combatreform.org/ARMORHISTORY

1. Korean War:
Intro, Task Force Smith, Inchon, and
Integration
Lsn 20

2. North Korea Attacks:
25 June 1951
• North Korean army crosses the
38th parallel with an invasion
force totaling over 90,000
troops and 150 Soviet-built
tanks
• By the night of June 28, Seoul
had fallen and the South
Korean forces were in disarray.
• The United Nations passes a
resolution recommending that
"the members of the United
Nations furnish such assistance
to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore
international peace and security
to the area."

3. Force Comparison
• North Korean People’s • U.S. Armed Forces in
Army (NKPA) 1950:
– 14 Divisions (9 in – 10 Army divisions (4
invasion force) in Japan)
– Soviet trained, armed – 48 USAF air groups
and advised – 331 combatants (64 in
– 150 tanks, almost 100 Pacific)
modern aircraft – 2 Marine divisions (-)

4. Task Force Smith
• 30 June
– MacArthur instructs Eighth Army to order the
24th Infantry Division to Korea
• 1 July
– Eighth Army orders 24th ID to deploy a
delaying force of two rifle companies, under a
battalion commander, reinforced by two
platoons of 4.2 inch mortars and one platoon of
75mm recoilless rifles to Pusan

5. Task Force Smith
• 4 July
– Part of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion joins
TF Smith
• 5 July
– Task Force Smith begins occupying defensive
positions at 0300
– 0700 begin seeing enemy movement
– 0816 begin firing artillery
– 1430 Smith decides to withdraw

6. • 6 July
– Smith arrives at
Ch’onan and
counts 185 of
his men (began
with 540)
• After all
stragglers
returned, the
total loss to TF
Smith was 35%

7. Implications of Task Force Smith
“ No more Task Force Smiths”
-- GEN Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff,
1991-1995 (administered the post Desert Storm
Army downsizing)

8. “Hollow Army”
- WWII peak Army strength was 8,268,000
- 89 combat divisions in June 1945
- June 1950 strength was about 591,000 (1/14 the peak
WWII size)
- 10 active combat divisions
- But to keep them fielded, one battalion from each
infantry regiment and one firing battery from each
field artillery battalion had been eliminated
- This move effectively reduced combat power by 1/3

9. Far East Command
• 108,500 troops under GEN MacArthur
• 4 infantry divisions in Japan (7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry)
• Authorized peacetime divisions strength was 12,500 (13,500 for the 25 th )
• Authorized wartime strength was 18,900
• 3 of the 4 divisions in Japan had about 11,000 men
• In addition to the missing infantry and artillery battalions each
• Lacked three anti aircraft artillery batteries
• Lacked the regimental tank companies
• Had only a company of M24 Chaffee light tanks in place of the
divisional tank battalion
• Estimated the divisions could field 62% of normal infantry firepower, 69% of
normal AAA capability, and 14% of armored support

10. Equipment in FEC
• Mostly outdated WWII equipment and much of it was
unserviceable
• Of 18,000 jeeps only 8,000 were serviceable
• Of 13,780 2 1/2 ton trucks, only 4,441 were serviceable
• Had none of the new 3.5 inch antitank rocker launchers
• Only the 2.36 inch Bazooka which had proved inadequate in
1944 – 1945
• Hydraulic fluid for recoil mechanisms in the M24 tanks had
been on backorder for two years, so most of their 75 mm guns had
never been fired
• Some men were wearing tennis shoes because of a lack of boots
• ¼ of the small arms were defective

11. Training
• Occupation duties take precedence over training
• No unit training above the company level had
taken place in Eighth Army before April 1949
• Limited maneuver area and an annual
personnel turnover rate of 43% impeded training
• The four divisions were rated as 65% to 84%
combat ready
– Some senior officers felt that 40% was more
realistic

12. Pusan Perimeter:
27 June to 15 Sept
• The American forces were
unprepared for the North
Korean attack.
• By the end of July, the
North Koreans had pushed
the U.N. forces to the
southeast corner of the
peninsula, where they dug
in around the port of
Pusan.

