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ALTRUISM, COOPERATION, AND
EFFICIENCY: AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION IN POLYGYNOUS
HOUSEHOLDS

  Joyce Chen (Ohio State), Richard Akresh
  (Illinois-Urbana), Charity Moore (Ohio State)
Efficiency in the Household
   Households have many features that encourage
    cooperation and the efficient allocation of resources
     Altruism/shared  public goods
     Repeated interaction
     Better information


   And, yet, there is ample evidence of inefficiency, in
    both consumption and production
     Udry  (1996), Goldstein and Udry (2008)
     Duflo and Udry (2004), Dubois and Ligon (2010)
Inefficiency in the Household
   Common culprits of inefficiency include
     Imperfect monitoring
     Limited commitment/enforcement
     Social norms
     Separate spheres


   Perhaps altruistic preferences themselves can inhibit
    cooperation and efficiency
     Leadto higher utility in a non-cooperative equilibrium
     Make threats of punishment less credible
Altruism and Exchange
   Bernheim and Stark (1988) first suggested, in a
    theory paper, that altruism can inhibit cooperation
    by reducing the credibility of punishments

   Empirical studies typically compare relationships
    between family and non-family members, making it
    difficult to distinguish altruism from information, etc.

   We look at relationships with differing degrees of
    altruism, within the same family
Outline

   Context and Data
   A Simple Game-Theoretic Model
   Main Results
   Robustness and Extensions
Context: Burkina Faso
   Data are drawn from the 1984-85 ICRISAT Survey

   Married Burkinabé women often have access to
    private plots under their own control

   But they also must provide labor on household
    communal plots, usually at discretion of the head

   Husbands typically provide staple foods and
    contribute to medical expenses and school fees
Table 1. Average Yield and Plot Area
                                    Monogamous
                  Household Wife of          Other     Other
                     Head        Head        Male     Female
Yield (1000 FCFA) 126.29         49.15      142.93     124.82
                    (651.6)     (267.0)     (498.2)   (434.7)
Area (Hectare)       0.748       0.075       0.318     0.069
                     (1.24)      (0.13)      (0.54)    (0.12)
Observations           743         425        172       319
                                    Polygynous
                  Household Wife of          Other     Other
                     Head        Head        Male     Female
Yield (1000 FCFA)    85.47       59.50      145.51     71.57
                    (341.3)     (208.4)     (358.6)   (250.6)
Area (Hectare)       0.756       0.099       0.385     0.074
                     (1.14)      (0.14)      (0.48)    (0.10)
Observations          1156        1305        407       699
Context: Burkina Faso
   Polygyny is quite common in our data (51%)
     Mostof these households (56%) have just two wives
     One-third have three wives, 11% have more



   Although interaction between co-wives is often
    characterized by conflict, there is also a fair amount
    of cooperation for pragmatic goals
     Labor-sharing

     Exchange   of goods and/or services
Altruism and Cooperation
   Consider a household with three individuals – one
    husband and two wives

   Each player engages in agricultural production on
    his/her own plot, using the same technology

   But different plot characteristics mean the optimal
    labor allocation differs across plots as well
Altruism and Cooperation
   Husbands and wives care about each other’s
    consumption of certain goods
     “Separate  spheres”– otherwise, production and
      consumption decisions are separable
     Consistent with anthropology of Burkinabé households


   Co-wives have no altruistic linkage

   Each individual can choose to coordinate production
    (i.e., share labor) with other household members
The Basic Game
   With altruism, there will be some exchange
    between spouses, even without explicit cooperation,
    but not between co-wives

   The gains to cooperation can be higher for co-
    wives, even if aggregate production is not

   Lack of altruism allows co-wives greater scope for
    punishment, while altruism makes the husband’s
    punishment susceptible to renegotiation
Altruism and Efficiency
   Results are sensitive to separate spheres assumption
     Consistent  with Burkinabé households
     Not an uncommon formulation of altruism to have
      preferences over a good that one does not directly
      control (e.g., children’s education, utility of spouse)

   Cooperation implies efficient allocation of inputs
    across plots controlled by cooperating parties
     Controllingfor land quality, crop choice and time-
      varying shocks, plot yields should be equalized
Empirical Application
   Estimate yields as a function of plot characteristics
    (size, toposequence, soil type, location) and
    cultivator characteristics
        𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑿𝑿ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡

               where 𝛾𝛾 𝑘𝑘 = 𝛾𝛾 0 + (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝛾 𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃 ) for k = G, OM, OF
                                𝑘𝑘




