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Formal Method for Avionics Software Verification From a real use for Airbus aircrafts to the integration in ED-12C/DO-178C  Open-DO Conference   Combining Formality with Agility for Critical Software Presented by Hervé Delseny Head of Software Process Definition and Follow-up Expert in Software Aspects of Certification Avionics and Simulation Products Airbus
Formal Method : Advantages ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Formal Method on A380 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Formal Method on A380 : 1 st  Type ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Formal Method :  1 st  Type  Next to come ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Formal Method on A380 :  2 nd  Type  Unit Proof ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Formal Method on A380 : Unit Proof ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Formal Method on A380 : Unit Proof Design ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Coding ,[object Object],[object Object],Unit Proofs ,[object Object],[object Object],Integration ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Subset Specification ,[object Object]
Formal Method on A380 : Unit Proof - Definition of proof environment - Flows Generation Verification  of Flows against Design Proof performing Analysis of Proof Results Design Phase Data & control flows Caveat Caveat Flows Code compliant  With Design Coding Phase C Source Functional Properties Caveat Process Management Tool Caveat is integrated into the process management tool to automate the proof process If OK If not OK
Formal Method on A380 :  Conclusions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DO-178C Formal Method Supplement ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FM supplement ,[object Object],Gives  guidance  for planning, development and verification processes ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What is a Formal Method ? ,[object Object],A  formal method  is a  formal analysis  carried out on a  formal model. Formal Method Formal model Formal Analysis
What is a Formal Model ? ,[object Object],A  formal notation  is a notation having a  precise ,  unambiguous ,  mathematically  defined  syntax  and  semantics . A  formal model  is a model defined using a  formal notation Formal Method Formal model Formal Analysis
What is a Formal Analysis ? ,[object Object],Formal Analysis Formal Method Formal model
Notion of property ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Being Sound ,[object Object],A sound method  never assert  that a  property is true  when  it is not. Formal model of the requirements Formal Analysis OK X Not Sound
Conservative representation ,[object Object],We need to be sure that  whatever is proved about the formal model also applies to what is modeled . Then review or analysis should be used to demonstrate that the formal statement is a  conservative representation  of the informal requirement Requirements Formal model of the requirements Formal Analysis Results
DO-178/ED-12 – Verification Process System Requirements High-Level Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements Compliance  Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance  Robustness Accuracy & Consistency  HW Compatibility  Verifiability Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Verifiability  Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance  Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance  Traceability Compliance Compliance  Traceability Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Partition Integrity
FM Supplement : Formal verification ,[object Object],[object Object]
FM Supplement :  Formal verification instead of reviews HLR  Formal  HLR Accuracy & Consistency  HW Compatibility  Verifiability Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Accuracy & Consistency  HW Compatibility  Verifiability Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements When HLR are formaly expressed Formal analysis can be used Verifiability  Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance  Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance  Traceability Compliance Compliance  Traceability Compliance  Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance  Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Partition Integrity
FM Supplement :  Formal verification instead of reviews HLR  Formal  HLR Accuracy & Consistency  HW Compatibility  Verifiability Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements When HLR and LLR are formaly expressed Formal analysis can be used Formal  LLR Compliance  Traceability Verifiability  Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance  Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance  Traceability Compliance Compliance  Traceability Compliance  Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance  Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Partition Integrity
FM Supplement : Formal verification ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FM Supplement :  Formal verification for EOC HLR  Accuracy & Consistency  HW Compatibility  Verifiability Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements When LLR are formaly expressed with a conservative representation between code and EOC, then Formal analysis can be used to replace some tests Formal  LLR Compliance  Traceability X Verifiability  Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance  Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance  Traceability Compliance Compliance  Traceability Compliance  Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance  Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Partition Integrity Conservative representation
FM Supplement : Formal verification ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FM Supplement :  Formal verification for EOC HLR  Accuracy & Consistency  HW Compatibility  Verifiability Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements Compatible With Target Properties might be proved directly on EOC : WCET, Stack usage, … Compatible With Target Verifiability  Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance  Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance  Traceability Compliance Compliance  Traceability Compliance  Robustness Compliance  Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility  Verifiability  Conformance  Partition Integrity
FM Supplement : Formal verification ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
To conclude ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Special thanks to  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
© AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.AS. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.A.S will be pleased to explain the basis thereof. AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.

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Formal Method for Avionics Software Verification

  • 1. Formal Method for Avionics Software Verification From a real use for Airbus aircrafts to the integration in ED-12C/DO-178C Open-DO Conference Combining Formality with Agility for Critical Software Presented by Hervé Delseny Head of Software Process Definition and Follow-up Expert in Software Aspects of Certification Avionics and Simulation Products Airbus
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9. Formal Method on A380 : Unit Proof - Definition of proof environment - Flows Generation Verification of Flows against Design Proof performing Analysis of Proof Results Design Phase Data & control flows Caveat Caveat Flows Code compliant With Design Coding Phase C Source Functional Properties Caveat Process Management Tool Caveat is integrated into the process management tool to automate the proof process If OK If not OK
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19. DO-178/ED-12 – Verification Process System Requirements High-Level Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements Compliance Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Verifiability Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance Traceability Compliance Compliance Traceability Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Partition Integrity
  • 20.
  • 21. FM Supplement : Formal verification instead of reviews HLR Formal HLR Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements When HLR are formaly expressed Formal analysis can be used Verifiability Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance Traceability Compliance Compliance Traceability Compliance Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Partition Integrity
  • 22. FM Supplement : Formal verification instead of reviews HLR Formal HLR Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements When HLR and LLR are formaly expressed Formal analysis can be used Formal LLR Compliance Traceability Verifiability Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance Traceability Compliance Compliance Traceability Compliance Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Partition Integrity
  • 23.
  • 24. FM Supplement : Formal verification for EOC HLR Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements When LLR are formaly expressed with a conservative representation between code and EOC, then Formal analysis can be used to replace some tests Formal LLR Compliance Traceability X Verifiability Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance Traceability Compliance Compliance Traceability Compliance Robustness Compatible With Target Compliance Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Partition Integrity Conservative representation
  • 25.
  • 26. FM Supplement : Formal verification for EOC HLR Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy System Requirements Software Architecture Source Code Executable Object Code Low-Level Requirements Compatible With Target Properties might be proved directly on EOC : WCET, Stack usage, … Compatible With Target Verifiability Conformance Accuracy & Consistency Complete & Correct Compliance Traceability Architecture Compatibility Compliance Traceability Compliance Compliance Traceability Compliance Robustness Compliance Robustness Accuracy & Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Algorithm Accuracy Consistency HW Compatibility Verifiability Conformance Partition Integrity
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 30.  
  • 31. © AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.AS. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS OPERATIONS S.A.S will be pleased to explain the basis thereof. AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.