13. Inchon (Operation Chromite)
15 Sept
• MacArthur completely changed
the course of the war overnight
by ordering -- over nearly
unanimous objections -- an
amphibious invasion at the port
of Inchon, near Seoul.
• The Americans quickly gained
control of Inchon, recaptured
Seoul within days, and cut the
North Korean supply lines.
• American and ROK forces
broke out of the Pusan
Perimeter and chased the
retreating enemy north.

14. Inchon and Principles of War
• Surprise
– Inchon was an unlikely landing site because of strong
tides and mud flats
• Maneuver
– Amphibious turning movement
• Offensive
– Had to do something to reverse Pusan situation and
gain the initiative
• Objective
– Landing at Inchon facilitated capture of Seoul; both the
South Korean capital and the site of important road and
railroad intersections

15. Facets of Operational Art
• Synergy
• Simultaneity and depth
• Anticipation
• Balance
• Leverage
• Timing and tempo
• Operational reach and approach

16. Facets of Operational Art (cont)
• Forces and functions
• Arranging operations
• Centers of gravity
• Direct versus indirect
• Decisive points
• Culmination
• Termination

17. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Operational reach and approach
– The distance over which military power can
mass effects and be employed decisively.
– As the North Koreans moved south, they
overextended their lines of communication.
– Conversely, shorter American lines of
communication allowed the strengthening of
the Pusan perimeter.

18. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Culmination
– The point in time and space at which an attacker’s
combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender
– Because of operational reach, by 23 August, numerical
parity between the two forces north of Pusan was
surpassed in favor of the Americans
– The NKPA had reached its culminating point while
Eighth Army was getting stronger.

19. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Direct versus indirect
– Where direct attack means attacking into an opponents
strength, commanders should seek an indirect approach.
– MacArthur’s concept was to “rely upon strategic
maneuver to overcome the great odds against me…
[T]he alternative is a frontal attack which can only
result in a protracted and expensive campaign.”
– Amphibious turning movement

20. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Center of gravity
– Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power
from which a military force derives its freedom of
action, physical strength, or will to fight.
– If the enemy CoG was the North Korean People’s
Army, how did Operation Chromite succeed when it
took place some 140 miles north of the main NPKA
forces?
• By focusing on a critical vulnerability, the enemy
lines of communication

21. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Decisive points
– A point, if retained, that provides a commander
with a marked advantage over his opponent.
– Seoul was decisive both for its symbolic value
as the capital and as the most critical node in
the supply line of the enemy attack.

22. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Simultaneity and depth
– The simultaneous application of power against
key adversary capabilities and sources of
strength.
– Air Force, Navy, and Marine Air struck targets
ranging from the enemy’s strategic marshalling
areas to tactical forces
– Included both the amphibious turning
movement and the breakout from Pusan

23. Inchon and Selected Facets of
Operational Art
• Termination
– Knowing when to terminate military operations
and how to preserve achieved advantages.
– Success leads MacArthur to continue attack
into North Korea; a strategic miscalculation that
ultimately leads to his relief.

24. Integration
• On 26 June 1948, Truman signs an
executive order calling for the equal
treatment and opportunity of blacks in the
military
• The Army initially moved slowly to follow
this order, but military necessity brought on
by the Korean War accelerated the process
– By 1952 integration was a fate accompli in the
Far East Command

25. Segregated Units

26. Integrated Units

27. Results
• The Army’s integration was “the great
victory of the Korean War”
– The Compact History of the Korean War,
Middleton, 1965, p. 90.
• “Jim Crow died on the hills of Korea”
– A Short History of the Korean War,
Stokesbury, 1988, p. 232

28. Review
• What were the training, personnel, and equipment
readiness problems with Task Force Smith and the
post-WW II Army in general?
• How has the Army corrected these?
• Describe Inchon in terms of the principals of war
of surprise, offensive, maneuver, and objective.
• What were the broader social implications of the
Army’s integration policy?

29. Homework
• Read Doughty, 613-631