   Include household-crop-year fixed effects (λ)

   Allow cultivator characteristics to vary with conjugal
    status (monogamous/polygynous)
Empirical Application
   If cooperation is greater among co-wives, should
    observe smaller negative effect of gender in
    polygynous households

   If polygyny also provides husbands with more
    opportunities for cooperation, then we should
    observe a smaller gap between heads and other
    male cultivators as well
                         𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 ≥ 0
                            𝑃𝑃
Alternate Explanations
   Household head can enforce cooperative
    arrangements between players other than himself –
    also implies smaller yield differences between other

                         𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 < 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
    cultivators than between husbands and wives

   Strong preferences (lower costs) for cooperation
    among women – also implies smaller differences

                           𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 > 0
    between females in polygynous households
                              𝑃𝑃
Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimates of the
             Effect of Cultivator Characteristics on Plot Yield
                                                      Other
                                     Men Only Cultivators Women Only
                            (I)          (II)          (III)        (IV)
Gender (1=female) -202.21 ***                      -160.72 ***
                       (34.14)                     (54.01)
Other Male              -97.18 **     -74.78 **
                       (39.38)       (36.06)
Other Female            -31.96                                    18.16
                       (31.39)                                  (20.77)
Gender*Polygynous 168.94 ***                        131.04 **
                       (40.09)                     (61.80)
Other Male*Poly          86.50 *       69.99 *
                       (45.82)       (42.05)
Other Female*Poly        28.71                                   -18.87
                       (35.81)                                  (23.23)
Observations              5230          2478          1597         2748
Main Results
   Estimates consistent with altruism– co-wives more
    likely to cooperate with each other than with
    husband
     Husbands  do not do as well under polygyny, relative to
      other male cultivators – evidence of transaction costs

   No clear evidence for alternate explanations
     Gap   between other males and other females is not
      significantly smaller
     No significant gap between wives and other women
Table 3. Alternate Tests
    Gender (1=female)     -63.60        Gender (1=female)     -45.46
                         (66.14)                             (50.68)
    Gender*Other Female -132.29 *       Gender*No. of Kids    -23.28 **
                         (78.33)                             (10.27)
    Gender*Poly            33.67        Gender*Poly            41.94
                         (75.20)                             (64.85)
    Gender*Poly*OF        126.61        Gender*Poly*Kids       22.15 *
                         (88.86)                             (11.62)
    Observations         3629           Observations         4701


   If females have stronger preferences for
    cooperation, addition of other female cultivator
    should increase efficiency among women

   Cooperation should be decreasing in the degree
    of altruism (# of shared goods) between players
Robustness Checks
   Fixed effects control for factors that are fixed
    across individuals planting the same crop, in the
    same year, within the same household

   But they do not control for differences in crop choice
    or preferences for cooperation across monogamous
    and polygynous households
     Main results include full set of interactions with
      polygyny to allow for different technologies
Table 4. Robustness Checks, Fixed Effects Estimates
                     Polygynous Polygynous Household-
                     =2 Wives      >2 Wives      Year FEb
                        (I)           (II)          (V)
Gender (1=female)   -155.14 ***   -155.14 ***    -81.52 ***
                    (40.11)       (39.01)       (23.50)
Other Male           -56.35        -56.35        -29.70
                    (47.21)       (45.91)       (29.82)
Other Female         -16.02        -16.02          0.97
                    (36.50)       (35.49)       (26.27)
Gender*Polygynous    136.33 **     154.32 ***     76.40 ***
                    (53.59)       (53.01)       (28.36)
Other Male*Poly       72.42         45.40         29.62
                    (62.19)       (62.09)       (35.80)
Other Female*Poly     14.76         13.91         -8.50
                    (48.07)       (44.86)       (30.85)
Observations           3112          3142          5230
Unobserved Land Quality
   Fallow decisions can provide some indication of
    land quality

   Omitting observed land quality measures can
    reveal the direction of bias, if correlation between
    observed and unobserved characteristics is known

