedures, structures, activities
and processes: the extent to which it provides information on what it is doing, where and how
this takes place, and how it is performing. This constitutes and enables the public in general
to identify if organizations are operating properly, inside judicial regulatory schemes, and if
they are conforming to crucial standards. Furthermore, Blagescu et al. (2005) argue that
“transparency is not a ‘one-way flow of information’, but an on-going dialogue between
stakeholders and organizations” (p.2);
b) Participation regards to organizations taking account of its stakeholders by enabling them to
have a ‘say’ in decision-making activities and processes that affects them. Blagescu et al.
stated (2005: 2) that if organizations want to be accountable, they need to understand the
needs and interests of key stakeholders, what is best achieved through engagement and a
participatory approach to decision-making. Therefore organizations should develop
mechanism that enables those stakeholders to participate regarding the decisions affecting
them; these organizations should commit to enable stakeholders’ input into the broader
organizational policies and strategies.

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