   Data for 1981-83 only included co-wives’ plots for
    cotton, cereal and root crops
Table 5. Checks for Unobserved Land Quality
                      Years Since    No Plot     1981-83
                         Fallow      Chars.        Only
                           (I)         (II)         (III)
Gender (1=female)        -6.73 *** -125.67 *** -35.13 ***
                        (2.20)     (31.15)     (12.48)
Other Male               -9.48 **    -8.52       -30.30 **
                        (3.99)     (36.98)     (12.58)
Other Female              2.73       -3.58         2.74
                        (2.14)     (31.80)     (15.60)
Gender*Polygynous         1.31      128.65 ***     1.66
                        (2.32)     (35.90)     (14.88)
Other Male*Poly           2.34       21.09        17.15
                        (4.03)     (43.12)     (15.25)
Other Female*Poly        -3.21        6.01       -23.77
                        (2.33)     (36.33)     (18.53)
Observations              4356        5230         4198
Unobserved Heterogeneity
   While greater efficiency among wives seems clear,
    proximate cause is not yet clear
     No evidence of greater cooperation among husbands
      and wives, contract enforcement by head or greater
      propensity for cooperation among women

   But polygyny may require the head to contribute
    more time to administrative tasks

   Or, polygynous men may have a different level of
    underlying productivity
Table 6. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of
Cultivator Characteristcs on Plot Yield, by Household Structure


                               Vertical a    Horizontal b
                                  (I)            (II)
       Gender (1=female)        -8.43        -516.33 ***
                              (21.02)       (111.29)
       Other Male              -18.55        -237.79 **
                              (25.80)       (109.52)
       Other Female            -22.94          -5.00
                              (20.73)        (74.17)
       Gender*Polygynous        -9.68         518.79 ***
                              (26.50)       (117.88)
       Other Male*Poly           8.06         251.77 **
                              (34.52)       (116.05)
       Other Female*Poly        20.62           2.30
                              (27.05)        (78.45)
       Observations              2878           1823
Table 7. Household Fixed Effects Specification

Gender (1=female)          -99.54 ***
                          (26.25)
Other Male                 -32.28              Implied Fixed Effect
                          (31.46)       Switch to Poly          -30.98
Other Female                7.914                              (49.66)
                          (27.03)       Always Polygynous       -67.78 ***
Polygynous                 -82.87                              (20.49)
                          (83.71)       Total Hh Plot Area       7.790 ***
Gender*Poly                 65.37 **                            (2.752)
                          (30.21)       Capital Intensity         30.21
Other Male*Poly             12.21                               (37.21)
                          (37.27)       Observations                120
Other Female*Poly          -15.13
                          (31.65)
Observations                 5230
Unobserved Heterogeneity
   Cooperation is likely more difficult in horizontal
    households, given varying family allegiances
     Polygyny, by providing more opportunities for mutual
      benefit, has a greater positive effect on efficiency
     Not consistent with greater demands on time for
      polygynous household heads

   Differences between polygynous household heads
    and other male cultivators seem to arise over time,
    rather than being intrinsic
Dynamic Inefficiency
   Greater cooperation may make investments in large
    capital goods more cost-effective

   Wealthier households are more likely to make such
    investments, but wives have found to be a substitute
    for investment in durable assets
     Look  at expenditure on large capital goods as a
      percentage of total expenditure on farm inputs
     Treat polygyny and household wealth (total area under
      cultivation) as endogenous
Dynamic Inefficiency
   Instruments include:
     Ethnic group of the household – polygyny based in
      ethno-cultural traditions, while farming practices are
      similar across ethnic groups
     Area of land inherited – land for permanent cultivation,
      reflects relative position in lineage, unobserved skill

   Also include village-year fixed effects to account
    for aggregate shocks and differences in agro-
    climatic zones
Table 8. Percentage of Input Purchases in Large Capital Goods, IV Estimates
                                     First Stage        Polygyny Total Area
Polygynous             0.592 *** Dagari-Djula            0.708 ***     0.841
                    (0.209)                            (0.190)       (1.172)
Total Hh Plot Area     0.008     Bwa                     0.201         4.140 ***
                    (0.017)                            (0.147)       (0.909)
Observations            231      Other Ethnic Group      0.096         0.648
                                                       (0.195)       (1.208)
Sargan Test             0.27     Inherited Area          0.004         0.260 ***
(p-value)             (0.87)                           (0.008)       (0.050)
Dynamic Inefficiency
   Polygynous households invest more, proportionally,
    in large capital equipment
     Without cooperation, lumpy investments should lead to
      greater divergence in yields

   They seem to have more labor and more capital
     Perhaps monogamous households use more chemicals
      and/or improved seed varieties
     Need to estimate production function to fully
      understand the implications for income and growth
Conclusions
   In polygynous households, co-wives cooperate more
    with each other, at the expense of husbands
     Difference   between heads’ and wives’ yields is smaller,
      as is the difference between heads and other males

   Some evidence of head acting as an enforcement
    mechanism, but only in certain contexts

   Some evidence of greater cooperation among all
    women, but relationship matters
Conclusions
   Results do not seem to be explained by
     Differing preferences for cooperation
     Endogenous crop choice
     Unobserved plot quality
     Differing demands on the household head
     Self-selection into polygyny


   Although polygynous households are a very specific
    case, there are many cases of 3+ player games in
    which there are differing degrees of altruism

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  • 1. ALTRUISM, COOPERATION, AND EFFICIENCY: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN POLYGYNOUS HOUSEHOLDS Joyce Chen (Ohio State), Richard Akresh (Illinois-Urbana), Charity Moore (Ohio State)
  • 2. Efficiency in the Household  Households have many features that encourage cooperation and the efficient allocation of resources  Altruism/shared public goods  Repeated interaction  Better information  And, yet, there is ample evidence of inefficiency, in both consumption and production  Udry (1996), Goldstein and Udry (2008)  Duflo and Udry (2004), Dubois and Ligon (2010)
  • 3. Inefficiency in the Household  Common culprits of inefficiency include  Imperfect monitoring  Limited commitment/enforcement  Social norms  Separate spheres  Perhaps altruistic preferences themselves can inhibit cooperation and efficiency  Leadto higher utility in a non-cooperative equilibrium  Make threats of punishment less credible
  • 4. Altruism and Exchange  Bernheim and Stark (1988) first suggested, in a theory paper, that altruism can inhibit cooperation by reducing the credibility of punishments  Empirical studies typically compare relationships between family and non-family members, making it difficult to distinguish altruism from information, etc.  We look at relationships with differing degrees of altruism, within the same family
  • 5. Outline  Context and Data  A Simple Game-Theoretic Model  Main Results  Robustness and Extensions
  • 6. Context: Burkina Faso  Data are drawn from the 1984-85 ICRISAT Survey  Married Burkinabé women often have access to private plots under their own control  But they also must provide labor on household communal plots, usually at discretion of the head  Husbands typically provide staple foods and contribute to medical expenses and school fees
  • 7. Table 1. Average Yield and Plot Area Monogamous Household Wife of Other Other Head Head Male Female Yield (1000 FCFA) 126.29 49.15 142.93 124.82 (651.6) (267.0) (498.2) (434.7) Area (Hectare) 0.748 0.075 0.318 0.069 (1.24) (0.13) (0.54) (0.12) Observations 743 425 172 319 Polygynous Household Wife of Other Other Head Head Male Female Yield (1000 FCFA) 85.47 59.50 145.51 71.57 (341.3) (208.4) (358.6) (250.6) Area (Hectare) 0.756 0.099 0.385 0.074 (1.14) (0.14) (0.48) (0.10) Observations 1156 1305 407 699
  • 8. Context: Burkina Faso  Polygyny is quite common in our data (51%)  Mostof these households (56%) have just two wives  One-third have three wives, 11% have more  Although interaction between co-wives is often characterized by conflict, there is also a fair amount of cooperation for pragmatic goals  Labor-sharing  Exchange of goods and/or services
  • 9. Altruism and Cooperation  Consider a household with three individuals – one husband and two wives  Each player engages in agricultural production on his/her own plot, using the same technology  But different plot characteristics mean the optimal labor allocation differs across plots as well
  • 10. Altruism and Cooperation  Husbands and wives care about each other’s consumption of certain goods  “Separate spheres”– otherwise, production and consumption decisions are separable  Consistent with anthropology of Burkinabé households  Co-wives have no altruistic linkage  Each individual can choose to coordinate production (i.e., share labor) with other household members
  • 11. The Basic Game  With altruism, there will be some exchange between spouses, even without explicit cooperation, but not between co-wives  The gains to cooperation can be higher for co- wives, even if aggregate production is not  Lack of altruism allows co-wives greater scope for punishment, while altruism makes the husband’s punishment susceptible to renegotiation
  • 12. Altruism and Efficiency  Results are sensitive to separate spheres assumption  Consistent with Burkinabé households  Not an uncommon formulation of altruism to have preferences over a good that one does not directly control (e.g., children’s education, utility of spouse)  Cooperation implies efficient allocation of inputs across plots controlled by cooperating parties  Controllingfor land quality, crop choice and time- varying shocks, plot yields should be equalized
  • 13. Empirical Application  Estimate yields as a function of plot characteristics (size, toposequence, soil type, location) and cultivator characteristics 𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑿𝑿ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 where 𝛾𝛾 𝑘𝑘 = 𝛾𝛾 0 + (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝛾 𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃 ) for k = G, OM, OF 𝑘𝑘  Include household-crop-year fixed effects (λ)  Allow cultivator characteristics to vary with conjugal status (monogamous/polygynous)
  • 14. Empirical Application  If cooperation is greater among co-wives, should observe smaller negative effect of gender in polygynous households  If polygyny also provides husbands with more opportunities for cooperation, then we should observe a smaller gap between heads and other male cultivators as well 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 ≥ 0 𝑃𝑃
  • 15. Alternate Explanations  Household head can enforce cooperative arrangements between players other than himself – also implies smaller yield differences between other 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 < 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 cultivators than between husbands and wives  Strong preferences (lower costs) for cooperation among women – also implies smaller differences 𝛾𝛾 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 > 0 between females in polygynous households 𝑃𝑃
  • 16. Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of Cultivator Characteristics on Plot Yield Other Men Only Cultivators Women Only (I) (II) (III) (IV) Gender (1=female) -202.21 *** -160.72 *** (34.14) (54.01) Other Male -97.18 ** -74.78 ** (39.38) (36.06) Other Female -31.96 18.16 (31.39) (20.77) Gender*Polygynous 168.94 *** 131.04 ** (40.09) (61.80) Other Male*Poly 86.50 * 69.99 * (45.82) (42.05) Other Female*Poly 28.71 -18.87 (35.81) (23.23) Observations 5230 2478 1597 2748
  • 17. Main Results  Estimates consistent with altruism– co-wives more likely to cooperate with each other than with husband  Husbands do not do as well under polygyny, relative to other male cultivators – evidence of transaction costs  No clear evidence for alternate explanations  Gap between other males and other females is not significantly smaller  No significant gap between wives and other women
  • 18. Table 3. Alternate Tests Gender (1=female) -63.60 Gender (1=female) -45.46 (66.14) (50.68) Gender*Other Female -132.29 * Gender*No. of Kids -23.28 ** (78.33) (10.27) Gender*Poly 33.67 Gender*Poly 41.94 (75.20) (64.85) Gender*Poly*OF 126.61 Gender*Poly*Kids 22.15 * (88.86) (11.62) Observations 3629 Observations 4701  If females have stronger preferences for cooperation, addition of other female cultivator should increase efficiency among women  Cooperation should be decreasing in the degree of altruism (# of shared goods) between players
  • 19. Robustness Checks  Fixed effects control for factors that are fixed across individuals planting the same crop, in the same year, within the same household  But they do not control for differences in crop choice or preferences for cooperation across monogamous and polygynous households  Main results include full set of interactions with polygyny to allow for different technologies
  • 20. Table 4. Robustness Checks, Fixed Effects Estimates Polygynous Polygynous Household- =2 Wives >2 Wives Year FEb (I) (II) (V) Gender (1=female) -155.14 *** -155.14 *** -81.52 *** (40.11) (39.01) (23.50) Other Male -56.35 -56.35 -29.70 (47.21) (45.91) (29.82) Other Female -16.02 -16.02 0.97 (36.50) (35.49) (26.27) Gender*Polygynous 136.33 ** 154.32 *** 76.40 *** (53.59) (53.01) (28.36) Other Male*Poly 72.42 45.40 29.62 (62.19) (62.09) (35.80) Other Female*Poly 14.76 13.91 -8.50 (48.07) (44.86) (30.85) Observations 3112 3142 5230
  • 21. Unobserved Land Quality  Fallow decisions can provide some indication of land quality  Omitting observed land quality measures can reveal the direction of bias, if correlation between observed and unobserved characteristics is known  Data for 1981-83 only included co-wives’ plots for cotton, cereal and root crops
  • 22. Table 5. Checks for Unobserved Land Quality Years Since No Plot 1981-83 Fallow Chars. Only (I) (II) (III) Gender (1=female) -6.73 *** -125.67 *** -35.13 *** (2.20) (31.15) (12.48) Other Male -9.48 ** -8.52 -30.30 ** (3.99) (36.98) (12.58) Other Female 2.73 -3.58 2.74 (2.14) (31.80) (15.60) Gender*Polygynous 1.31 128.65 *** 1.66 (2.32) (35.90) (14.88) Other Male*Poly 2.34 21.09 17.15 (4.03) (43.12) (15.25) Other Female*Poly -3.21 6.01 -23.77 (2.33) (36.33) (18.53) Observations 4356 5230 4198
  • 23. Unobserved Heterogeneity  While greater efficiency among wives seems clear, proximate cause is not yet clear  No evidence of greater cooperation among husbands and wives, contract enforcement by head or greater propensity for cooperation among women  But polygyny may require the head to contribute more time to administrative tasks  Or, polygynous men may have a different level of underlying productivity
  • 24. Table 6. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of Cultivator Characteristcs on Plot Yield, by Household Structure Vertical a Horizontal b (I) (II) Gender (1=female) -8.43 -516.33 *** (21.02) (111.29) Other Male -18.55 -237.79 ** (25.80) (109.52) Other Female -22.94 -5.00 (20.73) (74.17) Gender*Polygynous -9.68 518.79 *** (26.50) (117.88) Other Male*Poly 8.06 251.77 ** (34.52) (116.05) Other Female*Poly 20.62 2.30 (27.05) (78.45) Observations 2878 1823
  • 25. Table 7. Household Fixed Effects Specification Gender (1=female) -99.54 *** (26.25) Other Male -32.28 Implied Fixed Effect (31.46) Switch to Poly -30.98 Other Female 7.914 (49.66) (27.03) Always Polygynous -67.78 *** Polygynous -82.87 (20.49) (83.71) Total Hh Plot Area 7.790 *** Gender*Poly 65.37 ** (2.752) (30.21) Capital Intensity 30.21 Other Male*Poly 12.21 (37.21) (37.27) Observations 120 Other Female*Poly -15.13 (31.65) Observations 5230
  • 26. Unobserved Heterogeneity  Cooperation is likely more difficult in horizontal households, given varying family allegiances  Polygyny, by providing more opportunities for mutual benefit, has a greater positive effect on efficiency  Not consistent with greater demands on time for polygynous household heads  Differences between polygynous household heads and other male cultivators seem to arise over time, rather than being intrinsic
  • 27. Dynamic Inefficiency  Greater cooperation may make investments in large capital goods more cost-effective  Wealthier households are more likely to make such investments, but wives have found to be a substitute for investment in durable assets  Look at expenditure on large capital goods as a percentage of total expenditure on farm inputs  Treat polygyny and household wealth (total area under cultivation) as endogenous
  • 28. Dynamic Inefficiency  Instruments include:  Ethnic group of the household – polygyny based in ethno-cultural traditions, while farming practices are similar across ethnic groups  Area of land inherited – land for permanent cultivation, reflects relative position in lineage, unobserved skill  Also include village-year fixed effects to account for aggregate shocks and differences in agro- climatic zones
  • 29. Table 8. Percentage of Input Purchases in Large Capital Goods, IV Estimates First Stage Polygyny Total Area Polygynous 0.592 *** Dagari-Djula 0.708 *** 0.841 (0.209) (0.190) (1.172) Total Hh Plot Area 0.008 Bwa 0.201 4.140 *** (0.017) (0.147) (0.909) Observations 231 Other Ethnic Group 0.096 0.648 (0.195) (1.208) Sargan Test 0.27 Inherited Area 0.004 0.260 *** (p-value) (0.87) (0.008) (0.050)
  • 30. Dynamic Inefficiency  Polygynous households invest more, proportionally, in large capital equipment  Without cooperation, lumpy investments should lead to greater divergence in yields  They seem to have more labor and more capital  Perhaps monogamous households use more chemicals and/or improved seed varieties  Need to estimate production function to fully understand the implications for income and growth
  • 31. Conclusions  In polygynous households, co-wives cooperate more with each other, at the expense of husbands  Difference between heads’ and wives’ yields is smaller, as is the difference between heads and other males  Some evidence of head acting as an enforcement mechanism, but only in certain contexts  Some evidence of greater cooperation among all women, but relationship matters
  • 32. Conclusions  Results do not seem to be explained by  Differing preferences for cooperation  Endogenous crop choice  Unobserved plot quality  Differing demands on the household head  Self-selection into polygyny  Although polygynous households are a very specific case, there are many cases of 3+ player games in which there are differing degrees of altruism